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India and Middle East

2009-11-25T15:47:00.000-08:00

India Should focus on the Middle East

New Indian Express, 26 November 2009

Despite less popular nomenclature, the Middle East developments have more far-reaching implications for India than commonly recognised. The region normally is noticed for all wrong reasons or only for wrong reasons; terrorism in Israel, Iraq and Algeria; Islamic upsurges in Egypt, Yemen; threats emanating from the Somali pirates to oil supplies from the Persian Gulf; political instability in Lebanon; or the nagging and seemingly endless nuclear controversy over Iran. Occasionally elections get attention in the Indian media.

Yes, the Middle East has its share of problems but it also offers a number of challenges and opportunities. Since the end of the Cold War the world has become complex and New Delhi is still learning to maintain close and friendly ties with countries, which are at competition, if not war, with one another. This is especially true for the Middle East.

No country would be able to remain indifferent to the impending fallout of the eventual American withdrawal from Iraq. Likewise, New Delhi would not be able to pursue closer ties with Tehran without worrying about the US factor. Its newly found bonhomie with Israel would have to factor in the cold winds from Cairo. Its overall energy security calculations would have to consider the growing Chinese presence and competition in the oil-rich Gulf region. It is no accident that Iran has been using the China angle to force India’s hands on the never-ending negotiations over the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Its closer military ties with the Jewish state have a bearing on India’s ties with as diverse a group as Egypt, Iran, Palestinians and of late Turkey.

Besides the geographic proximity and long political interactions, the region is important for a host of reasons. First, the Middle East is India’s prime trading partner. In 2007-08, it accounted for nearly 25 per cent of India’s total trade. Exports to this region stood at over $30 billion while imports stood at close to $72 billion. While the ongoing recession reduced the quantum of trade, the Middle East’s share in India’s overall foreign trade is unlikely to dwindle.

Second, a better picture of the region emerges in the energy sector. The region accounts of bulk of energy imports. Out of the $86 billion energy imports in 2007-08, as much as $58.8 billion came from the hydrocarbon-rich Middle East, with the Gulf region accounting for the lion’s share. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and UAE meet bulk of India’s energy needs. As India’s energy import dependency is expected to reach close to 90 per cent by 2025, the importance of the Middle East will only increase in the coming years.

Third, one need not overemphasise the role played by the expatriate population. Currently there are over four million Indian labourers in the Gulf and even without the hawala channel they contribute substantially to their families back home as well as to the Indian economy.

Fourth, Islam plays an important role in India’s ties with the Middle East. Even though most of the global Muslim population lives outside the region, the Middle East has become synonymous with the term ‘Islamic world’. The latest report by the Washington-based Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life identifies India as having the third largest community of Muslims after Indonesia and Pakistan. Any upheavals and progress in the Middle East naturally reverberates worldwide. If al-Qaeda has negative implications, the inter-faith dialogues pursued by Qatar and Saudi Arabia for example highlight the growing awareness in the region for better and nuanced understanding of one another. The Middle East mainstream is still moderate and needs to be befriended and encouraged.

Despite these factors, the Middle East does not figure adequately in India’s foreign policy agenda. The high-profiled visit by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia during the Republic Day celebrations in 2006, for example, was not followed up adequately. The reciprocal visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Riyadh is plagued by delays. There is also pending invitations from Israel, Iran and other countries of the region. Singh’s visit to Egypt earlier this year, which subsequently became controversial due to the Sharm el-Sheikh statement, was not a state visit as he was attending the Non-Aligned Summit hosted by President Hosni Mubarak.

The South Asian countries are becoming vital primarily because of the negative consequences. As we have seen, domestic instability and violence in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka often spill over into India. The Middle East on the contrary offers a number of incentives, opportunities and challenges.

Let there be no mistake. India’s great power aspirations will be tested in the Middle East. In the coming years, much of the great power rivalry involving the US, Russia, China and Japan will be fought over this region and its energy resources. The region will inevitably figure in India’s simmering discontent with the Obama administration over issues such as non-proliferation. The real implications of its energy cooperation or potential competition with China will be tested in the Gulf region. The maturity of its foreign policy establishment will be measured by how it handles the India-Israel-Iran and India-Iran-US triangles.

The time has thus come for a serious, nuanced and non-partisan understanding of the Middle East and its complexities. Erstwhile platitudes, historic bonhomie and civilisational rhetoric are important but would be insufficient to handle present dynamics and future challenges. The Middle East Institute @ New Delhi is a small step in this direction.

(The author teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University and is the honorary director of the Middle East Institute @ New Delhi. This commentary is published in partnership with www.mei.org.in)

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For Qatar, Small is also Effective

2009-09-20T04:16:00.000-07:00

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ISLAMIC STUDIES (Pretoria)
OCCASIONAL PAPER, 23/2009

FOR QATAR, SMALL IS ALSO EFFECTIVE

While bigger players squander their goodwill and fortune, the small Emirate is slowly emerging as a diplomatic powerhouse in the Middle East. The conduct of Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani in lending his weight to burning issues is a sign of emerging Qatari diplomatic acumen, even while others have burnt their fingers in similar diplomatic ventures. It has become obvious, given President Hosni Mubarak’s ineffective unity talks between Fatah and Hamas, that Egypt has lost its leadership role in the Middle East peace process.

Fortune, however, favors Qatar. In May 2008, the Emir Khalifa brought the warring Lebanese factions to Doha and facilitated a marathon discussion between the pro- and anti-Syrian factions. The Emir stepped in after other influences within the region and the historical links of the French proved insufficient to bridge the gap between the factions. On a few occasions Amr Moussa, the Secretary General of the Arab League, announced an impending settlement only to flounder. Qatar did not have any such pretentions. The warring Lebanese factions left the Emirate with the Doha Accord that ended the political boycott by the Hezbollah-led opposition and, eventually, paved the way for the parliamentary elections held on 7 June 2009. With Saad Hariri abandoning his efforts to form a unity coalition, one should not be surprised at Emir Khalifa’s re-entry onto the Lebanese political scene.

Likewise, when the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had problems with Hamas and its activities within the country, Qatar stepped in. The deportation of Khalid Mashaal and his colleagues to Doha in November 1999 resolved an impending showdown between the Islamic militants and the Hashemites. The move also enjoyed the tacit backing of Israel, which was at ease with a ‘friendly’ monarch watching over the ‘outside’ leadership of Hamas. The importance of Qatar in regional developments was given a boost in September 2008, when the Syrian president convinced the Arab League to appeal to Qatar to sponsor negotiations between the Darfur rebels and the Sudanese government. Although progress has been minimal, the development highlights the growing diplomatic reach of Qatar.

As part of an effort to cleanse the negative image in the region following the 11 September attacks, Qatar has also taken the lead in initiating and hosting inter-faith dialogue among the Semitic religions, which often involves Jewish religious figures. Doha has also hosted a number of Israeli officials, leaders and commentators.

What makes Qatar acceptable to both sides of the political divide; Israel and Hamas, Hezbollah and Hariri and Iran and the US?

One can look at three possible explanations. One: unlike other regional players, Doha does not have historical baggage, nor does it have any illusions about its regional influence. Although wealthier, it does not resort to chequebook diplomacy to gloss over deep political differences. Above all, it does not have pretentions of being a regional player. Not pressurised to deliver, Qatar is more effective than others.

Second, Qatar maintains open channels of communication with all the major players in the region, a fundamental pre-condition for any mediatory efforts. It has close ties with Syria and, unlike other Arab powers, did not boycott the March 2008 Arab summit in Damascus. This move proved helpful when the Emir sought to mediate between the Syrian-backed Hezbollah and the US-backed Hariri factions. The tension between Riyadh and Damascus, both before and after the Damascus summit, diluted the Saudi ability to resolve the Lebanese stalemate. The same fate awaited Egypt after Mubarak chose to skip Damascus.

Three, in pursuing foreign policy options, Khalifa is not always guided by American preferences and dictates. For example, American displeasure did not prevent him from dealing with Iran. His disagreement with the prevailing international consensus over the nuclear row was exhibited in July 2006: when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 that called on Tehran to suspend uranium enrichment, Qatar was the only member to vote against the resolution. Similarly, open communication with Tehran was accompanied by Qatar maintaining a low-level Israeli mission that had been briefly closed following Iranian pressures just days before the Emir hosted the Ninth OIC summit in November 2000.

In short, low profile activities, lesser expectations and, above all, the maintenance of closer ties with all the warring sides has enabled Qatar to play a role far bigger than its size and economic influence would suggest. Small is not only beautiful but, in the case of Qatar, it is also effective.

Israel-Iran

2009-08-10T15:34:00.000-07:00

A hostility affecting the region

The New Indian Express, 11 August 2009,

While their leaders warn of an impending global catastrophe if Iran goes nuclear, the Israeli public is taking a more sanguine view. An opinion poll by Tel Aviv University finds that over 80 per cent feel their personal lives ‘would not be expected to change’ if Iran developed nuclear weapons. Should this enable us to look for an understanding between the Jewish State of Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran?

With the war of words flying in both directions, such an entente is almost unthinkable. Since he became president in 2005 Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has functioned as if the destruction of Israel is the raison d’être of Iran. He has denied, denounced and belittled the Holocaust in which Jews were slaughtered by the Nazi regime. Organising Holocaust denial events has become his pastime. His quixotic fights with history shames many Iranians. His controversial re-election can only worsen the situation.

Moreover, every now and then Iran announces the successful test firing of missiles. Each test is deadlier than the last and the latest in mid-May was for a missile with an estimated range of 1,200 miles. This not only brings Israel but also southern Europe within Iran’s range.

Israel is equally obsessed with the Islamic republic. The present government blames Tehran for most of its problems with the Arabs and Palestinians. Iranian support for militant groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas clouds Israel’s ability to examine the root causes of the prolonged Arab-Israeli conflict. Today, Iran’s nuclear ambitions are Israel’s top foreign policy priority. The recent meeting between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Barrack Obama confirms this. Obama was keen to push the two-state solution, while the Likud leader wanted a firmer American commitment on Iran.

It appears that the military option is still on the Israeli table. Despite the technical difficulties and political hurdles, it has not given up the idea of attacking Iran’s nuclear programme. Netanyahu apparently told Obama that Israel would not wait indefinitely for concrete measures to prevent Iran from going nuclear.

When each side perceives the other as the mortal enemy, can one visualise reconciliation? At first glance, such a suggestion would be dismissed as wishful thinking.

Let’s take a second look. Israel and Iran are the only two countries in the greater Middle East that could be classified as regional powers. No one can deny that their policies, actions and rhetoric often have had seismic effects. For better or worse, many countries in the region fear their actions as well as rhetoric.

The other countries are no match for these two. Petro-power and Islamic credentials have not transformed Saudi Arabia into an effective regional power. Likewise, the political aspirations of Egypt are not commensurate with its diplomatic accomplishments. Of late, Cairo has been less effective even on the Palestinian front.

Should a resurgent and perhaps nuclear Iran bring Arab countries closer to Israel? Theoretically yes. Shared security concerns, especially over pro-Iranian militant groups, should bring the Arabs closer to Israel. But this will not happen before a comprehensive peace in the region. The cold peace between Egypt and Israel is between states, not people. The Arab street is not ready for reconciliation with Israel, at least not before Palestinian political aspirations are met. And the Netanyahu government is not ready for a two-state solution. Hence private understanding over Iran is the maximum that Israel can expect from the Arab regimes.

Moreover, for Israel as well as Iran, Washington remains an enigma. Can Obama convert high expectations into concrete policies and tangible results? Will his Iran policy satisfy Israel as well as Iran? Squaring the Israel-Iran-US triangle is easier said than done. The historical baggage and complexities are overwhelming. Thus, the Obama administration is more likely to disappoint than satisfy expectations on both sides.

As a result, Israel and Iran need to plan for an alternate contingency, one that recognises their mutual concerns as well as possible failure of Obama’s Middle East policy. Of late, spearheaded by Cairo, a number of Arab countries are arguing that the nuclear capabilities of Iran as well as Israel are a threat to the region, especially Arabs. Under Amr Moussa the Arab League is not prepared to de-link Iran from Israel’s nuclear capabilities.

These concerns should enable Israel and Iran to re-examine their hostility towards each other. There is a greater convergence of interest between the two than is recognised. One is not suggesting a modern-day Sykes-Picot arrangement where Iran and Israel divide the Middle East into spheres of influence. Even if they dream, neither Iran nor Israel has the imperial wherewithal for such overreach.

Nor can they go back to the days of the Shah when both countries pursued David Ben-Gurion’s policy of peripheral diplomacy. Driven by their mutual concerns over the increasingly revolutionising Arab world, one found the other as an ally. This strategy and their pro-western orientation worked in tandem until the Islamic revolution. Times have changed and Israel is no longer as isolated as it was during the Cold War. It has some friends and more clandestine allies in the Arab world.

Thus, the US-USSR behaviour during the later part of the Cold War offers an interesting model for Israel and Iran. Their mutual animosity did not diminish, public rhetoric against the other continued and each one scrambled for allies in the other’s backyard. This however, did not prevent the US and USSR from reaching broad understanding on critical matters. Israel and Iran are too small to divide the region among themselves, but could reach some broad understanding on issues that affect and undermine their security. It calls for chutzpah, perhaps; but are we not discussing the Middle East?

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Diary Beijing

2009-07-23T16:49:00.000-07:00

The New Indian Express, 24 July 2009

Moody machines at airport
It is often impossible to figure out what can ‘pass’ at the security checks. Obviously different countries have different standards. I confronted another problem and the same equipment had its preferences. For my Chinese friends who are fond of Indian food, I carried some species in the carryon baggage, our only luggage during the trip. While packing I did not think carefully and spread them in both bags. One bag with all spices went off smoothly and the other one did not. The machine discovered some ‘banned’ substance and we had to empty it. The security person wont allow us carry the species that had chillies and a larger bottle of cream. We quietly dropped them at the dustbin. Although disappointed, I could not ignore the irony. What happened to the same ‘banned items’ in my other carryon bag that went undetected? Not just the personnel, even the equipment is getting moody?

Airport barometer
The flow of passengers at the airport is an interesting indicator for measuring the economy of the country. While hotel occupancy might tell a different story, the size of the passenger flow shows the trend. This is more valid in countries such as Egypt and Turkey, which relies heavily upon the tourists for economy. Recent political tension over the Gaza war, for example, has adversely affected the flow of Israeli tourists to both these countries. The economic crisis is manifests in many European airports. A few years ago, SARS played havoc when international tourism to China dropped dramatically. The initial impression of the Beijing airport is interesting. Not only were there planeloads of people, there were more foreigners than Chinese. Of course, there were a number of Chinese speakers; the family behind me was Canadian whose kids were trying to read the signs in Chinese. There were far more counters for foreigners but still the non-Chinese queues were longer than the native ones. Perhaps it is a sign that weakening of the dollar has not dampened tourism to China.

Emulate China?
One of the first things one reads in the Chinese media was the report that the government officials in the southern province of Guangdong, often described as an ‘economic powerhouse’ of South China, should disclose all their personal belongings to the public. Through this measure the provincial government hopes to increase transparency among the public, which have become sceptical and disgusted over corruption in high places. Can’t help wonder if those aspiring to emulate China, both on the Left and on the Right in India, would demand our bureaucrats to disclose their personal as well as family belongings?

Ticketless travel
When you board a bus in Beijing a few things are striking. Most public buses are air-conditioned; senior citizens travel free while most young people have monthly tickets. The occasional travellers and tourists are the only ones who need a ticket. Like the West, the buses only have drivers who also double as conductors. But there is a big difference. You drop the money in a box next to the driver and move towards the back. Neither he nor the machine dispenses any ticket. The reason? Passengers discard small tickets in the streets and add to garbage and dirt in the streets. Hence the bus system has dispensed with tickets. So, literally you travel ticketless in Beijing. At the same time, the city is yet to find a way-out for the challenge posed by its smoking population. It is not uncommon to find burned out cigarette buds not just in street corners but also along the major roads.

Crossing chaos
For a country that prides itself on order and discipline, crossing the roads is a nightmare in Beijing. The traffic lights are heavily loaded against the pedestrian who get only a few seconds to cross the broad, normally six lanes, roads. Both young and old could not make it to the other side without being harassed by the vehicles that use the free right option. Special lanes for bicycles only make matters worse.

Lonely at the Wall
The Great Wall literally caters to different tastes. First time visitors prefer the popular tourist site at Badaling which is also the most developed and easily accessible. Naturalists prefer Mutianyu section with its lush green surrounding. This time around we opted for the undeveloped Ba Dao Kou section that demands trekking along the woods. Most sections of the Wall are dilapidated, could not find a single complete step and at times the Wall was literally unstable. It is impossible to pass beyond a few hundred metres that too with great difficulty. But once on top, the whole surrounding area is breathtaking. What more, we four were the only ones on the Wall as much as our eyes could see.

Astronauts on ground
That was how they looked. With only their eyes visible, that too behind goggles, they were completely covered in white protective clothing. Why did our plane skip the aerobridge in the new Beijing Capital International Airport? The Chinese officials are not satisfied with the passengers’ declaration that they have no signs of Swine Flu. A medical team boarded the plane and focusing their hand-held pistol-like equipment towards the forehead, they measured the body temperature of about 300 passengers. It took less than 15 minutes. Their efforts were not futile as a Chinese passenger had some symptoms and was quickly taken away in the waiting ambulance.

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India-Israel friendship

2009-07-21T17:29:00.000-07:00

The Singapore-based Middle East Institute just carried my short paper on The Friendship With Israel: India Squares the Circle. If interested you can find the full text click here

Tamils in Sri Lanka

2009-06-17T18:42:00.000-07:00

The Problem is ethnic, not just Tamil

The New Indian Express, Chennai, 18 June 2009

ONLY history can judge the true contribution of Vellupillai Prabhakaran to the Tamil cause in Sri Lanka. Has he put the problems of the ethnic minority on the world map a la Yasser Arafat or squandered the opportunity by wanton disregard for human lives? Such an assessment would be made not only by his followers, supporters and sympathisers but also by the wider international community, Tamils and non-Tamils alike. One thing is for sure. The Tamil problem as it is defined for the past three decades will not be the same. To be effective it has to be viewed, understood and above all presented differently. Packaging, if you prefer.

First and foremost, the Tamils of Sri Lanka need to re-examine their reliance upon Tamils across the Palk Strait. When push comes to shove, they were let down. Not by the larger Indian state as some would like to believe but by the leaders of Tamil Nadu. Chief minister M Karunanidhi personifies this trend. A few days after LTTE accepted the death of its leaders, he urged Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to treat Sri Lanka ‘as a special case’ where non-interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign country could not be applied. This was only after he concluded cabinet deals for his family.

Others are no better. During the election campaign how many buried their past and took refuge under Eelam agenda? All were prepared to ‘sacrifice’ their lives but not their hunger for power. Both DMK and AIADMK leaders used NSA against pro-LTTE leaders because it served their interests. Thus any emerging Lankan leadership from the present trauma would have to take a hardnosed approach to the track record of Tamil politicians in India, their politicking and their limitations. It is time they buried the notion that the Tamils across the Strait could provide deliverance.

Second, the inglorious defeat of Vaiko sends a strong message. The Lankan problem is an important emotional issue for the people of Tamil Nadu but it is not a critical issue. At the end of the day, it is battle in another state. It is time, the Lankan Tamils recognised this. A greater Tamil nation is a cultural identity that encompasses Tamils living in different parts of the world. Making them into a political nation is vastly different.

Let’s say that the Tamil Nadu government reintroduces the entertainment tax with the purpose of transferring that revenue towards the welfare of the Lankan Tamils. Will Kollywood organise a welcome rally? One per cent VAT for the same purpose would evoke public outcry. Will the youth who were in the forefront of many pro-Eelam agitations accept a ten rupee increase in the monthly bus passes? In short the leaders have conditioned the population into symbolism and rhetoric and forgotten the core issues. They are primarily concerned with the electoral gains to be made and play up the Sri Lankan problem.

Three, there has to be introspection. The LTTE failed not because of its military weakness or lack of support but primarily due to its short-sighted approach towards the struggle. If Prabhakaran failed to put the Tamil problem on the world map like Mr. Palestine, who should be blamed? Despite all the violence against Israel and its civilian population, under Arafat the Palestinian national movement strived for internal unity. The emergence of Hamas indicated his failure but Arafat bribed, cajoled, reasoned, blackmailed and at times intimidated his opponents and rivals. Physical elimination of rival factions was not his style.

Let’s admit. The LTTE chief was Arafat’s antithesis. How many Tamil political personalities, leaders and civilians populations were literally eliminated by the LTTE? Those who disagreed became traitors and were eliminated. New leadership would have to come to terms with black phase, own up and unequivocally distance itself. Likewise, before denouncing the Lankan government for targeting civilians, Tamil groups must admit that they were no better. In the name of fighting for the Tamil cause how many civilians, Tamils and Sinhalese alike, were killed by LTTE and various other groups. Every single civilian life is sacrosanct.

Finally, the problem needs to be redefined. It is not a just Tamil problem but a larger problem of majority intolerance. While the Tamil diaspora would continue to be a major source of support, the problem has to be taken to a higher level. Sri Lanka says it is a democracy, so let’s judge it by democratic standards. Are there laws and norms to reflect this democratic commitment? What is the number of Tamils in the bureaucracy, military, educational institutions, student communities and other sectors? Not poster boys but substantial representation. Does the judiciary uphold social justice or ratify state-sponsored discrimination? Sri Lanka relies heavily on international aid, assistance and cooperation and is vulnerable. China can step in and compensate Indian refusal for military supplies but Colombo needs the wider world which is more sensitive to minority issues.

Such an approach will also enable non-Tamil Indians to see the Sri Lankan problem differently. By playing up the Tamil card, the problem became parochial and narrow. Today it is Tamils of Lanka and tomorrow it can be another minority in another country.

It is an ethnic problem and not a Tamil problem. By expanding the scope, the Tamils of Sri Lanka will acquire more and genuine friends. Will the phoenix emerge from the ashes?

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Close encounter

2009-05-26T20:32:00.000-07:00

A loss not that significant

The New Indian Express, Chennai, 26 May 2009

Many of them lost their families, property, nationality, identity and dreams. Simply put everything they had or aspired for. I only lost a few photos. Not my life, passport, money or not even my camera. The person only took off the memory chip but returned my camera. I lost a few pictures took earlier in the day. What I lost can be replaced with a few euros.

But what was my crime? I took some picture of the Sri Lankan Tamils who were protesting in lush green lawn in front the headquarters of Air France along the Esplanade des Invalides in Paris.

As I was walking from the Home des Invalides a group of protestors caught my attention. When I got closer, I recognised that about hundred Tamils were protesting against the Sri Lankan government. Through their slogans in French, they were drawing the attention of the international community. There were a number of horrific pictures that reminded the passers-by of the brutality of the conflict back home. Only the previous day the Lankan government had announced that LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran has been killed. Were the protesters mourning his death or they were merely protesting the atrocities? No clue.

I took a few snaps. Then I noticed a poster of Mahatma Gandhi on the lamppost. The Mahatma was not holding his usual long walking stick but rather an inverse AK-47. I could not ignore the irony of the poster and wanted to take a picture. The black flag that was also tied to the same lamppost was fluttering and blocked the view. I wanted both Mahatma and AK-47 in one frame. This took a little more time and caught the attention of the protestors.

As I was moving away, a few young men came towards me and asked something in French. When I expressed in inability, they switched to English: “Which newspapers?” asked one. “Where are you from” another followed. The third one came to the point, “Why were you taking photos. “Others joined in the chorus. I said it is a public place and hence. Then one of them asked me to show the pictures. When I did, he snatched the camera. “I will delete the pictures, if you want” I struggled. Meanwhile someone was saying, ‘Passport, passport, Take it.” The shorter one who snatched my camera was more daring. In a fraction of second took he off the memory card and returned the camera and said: “Now, you can go.”

All this happened in under a minute and right in the heart of Paris and in the middle of the day. Scores of people were walking all over the place. Since others surrounded me, none could have noticed what was happening there. I was not the only one who was taking pictures of the protestors. The protest was held only to highlight the plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and hence taking pictures should not be an offence, let alone a violation of privacy.

The LTTE flag in the lawn clearly indicated that the protestors were sympathisers of the Tigers. Why were young men afraid of me taking photos of a public demonstration in a western capital? Maybe not all the protesters were refugees. Perhaps there were some cadre or potential cadre among them and that they would not like to be captured in camera. I have no idea.

But what happened to scores of others, mostly white tourists who were guilty of the same crime. I was the only tourist with sub-continent features in the area and so it was easier for them to bounce me and take away the photos. Wish those young men had the same courage towards white tourists who were clicking at the protest, both before and after I was intimidated. Perhaps skin colour sets limits to bravado.

Unable to decide the next move, I walked ahead and sat on a bench on the other side of the river and looked back at had happened. Not a pleasant thing but I could have lost much more. I decided to walk back along the same route. To avoid further unpleasantness I opted for the other side of the broad road. As I was passing-by, the few men who took away my picture moments ago were staring at me from the other side. I looked back at them.

A lone police car was nearby and I passed on quietly.

But for my own sake and inner peace, I needed to go there. So the next I was there and took pictures that I could not do the previous day. The day was bright and sunny, and the scene was much better and the golden statures atop the pillars across the Seine River were glittering under the sun.

That day also there was a demonstration but on a smaller scale. Maybe I went a little earlier. From afar I noticed many tourists who were taking pictures of the protest. But this time I decided to keep a safe distance and walked a street parallel to the main road. Of course no photos also. Why the same mistake twice?

Photos I took the previous day were for my personal use. Except for one or two close friends. Who has the interest let alone patience to look at amateurish pictures of exotic Paris? They would have remained in my hard disc only to be forgotten soon. Thanks to the lost memory card, the missing pictures are carved in stone. I gained more than I lost. I don’t have the photo but what I saw will go with me to my grave: Mahatma Gandhi holding an AK-47 in the heat of Paris.

For web link click here

Paris Diary

2009-05-22T20:43:00.000-07:00

Diary Paris

The New Indian Express, Chennai, 22 May 2009

Not a single white hawker

Sunday morning. Weather was a bit cold and occasionally drizzling. Many locals and foreigners already queued up below the Eiffel Tower. As with any other tourist sites, scores of vendors were selling or trying to sell souvenirs. With most costing just a euro, how many they will sell or make at the end of the day? One thing was striking. There were Africans, Arabs, South Asians, East Europeans or anyone one can possibly think of. In two hours of wandering there I did not find a single white hawker at the Tower.

Why be different
Jay walking. Both French and tourists are in perfect harmony in jay walking. Right in the heart of the city hordes of people are crisscrossing the busy streets while traffic signals warn them not to. They have stretched pedestrians first to new heights. After waiting at a couple of crossings, I quietly decided to join the main stream. Who likes to declare oneself to be an outsider?

Clouds of smoke
The Parisians are fond of smoking and most restaurants have no restrictions on smoking. Like many other western capitals that have tough anti-smoking laws, front gates of multi-story buildings are occupied by people hanging for a quick dose of nicotine. But the departure lounge at the Charles de Gaulle airport takes the cake. Denied of smoking inside, both those who arrived and cab drivers who were there to pick up passengers converted the open area into a smoking zone. With heavy clouds hanging over the airport, passive smoking was unavoidable.

Cafés aplenty
Eating out is of the Parisian culture, leisure or even lifestyle. Cafés at the street corners spread out dozens of rattan chairs and entice customers. Sipping a drink and watching the moving crowd is not just relaxing but gives you a peep into daily Parisian life. Unfortunately the weather decided to conspire against me and I had to settle for sit down service at enclosed cafés.

Graffiti landscape
Perhaps they are the signs of the riots that rocked Paris in late 2005. Or the new landscape in western capitals. Paris also has its share of graffiti. They are not confined to underground or rundown downtowns. A few pickup vans were painted in graffiti not just in French but also English, Russian and even Arabic. A beautiful glass door of designer apparel was not spared either. Another Rolex showroom reflected this. It had price tags of over two-dozen latest watches but not one was on display. Another graffiti along the scenic Seine River claimed: Israel criminel. As I was taking a picture a bus passed by. A travel company was aggressively selling package tours to Tel Aviv at €299.

Well-fed pigeons
If the healthy, well-fed and big pigeons at the Norte Dame Church are an indication, recession has not touched Paris. Cafés are full; long queues in the two nearby movie multiplexes; malls are open, though not many customers; major designers have not shut shops, at least not in the heart of Paris. Tourist sites are full of people. They speak all languages one can possibly recognise. Thanks to Nicholas Sarkozy and his charm offensive, Americans appeared to have stormed Paris and you see, hear them and smile at them all over. There are no empty buildings at the heart of Paris. Compare this with Washington. There are many ‘Available for Rent’ displays just a few blocks from the White House. But everything in Paris is not rosy. There are a few immigrants scavenging for leftover food in dustbins. An odd family, with their entire wealth, one unwieldy torn suitcase and a couple of large polythene bags, was resting on a bench; just a few yards from the Eiffel. The most breathtaking scene next to harsh realities of life.

The Indian connection
Paris without politics? Those clamouring for the Indo-Pakistan friendship would be delighted to find many Restaurant Indien Pakistanis. I was happy that at last somewhere people were less bothered about politics. This was until my French friend let out the business secret. All are run by Pakistanis but they needed to add India to attract customers. There were a few Tamil shops along the way, selling the DVDs of the latest blockbuster Ayan. My friend informed me that Tamil community in Paris is largely from Lanka and not to be confused with Indian Tamils. As I passed through a dozen of Tamils were holding a protest vigil at one of the crossing. This was a couple of days before the Sri Lankan government announced the death of LTTE chief Prabhakaran and none could have missed the prominent LTTE flag.

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Pope visit

2009-05-18T20:38:00.000-07:00

Pope's visit upsets more than it pleases

The New Indian Express, Chennai, 18 May 2009

A missed opportunity. That was how the otherwise sober Left-leaning Israeli daily Ha’aretz depicted Pope Benedict XVI’s speech at Yad Vashem, the Holocaust memorial in Jerusalem. It found fault with the pontiff for not uttering sorry for what had happened in Europe six decades ago. For centuries the relations between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people were tense at best. The role played by the Vatican during the World War II continues to cloud the relations between the two. Many have accused Pope Pius XII of turning a blind eye towards the Holocaust.

There is also some personal grudge against Pope Benedict. His alleged membership in Hitler Youth was raised even before Joseph Ratzinger was elevated to the papacy in April 2005. His recent decision to reinstate a Holocaust denier as bishop only made matters worse. Indeed some media commentators in Israel were fond of referring to the pope by his previous name than as Pope Benedict. Thus many were expecting that the pope would express a formal remorse, both officially and personally.

For its part, Israel was keen that recent tensions in the region would not impede the pontiff from visiting the region. Against the background of international criticisms and condemnation over the recent Gaza war, Israel needed this visit and positive media coverage. The unchartered waters with the new Obama administration in the US meant that Israel needed some positive equation with the pope.

However as the Israeli daily editorially lamented: ‘The thorough preparations for his visit to Israel, the complex traffic and security arrangements, and the millions of shekels that were earmarked for his hospitality, evaporated as if they did not exist thanks to a speech that was missing one word — sorry’.

Many Palestinian Christians were angry over the exclusion of Gaza from the itinerary of the pope. Such a visit would have shown Vatican’s sympathy and support for the people who underwent one of the traumatic periods in their history. With much of the Gaza Strip still in ruins, the papal visit would have sent a powerful political message to the international community and reminded them of the plight of the Palestinians.

Precisely for the same reasons, the pope avoided not only the Gaza Strip but also Ramallah. Going there without laying a wreath at the mausoleum of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat would have been politically untenable. But doing so would be equally controversial. Hence, the Pope’s meeting with President Mahmoud Abbas was fixed at the Presidential Palace in Bethlehem. Likewise, he met Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not in Jerusalem but in the Franciscan convent of Nazareth.

Since both parties claim Jerusalem to be their capitals, the pope avoided meeting both the prime ministers in the City of Peace. The Vatican is perhaps sending a subtle message to both the contenders: Don’t count us out.

Politics however is inevitable. The more the pope tried to make his trip a ‘Pilgrimage to the Holy Land’ the more it becomes political. The inter-faith dialogue at the Notre Dame Centre is a classic example. Sheikh Taysir al-Tamimi, head of the Palestinian Sharia Court used the occasion to list out ‘the crimes of the Jewish State’ and of ‘slaughtering’ women, children and the elderly. Only a moment earlier, the pontiff pleaded the followers of the three religions: “Can we then make spaces — oases of peace and profound reflection — where god’s voice can be heard anew, where his truth can be discovered within the universality of reason, where every individual, regardless of dwelling, or ethnic group, or political hue, or religious belief, can be respected as a person, as a fellow human being?” However, al-Tamimi’s remarks resulted in the pope walking out of the meeting.

The prolonged Jordanian-Palestinian tussle took a religious turn during the pontiff’s visit to the Kingdom before he arrived in Jerusalem. The pope blessed the foundation laying ceremony for Latin and Greek Melkite Churches at Bethany, beyond River Jordan. According to Christian theology, this is where John the Baptist baptised Jesus Christ and preached.

The pope’s visit to Bethany is seen by many as recognition of Jordanian claims to the true site of baptism and thereby undermining long-held Palestinian claim that baptism took place at Qasr al Yahud in the West Bank. Indeed during his visit to the region in 2000 the previous pope addressed a mass in Bethany but settled for a brief stopover at the Palestinian site. This time around, al-Yahud did not figure in the pope’s itinerary.

Even the Jordanian leg was not without problems. Some Muslim leaders were unhappy over the pope’s earlier remarks in 2006 when he quoted a medieval text that depicted some of Prophet Mohammed’s teachings as ‘evil and inhuman’ especially, the Prophet’s ‘command to spread by the sword the faith.’

Even the Catholics have their own problems with the pope though they are rarely aired in public. The Christians are a vanishing tribe in the Middle East. Demographically they are a minority in towns such as Bethlehem and Nazareth. In the past many have lamented that only Christmas brings cheers and Christians to Bethlehem.

The Arab-Israeli conflict has adversely affected the Christians in Israel and in the Palestinian areas. The Christian Arabs in Israel are only marginally better off than their Muslim counterparts. Over the years, Christians have vanished from many small villages in Israel. The classic example is Abu Ghosh, a small Arab town at the outskirts of Jerusalem; is has a historic church dating back to the Crusader period but no Christian community, except the priest and nuns.

Known for his theological background, Pope Benedict is not aware of the problems of the faithful. Like many of his predecessors, he has to navigate rather carefully. Openly exhibiting his concerns over would only cause more problems for the followers.

Thus different religious groups and communities viewed the papal visit differently. In a region accustomed to zero-sum approach to politics, even a religious pilgrimage ends up being a political contest between different faiths. Thus long after the pope returns to Vatican, the parties would continue to argue over their respective gains and losses.

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Elections 2009

2009-05-10T19:29:00.000-07:00

The Excitement of Voting for the first time in 47 years,

The New Indian Express, (Chennai), 11 May 2009, Monday

FIRST time voter at 47? Not a pleasant thought, one must confess. Is there an escape from harsh facts? This is despite my political baptism following a cautious warning from my mother.

Only the previous night Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared internal emergency. Don’t talk politics, my mother said and woke up the political animal inside me. Since then commented on many elections and offered unsolicited political advice but never voted in the elections.

So the excitement was real. Was there at the nearby polling booth more than half an hour before voting began.

There were more security personnel than voters. Definitely no queues.

Only one political party had organised their polling agents while members of another party were just arriving when I came out the booth.

For over two decades, on the election day I was at the wrong time or wrong place. If both were right, then my chaotic planning or sheer un-preparedness kept me away. Skipped many elections, Lok Sabha as well as state Assembly elections. Both in Tamil Nadu and later in New Delhi. There was a perennial conflict of interest between the place where I am registered a voter and place of my presence on the election day.

This was in contrast to my experience in Israel. By sheer accident since July 1988 I found myself in Israel on many election days. Eagerly watched many unfolding dramas and was there in Jerusalem just a few days before Ariel Sharon was elected as prime minister in February 2001. The most memorable was the first direct election for prime minister held in May 1996. Peacefully went to bed after exit polls gave a clear edge to Labour leader Shimon Peres. When I woke up in the morning I was greeted by Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu on the TV screen. The Oslo process was buried among the ruins of the Labour party.

Over the years, one has acquired the indifference that plagues middle class Indians. They are eloquent on the virtues of democracy and its importance as the only political option for an inherently diverse Indian nation. Their theme song? Larger and more diverse than Europe the Indian survival rests on democracy. This commitment is rarely translated into concrete action. They never voted with their feet. Like many members of my tribe, I am guilty of electing bad people by not voting. Minor foresight and planning could have synchronised the seemingly endless conflict between polling date and residence. If both were right, then systemic problems of India came handy. Not finding one’s name in the voters’ list is not uncommon among many serious people.

How often one hears: My name is in my hometown. That is after living for many years in New Delhi. For them a few minutes of paperwork are a ‘waste’ of time.

With voters’ list just a click away, netizens like me, are the worst offenders.

True the system is inefficient. After searching various lists put out by the chief electoral officer of the capital, I eventually found my name. Not surprisingly it was bifurcated; Kumar Swamy and not Kumaraswamy. But it was there. The joy was boundless.

The excitement of voting was palpable and I checked out a few of friends, colleagues and long acquaintances. None have voted and most could not. Either they are out of town or their names are missing in the voters’ list. In the end my vote might not make any difference. It won’t materially affect the condition of the teeming millions. Or worse, before long I might regret my choice.

As I walked back from the polling booth, the feeling was strange but real.

A sense of lightness. Next time around when I use words such as elections, democracy or accountability, they would be less hallow than yesterday.

At least for myself.

(The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

India and Gaza crisis

2009-03-17T17:40:00.000-07:00

March 2008 issue of MERIA Journal carries a brief commentary on India's approach towards the Gaza crisis. For the full text click here.

Assertive Women of the Middle East

2009-02-11T16:47:00.000-08:00

Assertive women of the Middle East

New Indian Express (Chennai) 12 Feb 2009 03:01:00 AM IST

“REAL change within Hamas will happen only when a woman heads the militant Islamic group,” observed a young Japanese diplomat in Tokyo. In her assessment this is essential if the Palestinian leadership were to make a sober assessment of the Gaza crisis. If happens, this would be unprecedented and revolutionary, not just for the Palestinians but also for other Islamic movements in the region.

Women in the Islamic countries have generally opted to stay on the margins of politics. Besides supporting their fathers, husbands and sons in their nationalist causes, they avoided direct participation, especially from the leadership contests. The traditional conservative nature of the Islamic society and family obligations precluded their active role in the political arena.

Women however are not new to political struggles in the Middle East.

Many Palestinian women have taken up arms against Israel. During the heydays of the Fidayeen, Palestinian women were in the forefront to highlight their plight to the international community.

In August 1969, for example, Leila Khalid became the first woman hijacker when she and her colleagues commandeered a TWA plane bound for Athens from Rome. When the peacemaking became the buzzword following the Oslo process, Hanan Ashrawi became the most familiar Palestinian face for the western audience.

The onset of Hamas-led militant attacks against Israel also attracted a few women to take the path of suicide bombing. In January 2004 Reem Salah Riashi became the first woman Hamas member to carry out a suicide attack when she blew herself up at the Erez checkpoint on the Israel-Gaza border.

Wider support for such operations influenced some women of the mainstream Fatah to carry out similar operations against Israel.

Such trends can also be found in Iraq where a significant number of suicide attacks against the American forces and civilian populations were carried out by women. In November 2005 an Iraqi woman joined her husband in carrying out a deadly attack at the Radisson Hotel in Amman. While 57 persons were killed in the attack, the malfunctioning of her weapons prevented Sajida from carrying out the operation and she was arrested on the spot along with her explosive vest.

At the same time, one could also notice a different trend in the Islamic world. Women are increasingly becoming more assertive and less apolitical.

Closer home, for over two-decades the political landscape of Bangladesh has been shaped by the intense rivalry and contest between two women — Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda Zia. In similar vein Benazir Bhutto dominated the politics of Pakistan until her assassination in December 2007. Many in the West viewed the junior Bhutto as the liberal face of Islam and a possible model for other Islamic societies. Like their male counter-parts in South Asia, their political prominence and progress are closely linked to dynastic politics but their political domination has been palpable.

One could notice similar trends in the Islamic countries of the Middle East. In June 1993 Turkey elected Tansu Ciller as its first woman prime minister. Though she was forced out of power, her election marked a distinct paradigm shift in the region. If other countries did not follow the Turks, it was because democracy is not a popular political model in the Middle East.

However, there are some noticeable shifts. Queen Noor of Jordan occupied a prominent role during the later years of King Hussein’s reign. This trend is continuing. Queen Rania, the wife of King Abdullah-II, garners wider public space within Jordan and has been making a number of diplomatic visits abroad. This holds true for Asma, the British-born wife of Syrian President Basher al-Assad who had moved away from the invisible role traditionally played by the spouses of Arab leaders.

The Egyptian first lady is not far behind either. Though a generation older than her counterparts, Suzanne Mubarak has a visible and active public life. Many see her as the most powerful person after the President.

Women are making progress on the diplomatic front as well. In May last year, the ruler of Bahrain appointed Houda Nonoo as his ambassador to Washington. Besides being a woman, she is also a Jewish and her appointment was warmly received in the West.

While nominating a woman to the most important diplomat position in the country raised many eyebrows in the region, she being Jewish also signalled a radical shift in the region’s attitude towards its minority population.

Seasoned observers in the region feel that even in conservative monarchies, women are no longer mute spectators.

The women in many Arab royal families are increasingly emerging as important power centres. They are expected to play a pivotal role in future succession battles. Mawzah, the spouse of the Qatari emir, is seen as the most powerful person after the emir. The public profile of the Queen Lalla Salamah of Morocco is on the rise. Similarly the daughters of the rulers of Qatar and Morocco are even seen by some as possible successors. Republican regimes in the Middle East are equally moving forward. Aicha, the daughter of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi could be a possible contender for power.

It is safe to assume that powerful women play a critical role even in the highly conservative House of al-Saud.

Thus, monarchical and republican societies have opened up the space at the top for women. Their role is increasingly visible and in some cases would be crucial for future political transition. Those contending for power would no longer be able to ignore powerful women within the palace. The Arab princess’ would decide many succession battles.

While women have carried out a number of militant activities, their involvement in the running of groups is conspicuous by their absence. Prominent movements in Middle East such as Hamas and Hezbollah continue to be dominated by men. Even though women have taken part in various militant activities and terrorism, the top leadership continues to be a men-only club.

My Japanese interlocutor hopes that a radical change at the top in favour or woman is critical for meaningful progress.

When women are increasingly breaking the glass ceiling in other parts of Middle East, can the militant groups remain indifferent? So far there is none on the horizon who can take the mantel of the Hamas leadership. Who knows what’s in store for tomorrow.

(Prof P R Kumaraswamy teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

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Two-State Problem

2009-01-30T17:30:00.000-08:00

The two-state problem

New Indian Express, 30 January 2009,First Published : 30 Jan 2009 01:52:00

Two-state solution. This is universally recognised as the only realistic and just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All other ideas are non-starters.

Surprisingly the two-state formula is more than six decades old but always eluded mutual endorsement and hence remained unfulfilled. Of late, we have a new problem.

Thanks to the ongoing Israel-Gaza conflict the two-state formula is assuming dangerous interpretations. Unless resolved quickly this would have a debilitating impact upon the future of the Palestinians.

In November 1947, the international community, represented by the newly formed United Nations, proposed the formation of independent Jewish and Arab states as the solution for the future of Palestine. It was not an ideal solution but more workable than any other idea floated at that time, including India’s lopsided federal formula.

Egged on by the neighbouring Arab countries, the Palestinian leadership did not even consider the partition idea. They underestimated the Jewish longing for sovereignty and the resolve to realise their nationalist aspirations and overestimated the strength and political unity of the neighbouring Arab states.

So confident were they that they never visualised a double disaster; emergence of a Jewish state and Arab schism over Palestine.

Those parts of Palestinian captured by the Arab armies in 1948 came under the control of Egypt and Jordan. The latter annexed the West Bank while the Gaza Strip remained under the military control of Egypt. The Palestinian experiment to form an independent Arab state in the Gaza Strip ended bitterly. Most Palestinians do not wish to be reminded of the all Palestine government proclaimed in October 1948.

Before long the two-state solution of the UN ended. For long the Arabs and Palestinians were demanding a Palestinian state in place of Israel. Their struggle for ‘liberation’ was confined to the territories that made up Israel. The June war of 1967 and the Israeli occupation saw the disappearance of Palestine from Arab control. As the revised charter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) demanded, the whole of Palestine, including the state of Israel, had to be liberated from the control of the Zionist ‘usurper.’ It was only after the first intifada that broke out in December 1987 that the Palestinian leadership, especially its charismatic leader Yasser Arafat, formally recognised the two-state option.

For the Palestinians Israel, which based its formation on the UN partition plan, moved in the opposite direction. Having been used to the political, economic and strategic advantages offered by the occupied territories, it hardened its stand and adopted an unsympathetic attitude towards similar demands of the Palestinian. Both Labour and Likud parties opposed the formation of an independent Palestinian entity west of the Jordan River. The fears of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan about Palestinian independence suited Israel well.

The intensification of the Palestinian uprising and international endorsement of the political rights of the Palestinians eventually forced a large segment of the Israeli population to re-examine the traditional view regarding the national rights of the Palestinians. Even though a twostate solution was not explicitly stated, many Israelis gradually recognised that the end result of the Oslo process would be the emergence of an independent Palestinian entity, if not a state in the occupied territories. Even a hardliner like Ariel Sharon was forced to recognise that a Palestinian state was inevitable.

Thus, more and more people both within and outside the Middle East recognised that the only solution would be the two-state option.

The peaceful co-existence of Israel and an independent Palestinian state emerged as the only solution to the vexed problem.

When the world was moving towards this direction, things went horribly wrong within Palestinian society. For Hamas, the militant Islamic movement, Palestine is an Islamic property whose unity should not be abandoned and ceded to non-Islamic control. The Hamas-Fatah differences are severe and deep-rooted. Having recognised the Jewish state through the Oslo process, the mainstream Fatah has a serious territorial dispute with Israel whereas Hamas has irreconcilable differences over Israel’s very existence.

Thus the Islamic militant movement opened a twin front. At one level, it fought Israel, the occupied power and launched some of the deadliest suicide attacks within the pre-1967 borders of Israel. At another level, it challenged the Palestinian Authority and the leadership of Arafat for pursuing a peace process that it saw as anti-Islamic. Hamas went back to the traditional position and advocated the onestate solution: a Palestinian state that encompasses the whole of Mandate Palestine including the State of Israel. This stand and the violent campaign that accompanied were partly responsible for the peace process coming to a grinding halt.

Emboldened by the spectacular electoral victory in January 2006 Hamas went a step further. The formation of the Hamasled government was followed by a series of internal tensions. This culminated in the militant takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas in June 2007. The open challenge exposed deep-seated internal divisions.

Not many would have forgotten that masked Hamas militants were stamping over the portraits of Yasser Arafat. That fellow Palestinians could be so disrespectful to someone who single-handedly put the Palestinian cause on the world map cannot be forgotten so easily; unless one suffers from selective amnesia.

Israel capitalised on this putsch and enforced a political boycott accompanied by strong economic sanctions and siege. Before the US and European powers followed in isolating the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

The Palestine Authority was not far behind and appointed a separate political arrangement for the West Bank. A statein- making is burdened with two prime ministers; Salam Fayyad for the West Bank and Ismail Haniya for the Gaza Strip. Nothing could be more ridiculous than this.

Even if political niceties prevented many Arab and Islamic leaders from deriding this development, the consequences are obvious.

It made a mockery of the two-state solution. Much of the international community, including most of the Arab and Islamic countries, recognise the Abbas-led Palestinian Authority while the support for Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip comes exclusively from the governments of Syria and Iran.
The Hamas-Fatah differences have become more obvious after the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip where nearly a thousand Palestinians were killed. Despite clarion calls for a third intifada, echoed by a section of the Indian media, the West Bank is relatively quiet. The residents of the West Bank could not be accused of being a traitor or collaborator.

Thus tragically the actions of Hamas have given a new and sinister meaning to the two-state solution. Two-state does not mean two Palestinian states co-existing in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Time someone told Hamas this.

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India and the Gaza crisis

2009-01-23T14:15:00.000-08:00

Conflict in the Middle East: Indias tightrope walk

By P R Kumaraswamy
Deccan Herald, 24 January 2009, Saturday

India expressed its willingness to recognise the complex Middle East realities by refusing to join the anti-Israeli chorus.

Pin-pricks! That was how a colleague described the barrage of rockets from the Gaza Strip that were pounding Israel. While having no qualms about depicting the Israeli response as ‘disproportionate and brutal’, the academic carefully skirted any reference to the Qassam rockets which precipitated the recent round of violence. Those who are unfamiliar with the Middle East realities might be wondering why Israel was using such a massive force against unarmed Palestinians especially when it was at the receiving end of international criticism and condemnations.

These ‘pin-pricks’ did not cause much human casualties. Not that their launchers did not want to kill but they did. Effective early warning systems and organised safety mechanism saved scores of lives in Israel.

But why dismiss the Qassam rockets as pin-pricks? Admitting that rockets were launched against Israeli civilians would weaken the case against Israel. Such a one-sided understanding of the Middle East is not unusual to mainstream Indian intellectuals. They choose to ignore the relative quiet of the West Bank. How come over two million residents of the West Bank remain mute spectators? Are they all collaborators?

India’s response to the latest battle was curious, to say the least. There were political pressures. President of the Indian Union Muslim League Panakkad Muhammedali Shihab Thangal demanded the resignation of his party’s representative E Ahamed from the Union cabinet. For his part, the Minister of State for External Affairs maintained that he would follow “the government’s view” which he felt strongly condemned Israel for its action.

This intellectual one-sidedness is in contrast to the tightrope walk done by the Indian government. This time around it had been more nuanced than the second Lebanon war that broke out 2006. In its first statement issued within hours after the hostilities began, the Indian government ‘condemned’ the Hezbollah whose abduction of two Israeli soldiers precipitated the crisis. This balance quickly disappeared thanks to domestic pressures from the Left and widespread support within the Arab street for the Islamic militants.

In its first statement, the Indian government admitted that it was “aware of the immediate cross-border provocations resulting from rocket attacks particularly against targets in southern Israel.” In later pronouncements, however, it accused Israel of using “disproportionate force” and “indiscriminate force” which were “unwarranted and condemnable”. Since the conflict erupted on December 27, the Indian government came out with as many as five official statements on the Gaza crisis.

In a statement issued following Israel’s ground offensive, it demanded “an immediate end to military action by all concerned,” an indirect reference to Hamas. A few days later it described the Israeli offer of a three-hour cease fire as ineffective because “nearly three-fourths of the Gaza population” was without electricity and food. Welcoming the peace initiatives of Egypt and France, it hoped for an early end to the plight of the people of Gaza Strip and an early resumption of the peace process.

Through these statements, India expressed its willingness to recognise the complex Middle East realities than in the past. One could fathom a few possible explanations for the Indian refusal to join the anti-Israeli chorus.
The crisis over the Gaza Strip highlighted the internal schism within the Palestinian society. The West Bank was relatively quiet and tranquil when the Gaza Strip was literally on fire. Obviously, the Fatah and Hamas are not in sync over the Gaza crisis. This naturally calls for a measure of caution and balance. Going overboard may garner media headlines but is disastrous as a national policy.

As far as India is concerned there is only one Palestinian Authority, the one that is headed by President Mahmoud Abbas. Without saying it in so many words, it has not recognised the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. Due to security concerns in August 2003, more than a year before Arafat’s death, the office of the Indian mission representative was shifted from the Gaza city to Ramallah. Thus, New Delhi cannot ignore the implications of Abbas’ not so subtle criticisms of Hamas for the current round of violence.

Furthermore, the Left is weaker than in the post. Their withdrawal of support to UPA government has considerably undermined their influence. Ever since the formation of the UPA government, the Left had been demanding a ‘course correction’ in India’s Israel policy. Recognising that the termination of relations was impossible, the Left parties had been calling for an end to military-security ties with the Jewish State. Much to their consternation and disappointment, the UPA enhanced the level of security ties with Israel. The launching of an Israeli spy satellite in January 2008 was a case in point.

Echoing the calls by Hamas leaders for the Palestinians to rise against Israel, some Indian media pundits talked of the third Palestinian intifada. In their eagerness to condemn Israel, they conveniently ignored the situation in the West Bank. How to square up the violence in Gaza Strip with total indifference of the West Bank Palestinians? Were the latter merely collaborators or have fundamental differences with Hamas over Palestinian destiny? Why get into uncomfortable intricacies. So is the Indian government’s nuanced approach.

(The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

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Israel model for India

2009-01-18T16:07:00.000-08:00

The Israeli model - Learn but observe the differences

January 18, 2009 | RSS

In recent weeks, many have drawn parallels between the Israel's ongoing war against the Hamas and the Indian response to Pakistan over the Mumbai terror attacks. For some, India has more valid grounds for an aggressive response than Israel; and for others Israel is a far too controversial and unsavoury model. But there are those who wish and demand that the Indian government emulates Israel in dealing with Pakistan.

Not many countries and societies endorsed the Israeli action, especially the death of hundreds of Palestinians. India is not an exception in deploring Israel.

However, the political disapproval of the Israel's policy towards the Palestinians should not prevent the professionals from examining Israel's experiences. Not learning from the successes and failures of others is often costlier.

At the same time, if India were to adopt an Israel-type strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, a number of crucial issues have to be recognized and sorted out.

1. Israel is able to pursue an aggressive strategy against the Islamic militants primarily because of the unqualified support of the Bush administration. Whether it gave an official approval or merely signalled its understanding, the US support is crucial. Without it the massive operation would not have happened. Can India secure such a support from the US or any other power or a constellation of powers for an aggressive counter-terrorism strategy against Pakistan?

2. Likewise, thanks to the American support, Israel has managed to ward off any punitive measures by the UN Security Council. Does India enjoy such a guarantee if the friends of Pakistan were to lobby for international sanctions against it?

3. Mounting international criticism has not prevented the Israeli leaders from pursuing a course of action that they consider vital for the security of their citizens. They are prepared to stand to the widespread international disapprovals, large-scale protest rallies and adverse coverage by the international media. Do the Indian leaders have the stomach to withstand massive public demonstrations in different parts of the world?

4. Israel was able to launch an aggressive campaign because of its vast and at times unparalleled intelligence base. For example, it struck nearly 50 targets in the Gaza Strip within the first few minutes of the air campaign. As of now, real-time intelligence and successful surgical strikes are possible only in Bollywood movies. Actionable intelligence still remains a pipe dream and would be so for a long time.

5. Israel could launch its war because Hamas is a non-state actor that controls only a part of the Palestinian territories. The internal schism between the mainstream Fatah and the militant Islamic group came out clearly during the current crisis. While over a thousand Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip, the Fatah-dominated West Bank remains relatively tranquil. This crucial divide has partly enabled Israel to pursue its military option. This is not the case in Pakistan. Despite all the internal tensions and acrimony, 'neutrality' over an Indian action is not an option for any Pakistani group. As highlighted by the recent statements, even jihadi groups opposed to the military crackdown would rally behind the Pakistani flag.

6. The military arsenal of Hamas is rather limited and largely consists of short range rockets. Its widely-published threats of turning the Gaza Strip in to a volcano if Israel were to launch a ground offensive has not materialized. There are signs of fatigue and internal divisions within its ranks. Pakistan is entirely different story. It is not a paper tiger but a nuclear power. Even the BJP-led NDA government refused to cross the LoC during the Kargil war, notwithstanding its past hard-line statements. Thus a militant counter-terrorism strategy against Pakistan is no longer the last option, unless one is prepared for thousands of civilian deaths on both sides.

7. Since mid-2005, the Hamas has launched over 5,000 rockets against Israel and despite the ongoing crisis, rockets continue to fall into Israel. Some had landed almost 40 km deep inside Israel. Yet, the major population and economic centres are beyond the range of Hamas rockets. This is not so for India. A number of critical economic targets are within the range of a Pakistani counter-offensive. This would mean large-scale destruction of economic assets accompanied by unacceptable human casualties.

8. Despite the accuracy of its military machine, Israel could not escape causing civilian deaths. Various human rights organisations agree that a bulk of the Palestinians who were killed in the Gaza Strip were civilians. Likewise, India would not be able to escape from a large scale 'collateral damage' which would have unbearable political consequences.

9. So far the campaign against Hamas enjoys widespread domestic support within Israel. Months of insecurity against rockets has made the wider public to rally around the government. Democratic societies cannot launch a war without such a strong backing of its citizens. Would there be a strong internal support within India for a war against Pakistan over Mumbai attacks?

10. Ultimately military campaign alone will not stop the Hamas violence. Israel has been seeking to end the rocket attacks by forcing Hamas to accept a ceasefire from a position of weakness. In the process Israel has squandered considerable international understanding and sympathy. Likewise, a military campaign will not end Pakistan's support for terrorism against India. At best it could make such a policy a costly enterprise, not just for Pakistan but also for India.

Above all, military successes rarely ensure political victory. The Middle East had many such examples. In 1956, for example, Israel won the Suez war but handed over the leadership of the Arab world to President Gamal Abdul Nasser. President George Bush (Sr.) won the Kuwait war but lost his re-election bid in 1992. His son quickly overthrow of the Saddam Hussein in 2003 only to find himself in the Iraqi quagmire. Thus even if it achieves the impossible 'victory' over Hamas, Israel's search for peace would be settled only in the negotiating table. Likewise, any realistic end to terrorism in South Asia rests on Pakistan's cooperation and not its defeat, even if that were possible.

Thus war is still an option. But look before you fire.

(18.01.2009 - P.R. Kumaraswamy is a professor of West Asia studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He can be contacted at kumaraswamy.pr@gmail.com ) (IANS)

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Hamas must get real

2009-01-05T23:24:00.000-08:00

New Indian Express carries my peice on the ongoing crisis in the Gaza Strip. For full text click here.

The Gaza War

2009-01-01T19:48:00.000-08:00

Israel's end game in Gaza

What are Israel's goals? The overthrow of the Hamas government is often mentioned as a potential long-term objective...

Even by West Asia standards, the scale of the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip and the magnitude of casualties are astounding. Ever since Israel launched the ‘Operation Cast Lead’ two days after Christmas, close to 400 Palestinians have been killed and over a thousand injured. In the retaliatory attacks by the Hamas four Israelis were killed, including a Druze soldier and an Arab citizen. With an immediate ceasefire not in sight the casualties are bound to increase.

Prolonged rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip not only tested Israel’s deterrence but also have generated widespread domestic anger. With the Knesset elections just weeks away, Israeli politicians compete with one other as strong on security. The dwindling popularity of the Labour Party had put additional pressures upon Defence Minister Ehud Barak.

What are Israel’s goals? The overthrow of the Hamas government is often mentioned as a potential long-term objective. It is colourful and might even be popular to talk of ending the militant control. At least in private many Fatah would like see such an outcome as a sweet revenge for the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007.

To accomplish this far-reaching goal Israel would have to opt for, as Barak put it, boots on the ground. Israel cannot accomplish this without a full-scale ground offensive and the re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. There are signs in that direction. So far the army has called up about 9,000 reserve soldiers. This is one of the largest mobilisations in recent years. A large number tanks and artillery are stationed around the Gaza Strip. These make a ground offensive an extreme possibility.

At the same time, Israeli leaders know the pitfalls of such an option. Pin-pointed operations and smaller incursions are more successful than a large-scale ground offensive. Hamas definitely has an upper hand in any conventional urban guerrilla war situation. In 1982 Israel needed days to reach Beirut but took more than quarter of a century to get out of Lebanon. The American experience is no better and before long the fall of Baghdad turned into an Iraqi quagmire. Hence, Barak would have to carefully weigh the pros and cons.

This means that Israel’s campaign would largely be aerial raids accompanied by naval bombardments. That nearly 50 sites were attacked within the first few minutes of the campaign indicates that it had planned the offensive long and hard. The aerial offensive has its advantages. It can benefit from Israel’s technological superiority and minimise army casualties.

The aerial campaign has its limits. The Gaza Strip is not a continent. The total area of this impoverished and most crowded place on earth is only 360 square km. The city of Bangalore, in contrasts, spans over 690 sq km. Therefore, even if it targets every known site associated with Hamas, before long Israel will run out of military targets.

Despite the technological advances, aerial campaign comes with a price: civilian casualties. Even if unintended, air raids against a crowded place like the Gaza city invariably kill a number of innocent bystanders. According the UN and other agencies, nearly a fourth of all those Palestinians killed so far are women and children. Civilian deaths are always emotional and potentially damaging to Israel. Already there are protest rallies in various western capitals and cities and they would only increase if the conflict prolongs.

Some Israeli estimates suggest that that only 220 out of 390 killed were members of Hamas. It is unclear if Israel distinguishes between members and militants of Hamas. With the Hamas leadership largely remaining underground, it is unclear if there are any political casualties.

The scale and intensity of destruction would suggest that the military potential of Hamas has been considerably reduced and not eliminated. That Hamas could launch longer range rockets into Israel, with some of them reaching 40 km, highlight its military potential. It is down but not out. Green and not white flag still flies in Gaza.

Thus, Israel would not be able to prevent the rocket attacks only by its military campaign. The massive deaths and devastation might persuade the Hamas to re-examine its strategy and seek a political understanding and renew the ceasefire. The maximum that Israel could expect from this campaign is this: a militarily weakened Hamas would be more willing for a political understanding.

At the same time, Israel also would have to accommodate some of the demands of the Hamas. They are also Palestinian demands. It would have end the siege of the Gaza Strip and stop its periodic military incursions into the Gaza Strip.

As one commentator reminded the Israelis, since the October war of 1973, each time Israel fought a war, the defence minister lost his job. The last one was Amir Peretz who led Israel into the disastrous second Lebanon war in 2006. If Barak were to avoid joining that company, he would require tangible results and a quick end to the military campaign.

To accomplish this, whether he likes or not, Barak would need a helping hand from the Hamas. That is the irony of West Asia.

For web link click here

(The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

2008-12-02T15:49:00.001-08:00

Pretoria-based CiPS carries my brief commentary on Hamas and 1967 borders: Enough to induce Obama?. For full text please click here

Obama Foreign policy Challenge

2008-12-01T22:46:00.000-08:00

Pretoria-based CiPS carries my brief commentary on Obama's real challenge: Iraq, Stupid. For full text please click here.

Delink terrorism from religion

2008-11-11T15:13:00.000-08:00

November 10 issue of South Asia Monitor carries my brief commentary on the need to delink terrorism from religion. For the full text please click here

India Obama Victory

2008-11-06T16:12:00.000-08:00

It may be premature to rejoice

New Indian Express,07 Nov 2008 12:14:00 AM IST

HISTORIC. Landslide. Popular.
Whichever way you say it, one thing is certain. The much-awaited change has occurred with the spectacular victory of Barack Obama, and the disinherited of the world celebrate his arrival. But should India be elated or worried over the return of a Democrat to the White House? At least in the short run, the bonhomie that marked Indo-US relations under the Bush administration will be missed in New Delhi. Though improvements in bilateral relations began with the visit of President Bill Clinton in March 2000, post-Pokhran India had to invest considerable political and diplomatic capital to overcome bilateral tensions, misgivings and sanctions.

In recent days anti-Bush voices in the US got a new boost: Economy stupid! Naturally the economic meltdown and fears over recession will be the top priority of the new administration.

For India this financial crisis means that its economic clout will be significantly dented.

Given his limited international exposure, foreign policy would be the last thing on Obama’s mind; South Asia far less so. The importance of the region emanates from the travails of Afghanistan and the need to keep the Taliban at bay. So the critical question Obama might ask would be: Who can serve me better, is it India or Pakistan? News on the Kashmir front is also disturbing. Media reports suggest that Obama wants to appoint a special mediator. This would make Pakistanis feel happier especially after Obama’s comments about terrorism and jihadi elements, not India, being the serious threats facing Islamabad at present.

Likewise, the traditional Democrats’ agenda — democracy, human rights and minority treatment— would become vocal and intrusive, causing some unpleasant moments for India. But the overall picture is not bleak. On the critical issue of Iran, New Delhi will heave a sigh of relief. The Bush administration’s anti-Iran obsession will be a thing of the past as the Democrats are eager to open direct talks with the Islamic republic. Even if US-Iran normalisation is not imminent, there will be a lessening of tension between the two erstwhile allies. This should enable India to be more ‘independent’ while dealing with Iran. And anti-American rhetoric within India may be considerably muted and less shrill.

The wider world will be watching the new shifts on Iraq. During the campaign Obama harped on his opposition to the Iraqi invasion. As president he will have to come up with a workable strategy. How does he plan to get the boys home early when regional powers are apprehensive over a post-withdrawal political vacuum in Iraq? American policy on Iraq would remove the enigma surrounding Senator Obama.

Obama’s decisive electoral victory is thus a huge responsibility. Having raised public expectations within and outside the US, he will have to deliver, and swiftly. Otherwise the massive mandate will become a millstone around his neck.

Peace Camp in Israel

2008-10-30T16:24:00.000-07:00

Pretoria-based CiPS carries my brief commentary on Peace camp in Israel: Strong ideas but weak stomach. For the full text please click here.

Terrorism: All are entitled to live

2008-10-23T16:20:00.000-07:00

All are entitled to live
New Indian Express,
24 Oct 2008 12:36:00 AM IST

The ongoing debate over the police encounter in Batla in New Delhi on September 19 highlights the partisan nature of the Indian polity.

Not just political parties, even mainstream intelligentsia abandoned their responsibilities and took refuge under political correctness. It has become fashionable to treat terrorism as yet another form of violence and belittle its devastating consequences.

Lives are important, rights are important but only that of those accused of terrorism. Victims of terrorism die in vain for they have no such rights. At least that is how mainstream India behaves.

We need to take a second look at this kneejerk trade union mentality. Camaraderie is vital for a society but there are times thismy- member-right-or-wrong attitude needs to change. Rallying around the flag should not be taken to absurd limits.

People holding public offices need to recognise that their responsibility is much wider than their immediate jobs. Social responsibility is larger than their responsibility to a particular institution.

The ongoing debate over terrorism exposes the narrow mindset of the political parties in the country. Moving the goalpost is their mantra. They would demand the banning of Hindutva outfits like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal but take a different stand when it comes to SIMI or vice versa. The Bharatiya Janata Party demands the dismissal of the government of Assam for its failure to curb communal violence but sings a different tune over Karnataka and Orissa.

Thus the demand of the BJP for the resignation of the Vice Chancellor of the Jamia Millia Islamia, Professor Mushirul Hasan, over his stand on the police encounter was accompanied by a deafening silence of its stalwarts over the spat of anti-minority violence that were taking place under their very noses.

But partisanship is not the prerogative of only the politicians. Same is true for a large number of the intelligentsia. Professor Mushirul Hasan, for example, explicitly condemned the New Delhi blasts only after, and not before, the BJP demanded his resignation. Similarly, those who vociferously argued against the ‘demonisation’ of Jamia would refer only to ‘events of 19th September’ and not of 13th September that rocked the streets of New Delhi. This leads to the next question: guilt by association.

No institution, organisation or group should be held responsible for the activities of all its members. Even members of the same family are not accountable for the activities of other members of the family.

By no cannons of law, logic or moral standards, can one hold Jamia responsible for the alleged crimes of three of its members.

Guilt by association will take us back to the Stone Age.

At the same time one cannot ignore a similar situation faced by Saudi Arabia following the September 11 terror attacks on the US. Riyadh could not escape the harsh reality: fifteen out of 19 hijackers who carried the terrorist acts were Saudi nationals.

Many used the terror attack to launch a diatribe against the Gulf state, vilified Saudi society and even sought to demonise Islam.

The Saudi state could not be held responsible for the actions of its citizens yet it could not escape from the negative consequences of their actions.

Despite its initial defences, eventually the House of Saud saw the episode as an opportunity for a serious introspection. It did not settle for ostrich-like self-denial. Much of the ongoing internal debate in Saudi Arabia over Islam, reforms in the education system and even dialogue with other religions initiated by King Abdullah have to be traced directly to the negative repercussion of the September 11 attacks. Likewise, if the Jamia were to escape from the consequences of the alleged actions of his students, it needs serious introspection.This leads to the next question: human rights.Yes, all citizens have equal rights. Those charged with terrorism have rights to a fair trial and to be treated as innocent unless proven otherwise. They have to be provided adequate legal defence and an opportunity to clear their name.Without this the idea of India would disintegrate.

But in their eagerness to defend the rights of those accused of terrorism, mainstream political parties and intelligentsia alike, ignore some larger issues.

While everyone is innocent unless otherwise proven, those who are charged with terrorist violence could not be placed on par with ordinary citizens. They face serious charges of involvement in the slaughter of innocent civilians. Let us not forget that serial blasts in New Delhi, for example, killed 24 ordinary civilians who were going about their daily routine.

Those charged with terrorism have legal defence, political support and even media limelight. But what happened to those whose lives were taken without any rhyme or reason.

Didn’t they have any rights? Let us not vacillate or look for an escape clause. Terrorism is not an impulsive road rage. Nor is it unintended manslaughter.

Terrorism is a cold-blooded, pre-mediated murder of innocent civilians. Just like the rights of the accused, one should also recognise the rights of the victims.We also need to go beyond parochial calculations in speaking out for everyone’s right to live: rights of victims, even if they happened to members of other caste, colour, race, religion and even nationality. One can be a critic of the Congress party and its dynastic politics. But one can still recognise late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s right to life.

His life was cut short by a well-planned, well-organised and well-executed political murder carried out by the LTTE. His children were orphaned for no fault of theirs.

Sadly, unlike the slain Indian leader, Nalini Sriharan enjoyed legal defence and was tried and convicted under due process of law. On ‘humanitarian considerations’ her original death sentence was commuted tolife imprisonment.Now even this is not sufficient, and she and her supporters demand early release. Nalini’s conviction was neither an act of vengeance nor retribution but merely her harvest for her role in the coldblooded murder. Did anyone give a second chance to Rajiv Gandhi? Rather than worrying about rights of terrorists and the need to protect them against draconian laws, responsible people have to recognise a higher value.Victims of terrorism also have rights. They had no opportunity to hear the charges against them. They enjoyed no legal defence. They are not agents of the state and nor are they linked to the supposed ‘injustice’ meted out to those indulging in terrorism.

This is not politically correct. The Indian society should first and foremost recognise the rights of the victims of terrorism.

They also have the right to live, something that the terrorists do not recognise. Yes, even as an ordinary individual, Rajiv Gandhi also had the right to live!

About the author:
Professor P R Kumaraswamy teaches at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and his co-edited book South Asia: The Spectre of Terrorism is being published by Routledge

Terrorism, political incorrectness

2008-10-12T17:22:00.000-07:00

South Asia Monitor carries my brief commentary where I argue that victims of terrorism also have rights, something the ongoing debate within the country ignore. For full text please click here.

Islam and the Dhimmi

2008-10-07T00:28:00.000-07:00

Pretoria-based CiPS carries my brief commentary on Islam and Dhimmi. For the full text click here.

Caught in Crossfire: Civilians in Conflicts in the Middle East

2008-09-28T22:06:00.000-07:00

Ithaca has just published my edited volume on Caught in Crossfire: Civilians in Conflicts in the Middle East. It has contributions from Avraham Sela, Meron Medzini, Dalia Gavriely, Samir Khalaf, Stuti Bhatnagar, N. Janardhan, Amira Hass, Girijesh Pant and William Haddad.

For details click here

Iran undermines Israel's regional interests

2008-09-22T17:11:00.000-07:00

Electonic Briefing Paper published by Pretoria-based Centre for International Political Studies carries my brief commentary on how Iran has been challenging Israel's regional interest. For the full text please click here.

Islam and Indian foreign policy

2008-09-18T19:11:00.000-07:00

Islam and foreign policy

New Indian Express (Chennai), 19 September 2008

Is there an Islamic dimension in India’s foreign policy, especially towards the Middle East region? The obvious answer would be elusive. For many, such a question is preposterous and an affront on India’s secular fabric. To suggest that religion played a role in shaping India’s policy towards the citadel of Islam is not merely unacceptable but is nothing short of a rightwing conspiracy.

The foreign policy could be indifferent to Islamic influences if India fulfils three basic conditions; one, Muslims living outside the Middle East are not stirred by political developments in the Islamic heartland; two, India does not have a sizeable Muslim population and that India is not wedded to democracy and pluralism.

None of these conditions are true. For a Muslim, whether religious or secular, the Middle East is not like any other piece of territory. The city of Jerusalem is not Berlin which could be divided along ideological lines and unified due to political expediency.

Even non-practising Muslims do not deny, let alone reject, the religious sanctity of Al- Aqsa situated in the old city of Jerusalem.

Like their counterparts in other parts of the world, Indian Muslims have strong emotional bonds with the region and its holy places. These feelings transform into political voices especially during violent upheavals in the region. Actions by non-regional or non-Islamic powers generate far wider interest and anger than Islamic players.

For long rightwing parties such as the erstwhile Jana Sangh and later the Bharatiya Janata Party, have been critical of the Congress policy towards the Middle East.

The pro-Arab bias did not go down well with a section of the population. Critics of the Nehruvian policy at times depicted India as the ‘chaprasi’ of the Arabs or the ‘14th Arab state.’ They felt that the Congress government was pro-Muslim domestically and pro-Arab externally.

At the same time, it is impossible to overlook the anti-minority attitudes of the Hindu right. Driven by their anti-Muslim mindset they looked to Israel as an ally. The pro- Israel bias of the Hindu right is often attributed to its anti-Muslim agenda. Many scholars and political pundits have argued that the rightwing parties are pro-Israel because they are anti-Muslim.

To suggest the converse, however, is not politically correct. Not many would accept that the Congress party was pro-Arab because it was pro-Muslim. Suggestions that the Congress party viewed the Middle East through an Islamic prism are vilified as conspiracy, blasphemous and of late, part of the neo-con agenda.

That India’s policy is devoid of any religious inputs have many takers. Driven by the need to ‘secularise’ the foreign policy some even ‘secularise’ the foreign policy of the BJP. They argue that while in power even the Hindutva forces did not ‘communalise’ foreign policy. Their desire for closer ties with Israel, the argument goes, was accompanied by a significant improvement in relations with principal Islamic countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. For them, not just Nehru but even the BJP is secular when it comes to foreign policy!

Such revisionist portrayal may be self-satisfying but a closer examination of India’s stand on a host of issues pertaining to the Middle East would reveal an indelible mark of Islam. During the nationalist phase this was marked by the political rivalry and competition between the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. It is often forgotten that the Congress party needed the substantial support of Indian Muslims. This was natural and inevitable. Otherwise, the Congress party could not call itself ‘Indian’ and ‘national,’ Hence since the days of the Khilafat struggle when Indian Muslims rallied around the Caliph then the Ottoman emperor, Indian foreign policy has had an Islamic flavour.

The opposition of the Indian nationalists towards the demand for a Jewish national home in Palestine was also partly, not wholly, influenced by the Islamic factor.

Though couched in nationalist terms and humanitarian considerations, religion did play a role in Indian leaders adopting a not so sympathetic view of Jewish political aspirations. On the eve of Partition, some like historian and future diplomat K M Panikkar felt that after Independence India would be less burdened by the Islamic factor and would be ‘free’ to adopt an explicitly pro-Israeli position.

This never materialised principally because the erstwhile Congress-Muslim League rivalry transformed into an Indo- Pakistani competition for the support of Arab and Islamic countries.With the Kashmir issue dominating its diplomatic battle, India feared that establishing normal ties with the Jewish state would be counterproductive.

The manner in which influential sections of the intelligentsia respond to admissions of Islamic inputs exposes their duality.In the summer of 2000 Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh told an audience in Jerusalem that the prolonged absence of diplomatic relations was due to domestic compulsions involving Muslims.

In September 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told the media in New York that India’s Iran policy would also be guided by the Shia factor. This was parroted when National Security Adviser M K Narayanan justified the stopover visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in April this year. Of late even the communist leaders have joined the chorus. During the Lok Sabha vote in July over the nuclear deal, communist M K Pandhe warned Mulayam Singh Yadav that the Muslims would abandon the Samajvadi Party if he voted with the government.

However, the manner in which Indian intellectuals read and respond to these observations vastly differ. Both Jaswant Singh and Manmohan Singh discussed an explicitly domestic issue on foreign soil and unabashedly admitted Islamic inputs in key foreign policy issues.

The Indian intelligentsia vilified Jaswant Singh for communalising India’s Israel policy. Their response to a similar move by the Prime Minister was a deafening silence. If Jaswant Singh ‘communalised’ foreign policy, so did Manmohan Singh. If the Prime Minister merely highlighted an objective reality, so did the BJP leader.

This duality goes a step further. Having vehemently denied any Islamic influence in India’s foreign policy, the same section does not hesitate to recognise and condemn the ‘Jewish lobby’ upon the American policy.

They have openly and warmly embraced the arguments that the Jewish lobby has dominated American policy towards the Middle East and in the process undermined American interests. Similar suggestions of Islamic influence let alone domination upon India’s Middle East still remain taboo.

That three per cent Jews influence American foreign policy towards the Middle East, but 15 per cent Muslims of India do not. Therein lies their ‘progressive’ world view!

India and ILSA

2008-09-11T17:00:00.000-07:00

On September 11, 2008 South Asia Monitor carried my commentary on India, Iran and the US Sanctions: Time for Stock Taking. For the full text click here.

Lebanon Syria normalisation

2008-09-01T19:06:00.000-07:00

A New Dawn in Lebanon

New Indian Express (Channai), 2 September 2008

Lebanese President Michel Suleiman made history when he visited Damascus on August 13.

The visit not only marked an end to recent tensions in the region but also transformed the very nature of relations between the two Middle East neighbours. Despite some scepticism the visit is truly historic and signals a formal end to Syrian denial of and disregard for Lebanese independence. During the visit Presidents Bashar al-Assad and Suleiman agreed to establish normal diplomatic relations and initiate the process of border demarcation.

Even though Syria and its leadership have to take a lot of concrete measures, a good beginning has been made.

First and foremost, Suleiman’s visit and his earlier meeting with Assad in Paris a few years ago clearly indicate a fundamental change in Syrian attitude towards Lebanese existence as a sovereign entity.

Syria had a historic grievance against the French when the Mandate authorities carved out Mount Lebanon and its surrounding areas to form an independent Lebanese state in 1943.

Such historic claims over others are not new to the Middle East. For long, other countries such Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Iraq had coveted their weaker neighbours. What however made the Lebanese case rather unique was the steadfastness with which Damascus maintained its opposition to recognising Lebanon as a sovereign entity .

For over six decades Damascus had political influence, economic interests and strategic presence in Lebanon but not diplomatic representation. When the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, Damascus found an opportunity. In the name of preventing a virtual blood bath, the Ba’athist leadership consolidated its presence. As the factional fight ended in 1989, Syrian presence and influence was legitimised and guaranteed.

Damascus ended up having thousands of troops in Lebanon but never an embassy . Its emissary in Beirut was ironically called ‘Governor’, thereby symbolising Syrian claims over Lebanon.

Such was its influence, Syria set the Lebanese domestic agenda and according to seasoned observers Bashar Assad was personally looking after the ‘Lebanon file’ prior to his election as president in June 2000. Disregarding popular sentiments in Lebanon, he ensured the re-election of President Emile Lahoud in 2004 through a constitutional amendment. Subsequent disputes over this election led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. This was followed by the killing of a number of politicians and other Lebanese personalities who were critical of Syria and its domination. The needle of suspicion continues to point towards Damascus.

Popular revulsion over Hariri’s assassination eventually made the Syrian military presence untenable and forced it to pull out its troops from Lebanon in April. Despite this, as highlighted by the prolonged delay in the election of Lahoud’s successor, Syria continues to wield considerable clout in Lebanon, especially through its erstwhile proxies such as the Hezbollah.

Syrian recognition however was not forthcoming. Keeping up the pressure, in May 2005 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1680 that explicitly called on Damascus “to establish full diplomatic relations and representation” with Beirut. The resolution was endorsed by 13 members of the Council while China and Russia abstained.

Syria also faced criticisms from its erstwhile friends such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Hezbollah’s military activities culminated in the second Lebanon war of 2006 that brought further death and destruction.

Syria was not prepared to abandon the Hezbollah.

Syrian inflexibility over Lebanon dis pleased many Arab countries and resulted in their boycott of the Arab summit hosted by President Assad in March this year. Soon accusations were flying between Damascus and other Arab capitals. However, the Syrian leadership recognised that reconciliation with the wider Arab world depends on meaningful progress on Lebanon.

For its part, France the former colonial power, has been active in promoting Lebanese-Syrian reconciliation. As part of the Mediterranean summit, French President Nicolas Sarkozy hosted Lebanese and Syrian leaders in July . Though his dream of a photo opportunity involving Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Syrian President Assad did not materialise, the Suleiman-Assad meeting broke the ice. This paved the way for Suleiman’s visit to Damascus a month later.
A modicum of relations with Lebanon would not only enhance Syrian influence in that country but also would increase its regional status.

For its part, this is a historic moment for Lebanon. The Syrian recognition is far more valuable than India’s recognition by Great Britain, Pakistan by India, Bangladesh by Pakistan in 1974 or the Israeli recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1993. Indeed one could even suggest that this is far more historic than the unlikely recognition of the breakaway Taiwanese republic by the People’s Republic of China.

To be meaningful, however, the Syrian recognition has to be formal and substantial. Recognition and normalisation would have to be accompanied by a formal Syrian renunciation of its territorial or other claims over Lebanon. Such an abandonment of past claims would have to be internalised through significant revision in the educational system. Otherwise, recognition would be no more than a political gimmick and would be a Damocles’ sword over Lebanon. Since Syria took more than six decades to recognise the independence of Lebanon, such a decision would have to be endorsed and guaranteed by the international community, especially the United Nations.

Likewise demarcation of borders would not be easy . For long Damascus has argued that the disputed Sheba farms currently held by Israel is a Syrian territory. However, during Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, both Syria and Lebanon claimed this to be a Lebanese territory. Syria even claimed that it had ‘transferred’ this to Lebanon. So far Syria has not provided any legal documents substantiating this claim. Given the recent tension and acrimony, Damascus would be in no hurry to resolve the problem.

Syrian recognition, normalisation of diplomatic relations and the presence of a full-fledged embassy would not however change the fundamental problem facing Lebanon. It is haunted by factional interests and infighting among the three principal groups, namely, Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims. Hence, Lebanese ability to enjoy the fruits of this historic moment ironically depends on the leeway and space provided by Damascus. Hence, at least in the short run, Lebanon would continue to be at the mercy of Syria.

Weblink:

Islamic Attitudes to Israel

2008-08-26T05:01:00.000-07:00

Routledge (UK) has just published my co-edited volume on Islamic Attitudes to Israel. It has contributions from Beverley Milton-Edwards, David Menashri, Efriam Karsh, Eliezer Schlossberg, Eyal Zisser, Jacob Abadi, Livnat Hotzman, Meir Hatina, Michael Bishku, Moshe Yegar and Rivka Yadlin.

For additional details please click here.

India, Iran and the Arab Prism

2008-08-19T05:49:00.000-07:00

Abu Dhabi-based Emirates Center for Strategic Studies Research (ECSSR) has just published my monograph on Indo-Iranian Relations and the Arab Prism.

To order a copy click here.

Arab factor in Indo-Iranian ties

2008-08-19T05:46:00.000-07:00

For a brief commentary on the role of the Arab factor in Indo-Iranian ties published in South Asia Monitor on 19 August 2008 click here

India and the Middle East

2008-08-13T05:27:00.001-07:00

The August 2008 issue of The Round Table carries my article on "Realism replacing rhetoric: Factors shapping India's Middle East Policy"

vol. 97, no.397, pages 575-587

Communist Foreign Hand

2008-08-11T16:21:00.000-07:00

Communist foreign hand

Tuesday August 12 2008 00:58 IST

New Indian Express (Chennai), 12 August 2008

Foreign financial contributions to political activities in India have always been controversial and many have used this to settle personal, organisational and ideological scores with their political rivals and competitors. At one time or another, various foreign countries have been accused of patronising their supporters and fellow travellers in India. Many were seen as ‘agents’ of this or that power.

While the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union hogged much of the attention, others were not far behind. Oil-rich countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia have been accused of funding extremist Islamic groups in India. Likewise at the height of the Ayodhya controversy, wealthy Indians in the West were charged with transferring funds to Hindutva forces. Indeed at times, ‘foreign agent’ has become a too common refrain in Indian politics.

Unfortunately, most of them remained allegations with little documentary evidence and far little follow up actions. Hence, they were quickly dismissed as nothing more than a political blot or external conspiracy to discredit a particular individual, group or political party.

This however is changing. The end of the Cold War has opened up a wealth of credible archival materials of the bygone era. As part of the Cold War Project, the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Centre is publishing large quantities of declassified Soviet documents. One such document throws some interesting insights into the question of the Soviet financial contribution to the then united Communist Party of India (CPI) just before the 1962 Lok Sabha elections.

On 17 January 1962 the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi I A Benediktov wrote a brief note on his meet earlier that day. It presents a summary of his meeting with Bhupesh Gupta, the Secretary of the National Council of the CPI. The meeting took place on the day the CPI ended its two-day meeting of the Secretariat in New Delhi to chalk out plans for the impending elections to the Lok Sabha.

Gupta was greatly disturbed by the sudden demise of Ajoy Kumar Ghosh. The death of the Secretary General of the CPI could not have come at a worse time because it deprived the party of not only its greatest organiser and orator, but also its important fund-raiser. Bhupesh Gupta had a twin-objective in initiating this meeting with the Soviet envoy. One, to ensure the continuation of close ties between the CPI and the Communist Part of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and two, to work out a mechanism for uninterrupted Soviet financial contribution to the CPI.

According to the Soviet ambassador, Ghosh candidly admitted that the party was suffering from “an acute insufficiency of funds for the pre-election campaign” and was apprehensive that “with the death of Ghosh, the source for receiving means for the communist party” from the CPSU might be closed.

Gupta was also worried about further complications. Until his death, A K Ghosh had singularly handled the financial contributions from Moscow and according to Gupta, the late leader had never consulted other party stalwarts such as E M S Nambudiripad (India’s first communist Chief Minister). They merely assisted in the distribution of funds. Ghosh monopolised funding to such an extent that he withheld this issue “from other leaders of the party and members of the National Council.” Because of this ‘strict secrecy’, Gupta proudly claimed, “not a single report on this question has appeared in the press.”

Admitting his own limitations, Gupta disclosed that unlike Ghosh, he would not be able to “single-handedly take on responsibility in questions of assistance” but would involve other leaders such as Nambudiripad. He confided that trade union leader Shripad Amrit Dange once sought exclusive responsibility for “all matters connected with foreign aid.”

Gupta vehemently denied suggestions that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was giving financial assistance to the CPI. Proclaiming that the CCP was not aware of the Soviet aid, he declared that the National Council “has not received, is not receiving and will not receive assistance” from the Chinese Communist Party but admitted that the party was receiving some aid from Sikhs living in England.

In the words of Benediktov, “Gupta repeated several times that the aid is needed precisely now” because the election campaign must be completed by the first week of February 1962. During this campaign, the main task of the CPI would be “to make clear to the population that the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to India, is its true friend.” After the elections however, “we would like to receive your support in the matter of theoretical preparation of party cadres.”

Gupta held another round of meeting with the Soviet envoy on January 27 and expressed his gratitude for the readiness of the CPSU to assist the CPI. Both documents however are silent about the quantum and modus operandi of the Soviet “financial assistance” to the CPI. Interestingly, the party only marginally improved its tally and won 29 seats as against 27 seats five years earlier.

It is common knowledge that the Soviets had provided more than ideological and theoretical support to the communist movements in various countries including India. Through a host of outlets such as friendship societies, media outlets and cultural associations they befriended influential segments of the public. The rupee-rouble trade was also used to prop-up a pro-Soviet constituency within India. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that the CPI was not the only Indian recipient of foreign contributions.

Thanks to the end of the Cold War, however, there are documentary evidences to prove that the Communist leadership had sought and received funds from Moscow for its political activities in India. These Soviet documents cannot be dismissed as an imperial conspiracy merely because they were obtained, translated, annotated and published by a Washington-based think tank.

What is the need to address an archaic issue that is more than three decades old, especially when the country is facing more serious problems of today? Likewise, it is too tempting to dismiss the issue as a manifestation of McCarthyism.

However, by definition political parties including the communist parties, shoulder a heavier responsibility than individuals, organisations or lobbying groups that receive foreign financial contributions. Furthermore, the Communist parties often project themselves as role models in the otherwise corrupt Indian political climate.

One cannot expect much from the political parties, partisan scholars or activists. They all will be dismissive and condescending. India still has some non-partisan Sovietologists who should ponder over the central issue: What was the nature of Soviet 'financial assistance' to the Communists?

Web link:
http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEM20080812005740&Title=Main+Article&rLink=0

Iran: Sanctions are best option

2008-08-11T16:16:00.000-07:00

Despite hype about military options, sanctions still remain the most effective American instrument against Iran. If interested in the commentary published in Gulf News on 8 June 2008, clink here.

Muslim factor in foreign policy

2008-08-10T16:22:00.000-07:00

For a brief commentary on The Muslim Factor in India's Foreign Policy published in The Japan Times on July 30, 2008, please click here.

Freedom at 1957

2008-08-09T16:50:00.000-07:00

What would have happened if India gained freedom in 1957 and not 1947? For the text of a brief commentary in New Indian Express (Chennai), 10 August 2008, click here.

Terrorism: Need for a non-partition debate

2008-08-07T16:07:00.000-07:00

The question of terrorism in India needs a non-partisan debate. If interested in the brief commentary published in South Asia Monitor on 6 August, click here.

India's Persian Problems

2008-08-04T22:02:00.001-07:00

July issue of Strategic Insights carries my article on India's Persian Problems. For the full text click here

Lanka's Israel Dilemma

2008-06-10T06:05:00.000-07:00

Lanka's Israel Dilemma

South Asia Monitor, June 9, 2008
The high profiled visit of Prime Minister Rathnasiri Wickramanayaka to Israel in late March underscores the long-standing Sri Lankan dilemma towards the Jewish State. At one level, it wants to benefit from Israel's military and security expertise but strong domestic and regional compulsions drive Colombo in the opposite direction. The need to balance the two became apparent in Wickramanayaka's recent visit to the Middle East, which also took him to the Palestinian areas and Jordan.

In tune with the current policy regarding ethnic violence within his country, Wickramanayaka played up the terrorism card and drew a parallel between the Tamil Tigers and various other "terrorist groups such as PKK, Taliban, Islamic groups in the Philippines and even some affiliates of Al-Qaida." He even maintained that some of the Tamil militants are being trained "in Palestinian camps in Syria and Lebanon." He sought to please his hosts by harping on terrorism and suicide bombings that have caused havoc in the island republic.

For his part, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert urged the visitor not to "give in to terrorism because it will only destroy your country ... It is forbidden to surrender to it." Despite such high public rhetoric, more than anyone else Olmert knows the inevitability seeking political settlement with militant groups.

It is fair to argue that Israeli military security assistance was high on Wickramanayaka's agenda. The importance of his visit was marked by the host of meetings he had in Israel and among others met President Shimon Peres, Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni. In a rare gesture he addressed the Jerusalem-based Israel Council on Foreign Relations.

A couple of recent developments provide an interesting backdrop to Wickramanayaka's visit. Of late Colombo has been upbeat about its military victories in the North and some even visualized a total collapse and annihilation of the Tamil Tigers. The mutual abandonment of the ceasefire merely increases the possibility of Colombo harping on the military option.

Furthermore, as part of this outlook, Colombo has been unsuccessfully seeking military assistance from New Delhi. The week-long visit to India of Commander of the Lankan Army Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka in March was part of that strategy.

New Delhi however, operates under different compulsions. The bitterness of the past and political compulsions of the present prevent it from entertaining such Lankan requests. As the refusal of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to attend the Independence Day celebrations in February highlighted, Sri Lanka continues to be a major issue in Tamil Nadu politics. With not many countries able and willing to help, Wickramanayaka's visit has to be viewed within the context of the ethnic conflict.

For Israel, this visit forms a part of the 60th anniversary celebrations of the founding of the State. By hosting leaders from different parts of the world during the yearlong celebrations, Israel is seeking to highlight and consolidate its growing international acceptance and recognition. The celebrations culminated on May 14 with a ceremony attended by US President George Bush and various other world leaders. More over Wickramanayaka was the highest Lankan official to visit Israel since 1948.

While Sri Lankan Prime Minister might not be a prize catch, Israel cannot hope to attract other leaders from South Asia. Ideally it would have liked to have hosted the Indian President or Prime Minister. Alternatively a high profile visit by UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi would have been a diplomatic coup underscoring Israel's growing importance to India.

Unfortunately however, since normalization of relations in 1992, senior Indian leaders have been extremely wary of visiting Israel. Even when rolling out a red carpet welcome to President Ezer Weizman in December 1996 and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003, India avoided similar visits to Israel. If late President K R Narayanan was reluctant to visit Israel, the tenure of A P J Abdul Kalam was marred by the onset of al-Aqsa Intifada.

Kalam's personal preference became apparent when he went to Israel a few weeks ago to attend a scientific conference. Indeed, in his earlier avatar as scientific advisor to the Defence Minister, Kalam was in Israel in the mid-1990s. With Lok Sabha elections not far away, political visits to Israel could be an electoral liability for the UPA.

Leaders of the two Islamic countries of South Asia, namely, Pakistan and Bangladesh going to Israel is rather unrealistic. Nepal, a country with whom Israel has long standing relations, is too pre-occupied with its domestic problems to contemplate a state visit to Israel. The country's Foreign Minister Sahana Pradhan however, was in Israel last July.

Domestically not everyone was happy with Wickramanayaka's visit. The internal tensions within Lanka's Israel policy once again came into the open. Some have adversely commented about the idea of Israel being a "model" for Sri Lanka. Others drew favourable parallel with the Palestinians and their struggle against Israel. Indeed, just days before Wickramanayaka's visit, President Mahinda Rajapaksa meet a delegation from the Sri Lankan Committee for Solidarity with Palestine and assured them that "he would never visit Israel" though "his Prime Minister would be leading a delegation to that country shortly."

As a balancing tactics during the current visit the Lankan leader went to the Palestinian Areas and met President Mahmoud Abbas. The Lankan media also highlighted a street in Ramallah being named after its president underscoring his longstanding commitment to the Palestinian case. Any lingering doubts about Lanka's Israel policy were dispelled when Colombo hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the last week of April, soon after Wickramanayaka returned from Israel.

While military supplies and training facilities can't be ruled out, Israel is unlikely to get involved in ethnic conflict. The reason has to be located within the context of the traditional Sri Lankan policy vis-à-vis Israel.

In March 1949 Sri Lanka granted de facto recognition to Israel but choose to maintain a distance. In 1960, in an unexpected move, it withdrew its non-resident Minister to Israel even while allowing the latter to maintain its diplomatic mission in Colombo. In July 1970 keeping in tune with her electoral promise, Prime Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike suspended diplomatic relations with Israel. This happened well before the 1973 oil crisis when a number of Third World countries broke off relations with Israel.

In the 1980s, at the height of the ethnic conflict, Colombo once again moved closer to Israel. Besides military supplies, it sought and obtained Israeli expertise in counter-terrorism. To facilitate the training of its armed forces, Colombo allowed an Israeli "interest section" within the US embassy. Refusal of other countries, especially India, to provide security assistance was explained as the reason for moving closer to Israel. According to former Foreign Secretary J N Dixit the Israeli presence played a pivotal role in India's involvement in Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. The military ties ended abruptly in 1990 and bi-lateral relations were once again established in 2000.

Thus by adopting a zigzag policy on Israel, over the years, Sri Lanka has eroded its credibility and hence, despite the media hype in Sri Lanka and elsewhere, Israel will be highly sceptical about moving closer to Colombo, especially on the military-security front.

web version:

http://www.southasiamonitor.org/2008/June/news/9wsa.shtml#

Israel Diary

2008-06-03T20:16:00.000-07:00

Dairy Israel

New Indian Express (Chennai), June 4, 2008.

The Jerusalem Take on Muslims

Two-day academic conferences on Asian studies would be smack of chutzpah in any country in the Middle East. But not Israel. In the third week of May, the Hebrew University which started functioning in 1925, hosted the Seventh and the largest academic conference on Asia. Devoted to cultural, religious, social and literary aspects of the content, it attracted over a hundred scholarly papers spread over more than two-dozen simultaneous sessions. The result was a mixed bag. Some provocative and some pedestrian.

Though most were in Hebrew, my rudimentary knowledge of the language was good enough to appreciate the big picture. Besides the discussions, I got an opportunity to meet a number of my old friends, former colleagues and intellectual fellow travellers. The Malayalam-fluent Ophira, Raquel who specialises in Japanese energy policy or Sofia who lives in Chinese classical poetry, all under one roof.

Uneasy Money
One scholar used the troubles facing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and speculation about him receiving hefty envelopes filled with dollar bills to add some lighter moments. The Chinese government was uneasy about its missiles supplied to Iran reaching Hezbollah that used them against Israel during the Second Lebanese war in 2006. During the recent visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Chinese officials highlighted Iran's end-user commitments but the speaker mischievously observed: "I don't know if Olmert was given envelopes by the Chinese."

A matter of Apparel
What to wear for the occasion? I was in a dilemma. I remembered an incident involving veteran Israeli diplomat Abba Eban. The Labour Party was still identified with the working class and party stalwarts and members were assembled in Tel Aviv to elect the list for the forthcoming Knesset election. Eban being an outsider could not be more pronounced. Only he came in a bow tie and failed to get his name in a realistic slot on the party list. He soon bowed out the politics.

So I settled for informal attire. Seeing me in T-shirt for my session, my old friend and Sinologist Professor Yitzhak Shichor recollected an anecdote. "The ambassador from Japan had just arrived and he was new to Israeli customs. For his first official function he went in formal suit, only to found that he was the only one in the entire crowd to be dressed formally. Not to repeat the same mistake, next time he went in informally. He was foxed again as the entire gathering was dressed formally. The ambassador gave up worrying about dressing for the occasion." Then Professor Shichor added, "We are a crazy people. When it comes to dress, anything goes…"

Indians Absent
Representatives from China, Japan and Korea were present during much of the deliberations and partly supported the conference. Seoul's ambassador to Israel Shin Kak-Soo broke off from the original schedule and did a mini presentation comparing the nuclear controversies surrounding North Korea and Iran. A notable absentee was the Indian embassy. With six panels devoted to various aspects of India's diversity, the absence was rather conspicuous and strange.

Notable exception
"Don't bother us with intellectual nonsense." This does not appear to be the attitude of the Israeli foreign office. A number of retired as well as serving diplomats could be noticed through the conference. An uncommon sight in India. They were hopping from one panel to the other but they were there. Some are soon returning to India's neighbourhood.

Sachar was there
The UPA government would be extremely happy that the Sachar Committee report is popular not just in India but also among Indologists in Israel. It figured prominently in the panel on Religion, Society and State in India. Though Israel is considered a favourite of the Hindutva brigade, the panelists used the report to highlight the marginalisation of Muslims. The Hindu right came in for some severe treatment. Some on the panel felt Muslims are not protected in India and that 'secularism' is also a sign of the Indian state appropriating the cultural traits of the Hindu majority. An academic from Ben-Gurion University recalled a remark by Syed Shahabuddin who reportedly said: "Muslims in India are like the Jews in Nazi Germany!" The remark did not go unnoticed in a country that remembers the Holocaust.

Sad old home
During the lunch break I took time off and went my old home: the library of the Harry S Truman Institute at the northern corner of the Hebrew University campus. Over looking the far off Dead See, its dilapidated present condition is exemplified by a lonely reader from Europe.
The once lively place hectic with readers, researchers and students is badly in need of a PR to exhibit its hidden treasures. When the University budget shrinks, the library often is the first casualty and Truman Library, which has some of the best collections on Asia in Israel, had seen better days before the late 1990s. I went there to meet my old friend Amnon. Most of my academic sharpness of the complex Arab-Israeli conflict occurred during my daily coffee seasons with him in the café in Frank Sinatra plaza. Amnon still remains cheerful but not the library. It needs a few scholars to utilise its wealth!

India Ahmadinejad

2008-05-22T08:43:00.000-07:00

Only Ahmadinejad gains

New Indian Express (Chennai), Thursday May 22 2008 09:27 IST

“Re-energizing, Playing the great game or defining moment.” This is how seasoned observers described the recent stop over visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For some it was sign of ‘autonomy’ in foreign policy formulation and a reminder to Washington of its desire to pursue a policy that serves Indian and not American interests.

The visit was undoubtedly a diplomatic coup for Iran. Now the Iranian leader can claim his country’s increasing acceptance by all major non-Western powers. Was it due to the unexpected election of Ahmadinejad or growing Indian proximity with Washington? Either way for a while India remained the last Third World country which was trying to the Iranian leader. Hence, bilateral ties got into cold waters.

If the two votes at International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) were not sufficient, India gave a distinct impression that it was seeking to keep a distance from Iran. Tehran, however, was not disheartened by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh avoiding the meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Council in 2006. In a calculated move in February last year, it ambushed visiting Foreign Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee and suggested a summit meeting among the three leaders to resolve the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Thus, Iran turned the technical need for a stopover from Sri Lanka into a diplomatic accomplishment. An insignificant state visit was transformed into a visit of the sub-continent, with Pakistan hosting him on the way to Colombo.

The subdued manner in which Indian commentators reacted both before and after the visit, tells an interesting story. It was a defining moment for Iran, yes.Was it a defining moment for India? Signs are they are not. What was India trying to convey to the outside world by hosting the Iranian leader. Iran cannot be ignored but nor can one be blind to the belligerent and confrontationalist stands of its leaders. Many anti-India elements within the US administration could see this as an unfriendly act, especially when President George W Bush is seeking closer ties with India. Should the anti-Iranian rhetoric intensify in Washington the handshake would be used to torpedo many pro-India moves.

In more substantial terms, what was accomplished during the visit? To expect miracles in seven hours is outlandish even for those with fertile imagination. But having kept a distance from someone who has been increasingly becoming controversial not just in the West, one is tempted to ask: what were India’s expectations when it rolled out the red carpet?

Was there a breakthrough on the energy front? The press conference of Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon let the cat out of the bag. After Dr Singh-Ahmadinejad meet, he told reporters that from India’s viewpoint, “most important is to construct an economically, commercially viable project, to have assured supplies and to ensure the security of supply in various ways. Discussions will continue. They both agreed that the officials would continue to discuss how to craft such a project which would meet the various criteria that we have mentioned.”

Simple English? More than a decade after the idea originally began the pipeline option is worth trying. Informed observers feel that with the kind of price demanded by Iran, the pipeline would be a pipedream.

On the LNG front, Menon felt that negotiations are on but added: “… of the conditions of the agreement have changed since both countries signed the agreement in 2005.” Basically he was confessing that India would have to pay a higher price than the $ 3.215 per million British thermal units (mBtu) that was agreed in June 2005 during the visit of the then Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar.

One interesting development was that Menon’s press conference was dominated by the Israeli angle and the recent launching of an Israeli spy satellite by India. In the past such an obsession was confined to the Egyptians.

Is it a sign of independent foreign policy? For many, ‘independent’ foreign policy has been an euphemism for anti- Americanism. Not surprising, most of those who demand India to be assertive vis-à-vis Washington followed Kremlin during the Cold War. Not long ago those lamenting about the American quagmire in Iraq were justifying the Soviet ‘presence’ in Afghanistan.Above all, a single act rarely makes profound impact on foreign policy and the stopover visit is definitely not one of them. Onenight stands might bring fun but they never make an enduring relationship.

Is a sign of constructive engagement? Despite the official spin, it is essential to recognise the controversy surrounding Iran would be resolved without any role for India.

The problem primarily is between Tehran and Washington and having mishandled its vote at the IAEA, India is not in a position to mediate between the two. Iran cannot trust it and the US would take it for granted! Nor does India have the kind of leverages and incentives enjoyed by China and Russia especially their political clout in the UN Security Council.

Was it domestic politics? Unlike the past the UPA government has been more than willing to admit the role of domestic factors shaping India’s Iran policy. In September 2005 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told reporters in New York that India’s decision at the IAEA would also be governed by the Shia factor. The same spin was used when the National Security Advisor announced Ahmadinejad’s visit at an international conference in New Delhi. The verdict on the cynical use of foreign policy for electoral considerations would be known very shortly in Karnataka.

Iran is not only a regional power in the Middle East but also an important player in the global energy scene. At the same time, Tehran, especially since the election of Ahmadinejad, is also a quarrelsome player. By reneging on its earlier price agreement, it has raised doubts about its reliability. Some of its belligerent actions and statements have unnerved its Arab neighbours.

While developing a policy towards Iran, New Delhi could afford to ignore American or other Western concerns. But it could not ignore one third player: the Arab neighbours of Iran. They are equally, if not more, important than Iran. In short, nearly four million Indians are gainfully employed in the Arab countries and not in Iran. Any short-sighted move on Iran would boomerang heavily on India’s ties with the Arab world.

Iran is thus an enigma. Depicting it merely as a friend or foe of India could be ideologically satisfying but intellectually dishonest.

Web version:

http://www.newindpress.com/newspages.asp?page=m&Title=Main+Article&aDate=5%2F22%2F2008

Bush Ambushes Israel

2008-05-16T19:54:00.000-07:00

With good intentions Bush ambushes Israel

Rediff May 16, 2008 20:30 IST

Two State visits in less than five months are one too many for a world leader and more so if it is US President George W Bush. But that is what has happened when he came to Israel on Wednesday to take part in Israel's 60th Independence Day celebrations.

Unlike his previous visit in early January, this time Bush did not visit the Palestinian areas. Both sides were keen to make it an exclusive visit to a friendly country. Israel could not have asked for a friendlier American leader.

During the first term the American president consciously kept away from the complex Middle East peace process. Unlike his predecessor Bill Clinton, he was not keen to invest any political capital in the peace process. If Clinton could not accomplish much, why even try. Taking cue from their leader, senior American officials also opted for a hand-off policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace making.
Israel at 60: Surviving the odds
With the trauma of the September 11 attacks consuming much of his time and energy, President Bush had little interest in the peace process. His primary attention was devoted to fighting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Subsequently, Iran and its suspected nuclear programme garnered his attention.

As a result, more than any other American leader, President Bush largely left the peace process to Israel and its leaders. He was quick to embrace Ariel Sharon who was elected prime minister weeks after the American election. They worked in tandem. Bush echoed when Sharon said Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was 'no peace partner' and soon Arafat became persona non grata at the White House.

When Sharon unveiled his unilateral pullout from the Gaza Strip, the American leader was more than happy and conveniently forgot the more complicated West Bank. The security fence that Sharon ordered gravely violated the pre-June 1967 borders or the Green Line. But Bush would not take notice.

Even after Sharon left the political scene following a massive stroke in early 2006, Bush pursued the same course. Dismissing European advice, Bush joined Israel in isolating Hamas following the spectacular victory of the Islamic militants in the Palestinian election later that month. Bush found no contradiction between this and his campaign for democratising the Middle East.

During the second Lebanese war the US President gave a large leeway to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to 'clean up' the military operations against Hezbollah. He was not prepared to demand a ceasefire until the Israeli commanders admitted that they did not have a workable military option to secure the two Israeli soldiers captured by the Islamic militant group.

Furthermore, more than any other world leader, Bush has been taking a strong and belligerent position against Iran and its periodic outbursts against Israel. Suspicions over the Iranian nuclear programme brought Israel and the US closer.

Partly to regain credibility and party to secure Arab support for his policy on Iran and Iraq, he has been reiterating his support for a two-State solution; Israeli and Palestinian States living side by side with peace and security. With much fanfare last November he organised a Middle East conference in Annapolis where leaders from over 40 countries and organisations took part and reiterated their commitment to the Middle East peace process. With the sole exception of Iran every major player in the world was present at the jamboree.

To give an impression of seriousness, President Bush even promised tangible outcomes before he leaves office; in practical terms, before the US presidential election is held later this year. His two visits to Israel in quick succession have to be viewed within this self-imposed November 2008 deadline.

As many analysts have pointed out, by excessively identifying with the policies of Israel, Bush has actually worked against Israel's long-term interests.

Indeed, the Jewish State has become more unsure now than in it was in January 2001 when Bush became president. Since then Hamas and Hezbollah exposed the limitations of Israel's military options. The Palestinian Authority enamoured by Israel and Washington is friendlier, accommodative but ineffective. Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2006, Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas is not even a paper tiger. Abbas promises friendship but Hamas delivers Qassam rockets.

Furthermore, Iran, Israel's principal adversary, has gained from Bush's Middle East strategy. He removed two most dreaded enemies of Tehran; the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. By 'democratising' Iraq and handing over power to the majority, Bush has also created as Arab Shia State. When Iranian officials speak of a Shia crescent extending from Bahrain in the Persian Gulf to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, they would secretly thank Uncle Sam.

In tacking Iran, both the US and Israel are clueless. Informed analysts in both countries dismiss a military option as ineffective and counterproductive. At the same time, Israel and the US have not been able to evolve a viable politico-economic strategy that would be acceptable to other major players.

Meanwhile, the US-Europe divide over Iraq came handy to Iran and like the resurgent Moscow under Vladimir Putin, Tehran has managed to exploit its energy resources to create a severe wedge between the US and other energy-dependent economies like India and China.

If these are not enough, the Iraqi saga continues and there appears no honourable exit for the US from the quagmire it had created. If its continued presence intensifies resistance, its early exit would have unpredictable consequences of many of Iraq's Sunni neighbours, most of whom are friends of the US. Dammed if you pullout and dammed if you don't.

Bush's newly-found involvement in the peace process is a typical case of too-little-too-late. With the US election just months away, no one expects anything dramatic. As Clinton found out during the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000, a century-old vexed conflict can't be resolved in a few weeks.

Meanwhile, what about the two-State solution? Wait for a more sober US president, if not the next generation!

Webversion:

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/may/16guest.htm

India Saudi Arabia

2008-04-30T07:44:00.001-07:00

Wooing Gulf investments - End of Indian summer over Arabia?

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 30, 2008.

FOREIGN Minister Pranab Mukherjee was luckier the third time. On two previous occasions his visits to Saudi Arabia were cancelled at the last minute. During his two-day visit he met a host of Saudi officials. He also had an audience with the King Abdullah. Besides the customary remarks about the Middle East peace process, situation in Iraq and regional stability Mukherjee flagged in the , economic agenda. He was enticing Saudi investment in India's massive infrastructure plans which he felt could absorb upto "$ 500-600 billion."

During the last February visit of his Saudi counterpart Prince Saud al-Faisal, both countries agreed to pursue investments in energy, petro-chemical and infrastructure. Mukherjee was also trying to capitalise on the momentum set by the landmark visit of the King as the chief guest at the 2006 Republic Day celebrations.

At the bilateral level, Saudi Arabia has been a major supplier of energy and accounts for about a third of India's total oil imports. With a total trade turnover of just under $ 16 billion, it is India's major trading partner in the Middle East.

Out of an estimated four million Indian workers in the region, at least 1.6 million are gainfully employed in the kingdom. Through their employment and homeward remittances these workers contribute not only to the welfare of their dependent families but also help mitigate India's perennial trade deficit with the region.

However, the manner in which India has approached the political aspects of its relations with Saudi Arabia has been abysmal. The last state visit to Saudi Arabia took place in 1982 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the kingdom. This was nearly quarter of a century after Jawaharlal Nehru's visit in 1956.

Mukherjee's visit came more than seven years after the visit of Jawant Singh in January 2001. Even the hype over King Abdullah's state visit did not usher in a sense of urgency.

In terms of education cooperation, the New Delhi-based Jamia Millia Islamia has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the Saudi largess. During his visit, King Abdullah was conferred an hon orary doctorate by Jamia for his contribution to peace and promotion of IndoSaudi relations. The Saudi monarch reciprocated this gesture by donating US $ 30 million for the construction of a library and research building.

However, the Indo-Saudi relations cannot be studied only through the energyeconomic prism. The desire of King Abdullah (since his earlier days as Crown Prince before ascending to the thrown in 2005), to reframe the traditional Saudi ties with the US through ‘Look East' policy also has security implications. Saudi Arabia would expect greater Indian transparency in dealing with the Gulf.

For example, did Mukherjee inform the King about the impending visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad?

Furthermore, both are on a learning curve. The Saudi brand of Wahhabi Islam and Indian secularism are anti-thetical. Yet, geo-strategic compulsions and hardcore realism will force both to reexamine their past perception of one another. The ‘Look East' policy of Saudi Arabia fits well within the Indian desire for greater economic cooperation with the energy giant. While fundamental dif ferences would not be overcome suddenly both countries would have to make se , rious and concerted effort towards mutual understanding.

India has been extremely accommodative of some of Saudi sensitivities. During his State visit King Abdullah skipped the customary visit to the Rajghat. For the Saudi ruler, laying wreath on Mahatma Gandhi's memorial symbolised idol worship, something impermissible under the Wahhabi Islam.

Indeed, the Indian indifference is not particular to Saudi Arabia. Ever since Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister a host of rulers from the region including Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan were in India. The top leadership of the country could not find time or inclination to organise reciprocal visits. Indeed this neglect of the Middle East comes against the backdrop of highsounding rhetoric about energy security .

If once excludes the recent visit of Vice President M H Ansari, even the energy rich Central Asia had not figured in the radar screen of senior Indian leaders.

The lack of sustained follow-up after King Abdullah's visit has to be located in the absence of a foreign minister who can devote his attention and energy exclusively to external affairs. From the days of Nehru, prime ministers often doubled as foreign ministers, thereby imposing organisational limitations on follow-up measures.

Mukherjee, however, faces different problems. Besides his own prime ministerial ambitions, he is the principal firefighter in the government. He heads scores of committees of Group of Ministers and countless number of official panels and party responsibilities. Of late, mediating with the cantankerous Left parties over the nuclear deal has become his principal function.

With a powerful section of the Congress party now rooting for Rahul Gandhi as the next Prime Minister, Mukherjee perhaps will find more time and energy to the external area. Time has come for him to use his rich political acumen to provide a much needed but a long absent leadership to the South Block. Will he now the play the role Manmohan Singh played when heading the North Block in the 1990s?

Web Version:

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080430000505&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

India and Ahmadinejad's visit

2008-04-27T17:22:00.000-07:00

Friends with Iran or kiss of death?

Rediff News April 28, 2008 15:01 IST
As he touches down in New Delhi on Tuesday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be having the last laugh. Not long ago Prime Minister Manmohan Singh skipped a summit meeting just to avoid being seen with the Iranian leader. What began as a stopover en route from Sri Lanka has blossomed into a hectic State visit.

This is a compromise between a full-fledged State visit and keeping distance from Iran. Not to be left behind, Pakistan hosts the Iranian leader on his way to Sri Lanka. During the few hours in the capital, the visitor would be meeting top Indian leaders, including President Pratibha Patil, Vice President and former ambassador to Iran M H Ansari, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and perhaps Congress President Sonia Gandhi. It is still not clear if Leader of Opposition L K Advani would be meeting the visitor separately.

The visit marks an interesting phase in India's foreign policy. This is the first formal meeting between the mercurial Iranian leader and Prime Minister Singh. Ever since he was elected President in July 2005, Ahmadinejad has been trying to consolidate his stature and international acceptance. With Western criticisms and disapprovals getting louder, he needed to be seen in different parts of the world and courted by prominent world leaders.�He visited all major non-Western powers such as China, Russia and of course Venezuela, which has emerged as the torchbearer of growing anti-Americanism in the Third World.

Partly to further Indo-Iranian ties, but primarily to enhance his international profile and acceptance, Ahmadinejad has been keen to meet Indian leaders. Such an opportunity came in June 2006 during the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council where both India and Iran are 'observers'. Timing, however, was bad. Photo opportunity with Ahmadinejad, the Indian leader feared, would have hardened the critics of the nuclear deal then on Capitol Hill. Hence, Dr Singh skipped that meeting and instead sent Petroleum Minister Murli Deora.

Indeed when Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee went to Teheran in February last year, the Iranian officials ambushed him by suggesting a summit meeting among leaders of India, Iran and Pakistan to sort out their differences over the gas pipeline.

Thus, by hosting the Iranian leader, what does India convey to the outside world? Going by the working of the UPA government, one can infer a few possible explanations.

The visit is most likely to be used by the government to exhibit its 'independent' foreign policy vis-a-vis the US. This would partially assuage the Left and its supporters within the establishment. Spin doctors might stretch it further and hope that by hosting the Iranian leader the government could make the Left 'flexible' on the nuclear deal.

The sudden silence adopted by the US following its initial displeasure over the Indian decision should also be seen within this context. Washington might see the visit as a small price for larger cooperation with India. Unfortunately, Ahmadinejad's visit would not turn things around.

It is more likely that the visit is a signal that the UPA government has given up on the nuclear deal. India courting the Iranian leader is the last thing US President George Bush needed to pacify the critics of the nuclear deal, especially when the Administration is preparing tougher economic sanctions against the Iranian banking system. With the American presidential elections only weeks away, New Delhi is perhaps least concerned about needling Washington.

Two, as a host of developments such as loan waivers, pay commission report, creamy layer debate etc indicate, India is definitely in election mode. Diplomatic parlays with Islamic countries are politically sensible and advantageous to the Congress party. This visit comes within days after Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's much delayed trip to Saudi Arabia.

As National Security Advisor M K Narayanan unabashedly admitted, there is a Shia angle to Ahmadinejad's visit. In simple English, do not forget the elections in Karnataka!

Three, as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi recognised in 1989, anti-Americanism plays well during Lok Sabha elections. A person who was keen to promote closer ties with Washington, he suddenly threw caution to the winds and publicly warned: naani yaad dilayenge. Hence, one should not rule out the possibility of negative reactions from the US after the visit playing a prominent role in electioneering in India.

Four, there are suggestions that outstanding disputes with Iran over the energy supplies could be resolved during the visit. All the three major energy deals with Iran -- namely, pipeline via Pakistan, LNG supplies and energy exploration -- are entangled in price disputes, technological difficulties or other controversies. They cannot be resolved amicably during the short visit but both sides might establish a mechanism for resolution and claim 'breakthrough or win-win deal'.

Whatever the outcome, India would be paying more for the LNG deal than what then Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar signed in January 2005.

Five, Ahmadinejad is the third Iranian President to visit India since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The visits by Hashemi Rafsanjani in April 1995 and Mohammed Khatami in January 2003 happened when Iran abandoned its belligerency towards the outside world and was adopting a more conciliatory policy towards its Arab neighbours.

Ahmadinejad is literally antithetical to both these leaders. Not only he is moving the country back to radicalism, but has adopted stands that unnerve a number of Iran's Arab and non-Arab neighbours. His periodic Holocaust denials have displeased even Khatami who publicly rebuked the Iranian President.

The nuclear bellicosity has put Iran on a confrontationist path not just with the West. The three resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (two of them unanimously) do not speak well of Iran's international stature. Even friendly countries such as Russia and China are no longer willing to accept the Iranian version on the nuclear issue.

Six, though they could never say it in public due to geo-political compulsions, the Arab countries are equally worried about Iran. Even without the nuclear genie, Iran has not hesitated to be a regional bully and ready to play the Shia card whenever necessary. Many Iranian officials are gleeful about the failure of American policy in Iraq and the resultant Shia crescent that extends from Bahrain to Bekaa valley in Lebanon.

Not long ago Saudi King Abdullah accused Teheran of 'converting' Iraqi Sunnis into Shia faith. Indeed, Ahmadinejad's stopover which comes within days after Mukherjee's Saudi visit would cause anxieties in Riyadh.

The foreign policy establishment has often got things wrong, and its 'reading' of the Nepalese elections is the latest example. Wishful thinking often masquerades as assessment. Iran should not be different. Driven by short term gains, India is rolling out the red carpet to Ahmadinejad.

There is nothing wrong if the Indian government concluded that friendship with Iran is more important than the nuclear deal or closer ties with the US. One can recognise, discover and if necessary even invent Iranian virtues. But if India pretends that it would be business as usual the day after, then it would find Ahmadinejad's visit to be a kiss of death.

Web version:

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/apr/28guest.htm

Mubarak's Chutzpah

2008-04-14T20:33:00.000-07:00

Cairo treating India with contempt
New Indian Express (Chennai), Monday April 14 2008 16:39 IST

On Thursday a section of the Indian media reported that Egyptian diplomats in New Delhi were hoping for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries before India goes to polls sometime next year. Following Tuesday Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the first summit meeting with a host of African heads of states. Later that evening an eminent panel headed by Vice President M H Ansari announced that the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 2007 would be bestowed upon India's long-time friend and President of Iceland Dr Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.

What is common to all the three developments that happened in the first week of April is Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak! Cairo's hope for a summit "before" the next Lok Sabha election is an unconcealed euphuism for its leader being the chief guest at the 2009 Republic Day celebrations. If other Middle Eastern leaders such as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2001), Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (2003) and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2006) were given such honours, how could India ignore Mubarak?

At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.

Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.

This is in quiet contrast to his attitude towards others where Mubarak uses his charm offensive. He was in Beijing 2006 when China hosted a summit meeting with African leaders in November 2006. Indeed just weeks ago, he had a highly successful visit to Moscow. For long New Delhi, however, has not figured in his radar screen.

Thirdly, the panel which announced the Nehru award for 2007 could not be unaware that for over a decade the prize money and citation for 1995 is gathering dust because Mubarak could not find time to come to New Delhi and receive the honour.

In July 1997 with much fanfare and also with some diplomatic calculations, a panel headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan selected the Egyptian leader for the Nehru award for 1995. Besides recognising his contribution to international peace, especially to the Middle East peace process, the move was aimed at garnering some diplomatic mileage.

Ever since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

More than a decade later, however, the Nehru award is yet to be conferred upon Mubarak. On two occasions his visit was cancelled at the last minute. Once President Narayanan was indisposed and on another occasion, turbulent events in the region prevented Mubarak from making his trip. But ten years is far too long even for genuine diplomatic excuses.

As per the procedure, the panel that selects the Nehru award is headed by the Vice President with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court functioning as the ex-officio member. Since July 1997 when the award for Mubarak was announced, India had three Vice Presidents and as many as ten new Chief Justices.

Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997. Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."

For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.

The behaviour of Egyptian leader is in complete contrast to the attitude of many other leaders and figures. During the past decade New Delhi has become the favourite destination of many world leaders, East and West and Developed and Developing.

Among others, it has hosted two sitting US Presidents, heads of states of all the major powers, scores of western leaders and Third World personalities. Many countries of the Middle East have discovered the growing importance of India and want to capitalise on its economic growth through high-profiled visits. Egypt was not one of them. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to galvanise the Egyptian indifference.

By conferring honours named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to promote its interests and influence in different parts of world. Unlike political leverages and economic clout, cultural diplomacy resents the soft power and is both effective and harmonising. The attitude of Mubarak, thus, raises serious questions about the rationale behind such cultural diplomacy.

The Egyptian failure to arrange Mubarak's visit for nearly a decade also indicates the current status of Indo-Egyptian relations. This is in contrast to the heydays of friendship between Nehru and President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both leaders met over a dozen times and Cairo was a constant stopover for many of Nehru's sojourns to Europe.

World has changed a lot and so is the Egyptian attitude. While Mubarak could not be forced to come to India, the latter could learn something out of this bitter experience. If India and its leaders are less important, there is no reason for New Delhi to be generous towards Cairo. Having treated the award named after India's first Prime Minister with such distain and contempt, Egypt now wants a sweetener.

But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.

Web version:

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080414061744&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

India Egypt

2008-04-14T17:29:00.000-07:00

Mubarak's chutzpah

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080414061744&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

Mubarak's Chutzpah

2008-04-14T07:00:00.000-07:00

Mubarak's Chutzpah - Cairo treating India with contempt
New Delhi hopes that an award named after Nehru might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 14, 2008

Web Link:

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080414061744&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.

Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.

Even since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997.

Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."

For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.

But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.

Bribes threaten Indo-Israeli military ties

2008-04-01T19:30:00.000-07:00

Investigations into corruption and bribes surrounding the Barak missile deal threatens to upset growing Indo-Israeli ties, ISN Security Watch (01/04/08)

Military ties, the most visible manifestation of Indo-Israeli relations, are being undermined from within by corruption and bribery. To ensure the smooth functioning of its growing military exports, leading Israeli companies have greased a few Indian palms – actions that are now threatening to blow up into a major controversy.

In October 2000, under the government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, India signed a US$250 million Barak missile deal with Israel. Within months, media began revealing large-scale corruption involving senior political figures and arms merchants.

Besides the usual defense agents and greedy politicians, the scandal has also involved members of the naval fraternity. Suresh Nanda - son of the former naval chief who headed the Indian navy during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war - is the prime suspect. He is estimated to have earned about US$100 million in commissions for the Barak deal, while some smaller amounts went to the friends of George Fernandes, India's defense minister at the time the deal was signed. The investigative agencies have also questioned Admiral Sushil Kumar, the then-commander of the Indian Navy.

Furthermore, recommendations against the procurement of Barak by APJ Abdul Kalam, the-then scientific advisor and later on president, worked against the deal, especially when bribes appeared to have tilted the scales.

Defense deals have always been controversial, especially since New Delhi sought to lessen its dependency on Russia. Because its ties with Moscow were tightly controlled and managed, one never heard of money changing hands even when the USSR remained India's most favored arms supplier. Its desire to diversify defense procurements brought in arms merchants who understood and worked within the pulses of the Indian establishment.

In the 1980s, a bribery scandal involving the Swedish Bofors Company adversely affected the electoral prospects of then-prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and cost the Congress party dearly. The long-drawn controversy was largely responsible for the party losing its nation-wide appeal and popularity.

Since then, Indian leaders have been arguing against using middlemen and agents in defense contrast. However, given the complexity of the process, legendary Indian bureaucratic bottlenecks and cut throat completions, conducting major defense deals without agents is nearly impossible.

For its part, the Indian defense establishment is maintaining that the Barak deal was a good acquisition that was badly executed. Similar arguments were put forth by the army at the height of the Bofors scandal: good gun, bad procedure.

Partly with political calculations in mind, upon coming to power in May 2004, the government of Manmohan Singh instituted probes into 48 major defense contracts signed by the previous government. And the Barak deal is not the only one under scrutiny.

According to media reports, Israeli Attorney General Menachem Mazuz is investigating Moshe Keret - the CEO of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for 20 year until 2005 for his role in the Phalcon spy plane deal. The judiciary in Israel has issued a gag order against disclosing the identity of another arms dealer involved in the probe.

As per the original deal signed with China, Israel was to supply four spy planes for US$1 billion. When the US scuttled that deal, Israel found a new buyer in India and agreed to sell three planes for US$1.1 billion. According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, though the Indian deal is still in the implementation phase, "the agent has received an advance of millions of dollars with many more millions promised."

The investigative agencies are closing in on the Indian beneficiaries of the Barak deal, but at the same time, the Indian government will not be able to remain silent on the role played by the Israeli companies.

Already the communist parties who are highly critical of India's defense ties with Israel have jumped at the opportunity and have demanded the blacklisting of Israeli companies involved in the scam. Should the Indian government accept their plea, leading firms such as the state-owned Rafael will be affected as it is involved in a number of defense deals with India.

Within a short span of 15 years, Israel has emerged as the second largest arms supplier to India and New Delhi the prime export destination for Israeli arms. In recent months, both countries are moving into joint defense research and other forms of security cooperation. Despite some disquiet in countries such as Iran and Egypt, both are keen to establish a long-term defense partnership.

Seen in this larger context, the Barak scandal is a major setback and will haunt both defense establishments for a long time to come.

For web version:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=18805

Israel and Hamas

2008-03-26T06:02:00.000-07:00

Israel, Hamas need a strategy

New Indian Express, (Chennai), Wednesday 26, 2008

ONGOING violence between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas is heading for one interesting pos sibility, namely, both sides burying their hatchet and seeking a temporary truce. While full recognition and formal negotiations are still far off, some form of rational interaction between the warring sides is increasingly become inevitable. It is matter of "when" and not "if."

For both sides, military option has become ineffective and politically problematic. A growing number of countries feel that Israel's response to the barrage of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip has been disproportionate.

Even those who sympathise with Israel and endorse its right to defend its civilian population are extremely concerned over the mounting Palestinian civilian casualties. In the latest round, the Israeli forces killed over 100 Palestinians, a vast majority of whom being non-combatants.

Advanced technology and human intelligence significantly diminish the chances of civilian casualties. But the world is yet to witness a weapon that only targets militants, leaving the unarmed unharmed. As Israel often recognises, even targeted killing would have to be extremely accurate, if civilian deaths were to be avoided.

Moreover, as the world once again learnt, Israel lacks an effective military strategy vis-à-vis the militants. Since the late-1980s, it has been fighting a host of militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and factions of mainstream Fatah. More than two decades later, however, Israel is yet to evolve an effective and successful military strategy against non-state actors. In short, Israel's response has not only been disproportionate but also ineffective. If it were to protect its civilian population from rocket attacks, Israel needs a strategy that works.

Even for Hamas the military option has been ineffective and costlier. For months Palestinian militants have been launching Qassam rockets against Sderot in the Negev. In recent weeks, they managed to strike the port city of Ashkelon north of the Gaza Strip. While Israel's human casualties remained small, these rockets have completely disrupted the daily lives of thousands of Israeli civilians, made them vulnerable and exposed the limitations of national defence. Minimal property damage was accompanied by large-scale psychological hardships and fear among Israelis.

By escalating the rocket attacks against Israel, Hamas not only exhibited its capability but also challenged Israeli military might. That it was able to launch Qassams despite massive Israeli responses underscore Hamas' determination, arsenal and organisational effectiveness. The large scale destruction of civilian infrastructure by Israel has not weakened the militants. Put it mildly, Hamas is unable to provide basic necessities to the people of the Gaza Strip but can still deliver Qassam rockets against Israel! This however has not changed the fortunes of the Hamas. International sympathy for the Palestinians is accompanied by widespread disapproval of rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. Even those Arab countries which have little sympathy for Israel are unable to understand let alone endorse the strategy pursued by Hamas-held the Gaza Strip authorities. Not even in private mainstream Arab leaders are prepared to endorse rocket attacks against Israel.

Moreover the military strength has not resulted in any improvement in the political fortunes of Hamas. The political isolation of Hamas-held the Gaza Strip is far from over. Despite the obvious limitations, the international community or those who matter, continue to rely on the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas. The widespread Arab sympathy over Israeli reprisals has not transformed into pro-Hamas sympathies. No Arab ruler is prepared to shift his support from Abbas to Hamas.

Thus, Hamas also needs a strategy that would end its isolation and garner political dividends. While Qassam rockets can ensure its military strength, they are not a sign of Hamas' political acceptance.

Thus, their failed military strategy would eventually force Israel and Hamas to re-examine their attitude towards one another. For Israel, Abbas-led Palestinian Authority is preferable because it is moderate, believes in co-existence and also worked with Israel for over a decade.

But on the flip side, it lacks popular support and becoming increasingly marginalised.

On the critical question preventing Qassam rockets, the effectiveness of Abbas is less than zero. Any meaningful Israeli strategy against Qassam therefore would mean Israel seeking some tacit understanding with Hamas, even if this means undermining Abbas and his determination to isolate the Islamic militants. In short, if Israel were to stop Qassam rockets, Abbas is not the address.

Even if this does not mean mutual recognition, sooner or later Israel will have to deal with Hamas politically.

The Islamic militants also have no option but to deal with Israel politically. Ironic as it might sound, the ability of Hamas to end its diplomatic isolation depends upon Israel. In September 1993 the White House rolled out a red carpet welcome to Yasser Arafat because the Palestinian leader was acceptable to Israel. This changed radically when Arafat ceased to be a peace partner. Israel's isolation of the Palestinian leader resulted in the US disengaging from the Palestinian leader. Pro-Arafat Arab countries did nothing to his confinement within his Ramallah compound.

The fate of Hamas will not be different. Its ability to emerge as a player in the Middle East peace process would inevitably require some Israel acquiescence, acceptance and gradual recognition. Without that Hamas will not be able to convert its military attacks against Israel into political dividends. By offering security guarantees to Israel in the form of suspension of Qassam attacks, Hamas could emerge as meaningful political player in the Middle East.

For its part, ensuring civilian security is of paramount importance to Israel rather than ideological rigidity towards dealing with Hamas. If it can rein in and control its rank and file Hamas will find Israel to be its partner. An effective hardliner like Hamas is a rational choice for Israel rather than ineffective moderates like Abbas.

Israel may be less sensitive towards the sufferings of the Palestinians but it is hyper about its own casualties. This will inevitably force Israel to re-examine its policy towards Hamas.

Here the Palestinians are at a great disadvantage. By elevating them as martyrs, Hamas has reduced the Palestinians as a cannon fodder for its suicidal policies. Time has thus come for Hamas to re-examine the efficacy of its military strategy within the context of Palestinian suffering. Palestinians lives should be protected and cherished and not squandered on mindless militant ideology. If it wants the international community to abhor the killing of innocent civilians, the Palestinian leadership, especially the Hamas should start valuing the lives of the Palestinians. The living souls are as valuable as the dead. When they start valuing lives of their own people a bit more seriously, the Israel-Hamas cooperation becomes inevitable.

Gaza crisis

2008-02-12T08:00:00.000-08:00

Exodus to catastrophe?

New Indian Express, Chennai, Feb 12, 2008

THE massive humanitarian catastrophe along the Gaza-Egypt border underscores the shortsighted attitude of various Middle Eastern leaders and the apathy of the international community. Literally over half a million Palestinians broke into Egypt, something many had not anticipated. Cornered by prolonged Israeli economic blockade, international isolation and Arab indifference, there were no option before the people of the impoverished the Gaza Strip.

For months the Gaza Strip was like a tightly sealed pressure cooker waiting to explode. The intensification of the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip in mid-January was followed by severe shortage of fuel and food supplies.

Recognising the internal tensions, Hamas literally broke down the fragile barriers with Egypt north of the Rafah crossing and opened the floodgate.

Thousands of Gazans moved into the Sinai Peninsula to buy and stock up basic necessities such as bread.

However, given the magnitude of the human exodus, restoring status quo ante along the Gaza-Egypt border will be easier said than done. With none of the major players having any viable option, "stabilisation" is perhaps the best anyone could hope for, if that is possible.

The crisis once again underscored the limitations of Israel's skewed policy following its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. While pulling out from the Strip enjoyed widespread domestic support, it did not lead to an overall reshaping of Israel's foreign policy priorities. The Gaza pullout should have been followed by a similar withdrawal from large portions of the West Bank. While unilateralism was feasible in the Gaza Strip, any Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territory in the West Bank would have to be a negotiated arrangement. The tragic stroke suffered by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and inept leadership of Ehud Olmert meant that the Gaza withdrawal became an end in itself. It failed to become a part of a larger Israeli arrangement with the Palestin ian leadership.

Furthermore, as highlighted by the second Lebanon war in the summer of 2006 and the ongoing rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, Israel has not developed an effective response to militant groups. At one level, Israel cannot afford to expose its citizens to the constant barrage of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip but at the same time, it is unable to go beyond retaliatory strikes that are ineffective.

The electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006 and its taking full control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of last year, meant Israel imposing a virtual embargo upon the nearly million and half Palestinians. When Israel tightened the restrictions, Palestinians broke through the barrier. As some Hamas leaders have warned, next time around Palestinians will flood into Israel, with ominous consequences.

Egypt is equally in a precarious situation. No country could accept such a large-scale uncontrolled movement of foreigners into its territory. What happened in Sinai was a virtual invasion.

Already fighting domestic militants, President Hosni Mubarak does not need another militant-related humanitarian crisis. Having sided with President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority over the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, Mubarak has no option but to deal with the Islamic movements to re-establish border control. Even though success cannot be guaranteed, Egypt has very little option other than to re-engage with Hamas.

Progress on border control will heavily depend upon Cairo's ability to offer significant political concessions to Hamas and its preparedness to be a mediator between rival Palestinian factions. Though Mubarak had played such a role in the past, this time around, he would be doing it under duress, necessitated by the Palestinian exodus into Egypt.

At third level, the crisis has undermined the position of Abbas and his extravagant claims of being the sole representative of all Palestinians. Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, described by some as coup d'état, Abbas was unable to set foot in the Gaza Strip. Partly aimed at his western audience and supporters, he has scrupulously avoided any negotiations with Hamas.
In recent days Abbas has expressed his willingness to take ‘control' of the Gaza-Egypt border. This is a daydream. This will be possible only if Abbas is able to cooperate with Hamas. Otherwise the recognised Palestinian leadership will be a nonplayer in resolving the Gaza exodus.

Other players are also equally busy.

If the US is in the middle of an intense election campaign, the others have rarely changed anything in the Middle East for the better. As various other regional problems highlighted, the Arab League is reduced to being a talking shop.

Contrary to widespread perception, Hamas also has not come out well. By blowing up the fences, it was able to let go the internal tensions and provided a temporary air to the beleaguered peo ple of the Strip. By forcing Cairo to reengage with it, the group has also obtained some political mileage. The current crisis might also compel President Abbas to reevaluate his refusal to deal with Hamas. These are not insignificant.

But, if one takes a broader look, Hamas has also come out badly from the crisis. Ever since it's electoral victory in January 2006, the organisation has brought more miseries to Palestinians than benefits. While Israeli intransigence and Arab indifferences are crucial, Hamas also cannot escape from its share. Since the Oslo accord of 1993, Hamas has consistently challenged the legitimacy and authority of the Palestinian Authority and its chairman Yasser Arafat. It did all it could to sabotage the peace process.

After the 2006 electoral victory, Hamas sang a different tune: total Palestinian acceptance of its legitimacy, especially on the peace process.

Even the Saudi mediation which resulted in the Mecca accord was insufficient to bridge the internal schisms. Rather than working in tandem with the other groups, especially Fatah, Hamas violently challenged the authority of Abbas and took full control of the Gaza Strip.

Not many would have forgotten masked Hamas militants stamping over the portraits of Arafat when they took over Palestinian offices.

Not only has it refused to negotiate with Israel, Hamas has been continuously launching rockets into Israel, especially at the western Negev town of Sderot. Its refusal to reign in rocket attacks has resulted in Israeli retaliations and economic sanctions, which in turn ended in the Gaza-Egypt crisis. Hamas can divert the attention and blame Israel and others for the problem. But in the long run, it cannot escape the inevitable question: Is Hamas ready to take responsibility and start governing? Without serious soul searching by all major players, the current crisis is a step closer to catastrophe for Palestinian national aspirations.

India and Israeli Satellite

2008-01-28T16:56:00.000-08:00

With Israel, is sky the limit?

New Indian Express (Chennai), Tuesday, January 29, 2008

The successful launch of 300 kilogram Israeli satellite on Monday by the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV-C10) from Satish Dawan Space Centre in Sriharikota undoubtedly marks a new stage in the Indo-Israeli relations. Also known as Polaris, TecSar has a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), a radar system which is more advanced than the Ofek generation satellites that Israel currently relies on. This allweather satellite is capable of providing images with a resolution of up to 10 centimetres.

Media reports in Israel were quick to point out that this new spy satellite significantly enhances Israel's intelligence capability and offers a roundthe-clock monitoring of its principal foe in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran. With its lingering suspicions over Iran's nuclear ambition, the launch could not have come at a better time for Israel.

For the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Polaris is a vindication of growing international confidence in its ability to successfully place satellites in orbit. Not long ago, it placed an Italian satellite in orbit and the Indian space industry is keen to corner a significant portion of this growing market. With only a handful of countries capable of launching satellites, the market is rather lucrative and aspires to earn about Rs 750 crores before the current financial year ends in March.

The issue however, is not as straightforward as some would like to believe.

Launching of satellite, especially spy satellites, is never a simple commercial transaction, more so, if it involves Israel.

The pre-launch publicity which is normally associated with the ISRO was conspicuous by its absence. As one keen media observer noted, the formal announcement was made not by the space agency but Antrix, the marketing and commercial arm of the ISRO.

The launch was originally slated for late last year but had to be postponed a few times. While space officials attribute this to "technical difficulties" and weather, media reports suggest that the delay was due to intense "political pressures" from the Gulf countries.

No country is however, formally named. Given the tacit political understanding that exists between them and the Jewish State, the Arab countries are unlikely to lose their sleep over an Israeli spy satellite. Indeed some of the smaller countries like Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) have unpublicised low-level Israeli representations on their soil. Hence, it is safe to assume that such pressures, if real, could have come primarily from Iran.

Not known for its restraint, the Israeli media was quick to flag the Iran ian angle. Unnamed Israeli officials were quoted as saying that the Polaris gives "Israel the capability to keep an eye on the Iranian nuclear programme." In the light of the tension and war of words between Israel and Iran, such statements are bound to paint India as an active collaborator in Israel's military strategy vis-à-vis Iran.

Put simply, should Israel resort to a military option against Iran's nuclear installations in future, Polaris would be pivotal. Perhaps it was due to this consideration that the launch was surrounded with secrecy.

Second, though the space agency might present it as a commercial enterprise, India's participation in the Polaris highlight India's growing military-intelligence cooperation with Israel. Spy satellites are often clear political signals. Through the launch India also signals its growing confi dence in forging security partnership with Israel. Since the relations were established in January 1992, military relations primarily benefited India.

Through arms sales and upgrading of aging Soviet weapons, Israel significantly contributed to the Indian military establishment. For its part Israel benefited economically.

The satellite launch marks a new phase and indicates India's willingness to play an active part towards Israeli security calculations. By enabling Israel acquire real-time intelligence over its adversaries India is enhancing Israel's security.

Three, the launch should not be seen in isolation. Last July the Cabinet Committee on Security approved a $2.5 billion project for the development of missiles capable of intercepting aircraft and other aerial targets. To be undertaken jointly by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries, this was a marked improvement in India's security ties with Israel.

From the erstwhile the cash-and-carry approach, New Delhi took a quantum leap towards joint defence research.

Four, the launch was also a subtle but firm message of the UPA government to the coalition partners, especially to the Left parties. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada by the Palestinians in September 2000, the Left has been highly critical of the bilateral relations. When the BJP was in power, it even depicted them a part of the anti-Muslim agenda of hindut va. Hence, after Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister in May 2004, the Left parties were demanding "a course correction" and the freezing of all military-security ties with Israel.

Not only did the UPA government not oblige the Left, but it has also taken bilateral relations to a higher level.

Joint missile defence and Polaris launch are a part of its willing to consolidate is military-security ties with Israel, despite the Left. Unlike the NDA, the UPA government is more transparent in disclosing its military transactions with Israel. Furthermore, such actions challenge the argument that the Indo-Israeli relations are a part of the anti-Muslim agenda. When the Cong party which is conscious of its Muslim support base is seeking military cooperation with Israel, the antiMuslim rationale depicted by the Left becomes impossible to sustain.

The launch, however, could generate some criticisms, concerns and negative reactions. Given the Israeli rhetoric, Iran is bound to react strongly. Some in Tehran might even accuse New Delhi of joining hands with the "Little Satan", the ayatollahs favourite expression for the Jewish state. As happened following India's vote in IAEA in September 2005, Iran might link the spy satellite to ongoing price negotiations over energy supplies. Despites its own problems with the ayatollahs, Egypt which is yet to come to terms with the Indo-Israeli normalisation, might join the chorus.

Other countries however, would not be blind towards the larger realities. India's bilateral relations with the Gulf countries are independent of Israel and vice-versa. Put it differently, Israel will not be able to address India's energy security and the Arab world can't address India's military security.

As the ISRO Chief Madhavan Nair aptly described, the Polaris is "a landmark event." But definitely not for the technical finesse of the launch.

India Sril Lanka

2008-01-17T19:06:00.000-08:00

Lanka & the Lakshman Rekha

New Indian Express, (Chennai), January 18, 2008, Friday.

SCHEDULING problems. That is how Prime Minister Manmohan Singh opted to resolve the controversy surrounding his anticipated visit to Colombo for the 60th Independence Day celebrations of Sri Lanka on February 4. The disappointment in Colombo was understandable especially when the Indian leader was expected to be the chief guest.

Since becoming President in November 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse has visited India thrice; two state visits in December 2005 and November 2006 and the summit meeting of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in April 2007. Manmohan Singh who was happy to host him, however, had to operate under different sets of constraints.

India is yet to come to terms with its bitter experience vis-a-vis its southern neighbour. If the ill-conceived Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 and the subsequently deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the Tamil Tigers were not sufficient, the brutal assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a female suicide bomber in 1991, virtually ended Indias involvement in the Lankan civil war. By encouraging Norwegian mediation, New Delhi has largely washed its hands off the long standing conflict.

As the current head of the SAARC, the Indian leader would be making an official visit to Colombo before handing over the responsibility to the latter. But to participate in such a visible event like the Independence Day celebrations was not something that India could contemplate easily.

Yet, New Delhi cannot ignore the Sri Lankan policy towards the ethnic conflict. Despite the costly war and human losses, Colombo has not formally abandoned the military option. It is hopeful of 'resolving' the problem by eliminating the cadres of Tamil Tigers. Media speculation about the health and welfare of LTTE supremo V Prabhakaran is part of this military option.

New Delhi should also remind Colombo that even if a complete military 'victory' over LTTE, if that is ever possible, will not resolve the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. Tamil militancy gained prominence because of the systematic marginalisation of the Tamil minorities and not the other way around. One Muttiah Muralitharan or Lakshman Kadirgamar does not make Sri Lanka as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural republic.

Secondly, New Delhis avoidance of a mediatory role and its desire for good neighbourliness should not imply that India is turning a blind eye to the destruction of innocent civilians, especially women and children, by the Lankan army. Because such violence evokes strong resentment and public anger within the country, New Delhi will have to abandon its deep slumber over Sri Lanka.

However, if it wants to avoid revisiting the saga of the 1980s, New Delhi has to draw its Lakshman rekha not only vis-a-vis Colombo but also vis-a-vis Chennai.

The events of the 1980s were also a reminder of the tensions within India's foreign policy: conflicting perceptions, one might even say interest, between New Delhi and Chennai visא-a-vis Sri Lanka. The ethno-national links with Sri Lankan Tamils play out strongly in the Tamil Nadu politics. Driven by narrow worldview and electoral calculations, many have turned a blind eye to blatant act of terrorism pursued by the Tamil militants or the widespread presence of child soldiers in their ranks. With the result, not many were abhorred by widespread fratricide and elimination of prominent non-LTTE personalities.

While Rajiv's assassination was a setback, pro-Tiger sentiments are still visible. Thus, even while being Chief Minister M Karunanidhi could openly eulogise a slain LTTE leader, without New Delhi making a murmur. All said and done, technically S P Tamilselvan was a member of a banned 'terrorist organisation' for its suspected involvement in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. Surviving on the support of the 39 MPs from the state, however, the ruling UPA does not have the stomach to annoy the Dravidian leader. The political compulsions of the state thus, are so strong and paradoxical that pro-LTTE and anti- LTTE forces often co-exist amicably; just as J Jayalalithaa is happy with pro-LTTE Vaiko the Congress survives on the DMK.

It is time, New Delhi draws its Lakshman rekha vis-a-vis the politicians of Tamil Nadu, especially those members of the UPA coalition. As a democratic country India would have to listen, accommodate and reflect concerns and aspirations of all segments of the population. The right of different groups to influence policy is a pre-condition for democracy. A contrary view regarding the rights of different ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups would mean end of democracy in India.

Such a right is also essential in the foreign policy arena. Strong ethnocultural heritage and linkages have enabled a number of groups to articulate stands vis-a-vis certain aspects of Indian foreign policy.

The Bengali elite for example, wield considerable influence upon India's policy towards Bangladesh. Same is true for Kashmiris vis-a-vis Pakistan. As publicly stated by the Prime Minister in September 2005, India's policy towards Iran has a Shia component.

Similarly, the people of Tamil Nadu who share strong ethno-national and linguistic heritage and affinity with the Tamils of Sri Lanka, has an inherent right and duty to influence India's policy regarding Colombo, especially over the ethnic conflict. A contrary position will be untenable in a democracy. Hence, despite the lame excuse of 'scheduling problem' it is widely recognised that the reluctance of Manmohan Singh to visit the island republic at this juncture is primarily due to pressures and demands from his coalition partners, especially the DMK and its allies.

As a democracy, New Delhi cannot ignore the concerns of various ethnic, national and religious groups while formulating its foreign policy. At the same time, it is essential to recognise that interests and positions of a particular group will not always be in sync with wider national interest.

As with corporate lobbying, ethno- national groups would advocate positions which are not beneficial to the larger society and this is true for Tamil politics.

While Singh's visit would have strengthened the position of President Rajapakse, it would also be interpreted as a sign of Indian endorsement of the military option and the Lankan abrogation of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE. Hence, not going to Colombo is the best option, despite the stated reasons.

At the same time, Singh will not be able to put off visiting Sri Lanka forever, especially with Colombo hosting the SAARC summit later this year. So, pressures from Chennai will resurface.

Many in the state would see electoral dividends from the stronger Indian stand towards Sri Lanka. The active involvement and eventual intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s were the result of New Delhi accepting the demands of the leaders of Tamil Nadu.

Driven by emotions, the political forces in the state pushed for a course that eventually proved disastrous for all. One should at least learn from the past. Put it differently, Chennai can influence but not set New Delhi's agenda regarding Colombo. Even geography says it: Sri Lanka is east of Tamil Nadu but south of New Delhi.

******

Benazir UN Probe

2008-01-04T19:53:00.000-08:00

UN probe a non-starter

New Indian Express, Saturday January 5 2008 07:40 IST

THE demand by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) for an inquiry by the United Nations into the death of its leader and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, has exposed not only the diminishing credibility of the Pakistani establishment under President Parvez Musharraf but also wider problems facing Pakistan.

Thanks to Musharraf’s strong-arm tactics against the senior judges, independent judicial investigation is no longer an option for Pakistan. By replacing independent-minded judges with his Men Fridays, Musharraf has systematically destroyed the impartially of the judiciary.

Even the minimal credibility of the government was lost when the establishment claimed that Ms. Bhutto was killed not by the assassin’s bullets but due to injuries she suffered from the sunroof lever of her Toyota Land Cruiser. Even if Ms. Bhutto’s body was eventually exhumed for post-mortem, any official explanation about the actual cause of her death would have few takers within the country. It was under these circumstances, the new leadership of PPP, has demanded a probe by the UN.

Such a far-reaching demand for an international intervention into a domestic situation highlights internal schism within the country. Ms. Bhutto pointing needle of suspicion at the President has only complicated the matter. If Musharraf was part of the plot against Ms. Bhutto, he cannot be a part of the investigation into her death! However, by demanding an inquiry by the UN, the Pakistani leaders have raised the stakes. Though unusual, this is not unprecedented. The UN is currently investigating the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who was killed in a terror attack in February 2005.

The parallels between killing of Hariri and Benazir are rather interesting. Like Benazir, Hariri was a popular leader who remained a thorn in the Lebanese establishment. His policies were at odds with President Emile Lahoud, who was seen closer to Syria.

In a country rife with sectarian divisions, Hariri emerged as a unifying force. As a wealthy businessman with closer links with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, he had considerable political clout abroad. In short, like Ms. Bhutto, even while out of office, he was popular both within and outside the country.

These qualifications, ironically made Hariri a threat to powerful sections of the Lebanese establishment tied to Damascus. His independence came in the way of large-scale Syrian military presence (some might say occupation) in Lebanon. His popularity undermined Syrian ability to dictate Lebanese politics.

There were apprehensions that Hariri could be victorious in the 2006 parliament elections and challenge the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. It was under such circumstances Hariri was brutally killed in a car bomb in Beirut that also killed 22 others.

Widespread anger at Hariri’s killing however galvanised the popular opposition against Syria and eventually forced Damascus to pullout its troops which came to Lebanon following the outbreak of the Civil war in 1975. At the same time, prolonged Syrian military presence, coupled with the refusal of Damascus to recognize Lebanese independence and sovereignty, made official investigation into the killing of Hariri an impossible preposition.

Many attributed Hariri’s assassination to his anti-Syrian policies. Despite the formal withdrawal of its troops Syria maintained considerable influence and leverage in the country, especially through the Islamic militant group the Hezbollah. Under such circumstances, Lebanese investigation into Hariri’s death became a non-starter. Hence, supporters of Hariri demanded an international investigation into the killing of their leader.

The dissimilarities between the murders of Hariri and Ms. Bhutto are also interesting. The UN probe for Hariri however, enjoyed the unqualified support of the US and also of France, an erstwhile patron of Syria.

Capitalising on the popular sentiments within Lebanon, these two countries worked with others and prodded the UN to act. The anti-Syrian rhetoric of the Bush Administration and the hasty Syrian retreat from Lebanon enabled the UN Security Council to swiftly act. The spate of killings of anti-Syrian personalities following Hariri’s assassination had also helped the situation.

After months of behind-the-scene negotiations and arms twisting by Washington, in April 2005 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1595 that called for an International independent Investigation Commission into the killing of Hariri.

Initially it asked German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis to head the probe and he was later replaced by Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz. Their prolonged investigation implicated Lebanese and Syrian intelligence in the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister.

Such an international backing however is unlikely over Ms. Bhutto’s killing. Despite its strong criticisms, Washington is unlikely to exert similar pressure for an UN probe. Given the fragility of the situation in Pakistan and widespread violence, Washington can ill-afford to openly express no-confidence on Musharraf.

The US pushed for a UN probe over Hariri because it enabled Washington to heighten its pressures against Syria which was impeding some of American policies in the Middle East, especially over the peace process.

A similar move over Benazir however would not only alienate the Musharraf administration but also might accentuate further tensions within Pakistan. Without a resolute great power demand, the UN is unlikely to get involved in Benazir’s killing.

Second, it is not clear if the PPP leaders had a closer look similar UN involvement in Lebanon. More than anything else, the Hariri probe has accentuated internal tensions within Lebanon. Indeed, the country is functioning without a president ever since Lahoud completed his term on November 23 as both sides were unable to agree on a mutually acceptable candidate. Far from healing the wounds, a UN probe might only complicate things for Pakistan.

Three, the track record of the Hariri probe is not encouraging. Two chiefs, three years and four reports later, the Hariri file still remains open. Given the political nature of the UN as well as patronage enjoyed by Syria, it is extremely unlikely that anyone would ever be held personally responsible for Hariri’s killing, let alone be convicted.

Hence, there is no reason to believe that if and when the UN takes over the Benazir case, the end result would be any different.

However, the demand for an international probe underscores deep divisions within Pakistan. Through his short-sightedness, blatant nepotism and sheer inefficiency, President Musharraf has systematically destroyed major institutions of Pakistan.

While none, not even his friends in Washington, believed him to be a democrat, many had high hopes on his willingness and ability to fight terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Growing militancy and violence in different parts of Pakistan has severely undermined his usefulness for the American “war on terrorism.” Thanks to Musharraf even the army could no longer be looked upon to save the country. Benazir’s killing was the last straw.

By demanding the world body to investigate a domestic political killing, Pakistani leaders have raised the banner of helplessness. Whether one likes or not, Benazir’s death is a Pakistani problem. Hence solution would have be Pakistani one. No external power, however well intended, would be able to establish the real cause of her death. Meanwhile, Benazir’s assassination would only intensify conspiracy theories, hidden hands and unresolved mysteries.

India, Iran and the US

2008-01-04T04:58:00.000-08:00

Delhi: Between Tehran and Washington

Middle East Quarterly, winter 2008

As the U.S.-Iranian dispute escalates, both Washington and Tehran seek friends and allies. New Delhi is caught in the middle. While the U.S.-Indian partnership has grown closer in recent years, New Delhi's approach toward Iran's suspected nuclear program causes concern in Washington. Overshadowing the debate is India's own nuclear program. With the July 2005 U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal yet to win U.S. Senate ratification, is India seeking to strengthen its energy security through Iran? Or is New Delhi pursuing the civilian nuclear deal without being sensitive to Washington's concerns vis-à-vis Iran?

Full text of the article can be found at:

http://www.meforum.org/article/1821

India and Annapolis

2007-11-29T20:19:00.001-08:00

Ready to mediate at Annapolis?

New Indian Express, Friday November 30, 2007

EVEN the most optimistic in Washington do not visualise any major breakthrough at Annapolis but by organising the biggest game in town for over seven years, the Bush Administration does not wish to exclude anyone.

While widespread participation might not result in a fruitful outcome, exclusion would undoubtedly have ruffled many feathers and hurt egos. Like a major wedding in town, anyone who matters was invited to the Annapolis Middle East peace conference. So was India.

While the presence of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee might have provided an opportunity for India to interact with other leaders, it would have created unnecessary expectations.

Non-political representation would have made its presence symbolic and insignificant. Through Science Minister Kapil Sibal, who in recent months has emerged as the main, if not sole defender of the nuclear deal in public, the government also sends a subtle message to Washington on the bilateral front.

Some might conclude the invitation to be a sign of recognition of the Indian diversity and even as a “role model” for a lasting peace in the region. Washington has no such illusions.

During much of his tenure President George W Bush avoided the vexed Arab-Israeli conflict like a plague. It was growing anti-Americanism more than anything else that appeared to have catapulted him to act. So with less than a year before leaving the White House, the administration has invested considerable effort and political capital in organising the largest Middle East gathering since the Madrid conference of 1991.

Partly to answer his critics for his unilateralism, President Bush opted to make Annapolis as wide as possible and managed to rope in all major players in the Middle East and beyond. With the notable exception of Hamas which controls the Gaza Strip and Iran, the Administration secured the participation of all major powers, key Middle Eastern players and important regional powers, groups and institutions. The two radicals excluded themselves by opting out of the peace process and not because the US did not want them at Annapolis.

As some western and other leaders discovered in recent months, doing Washington’s bidding is a political liability. Hence the willingness of Syria to attend the event was a diplomatic coup and so was the reluctant attendance of Saudi Foreign Minister.

That most of the countries were represented by their Foreign Ministers was no mean achievement, especially for an Administration that has been vilified for months over its Middle East policy.

The conference also enabled the US to reach out its rivals, recognise regional importance of others and convey “Not-forgotten-you” thank you note to some. While the presence of many countries adds to the prestige and importance of the conference, the US knows that only the two principal parties and not others who could make that leap. Thus while the absence of key players would definitely sabotage the efforts, the presence of so many countries will not by itself make the settlement any closer.

Thus, one should not read too much into India’s presence at Annapolis. Its exclusion on the contrary, might have been viewed as a sign of American displeasure over India backtracking on the nuclear front or worse a pressure tactic. Especially with Pakistan also being there, Indian exclusion would be controversial. By inviting Delhi to Annapolis, the administration reiterates its willingness to recognise India's role in a major international event.

Annapolis also highlights changing times for India. Following normalisation of relations with Israel in 1992, India was supportive of various peace initiatives and in the early 1990s took part in the multilateral arms control talks. But its overall presence was marginal. Not having normal relations with the Jewish State for over four decades, its ability to influence the peace process was less than zero.

During a decade and half, as the bilateral relations improved, it had acquired considerable political capital and economic leverage vis-à-vis Israel.

The manner in which both Congress and non-Congress governments handled the relations exhibit a degree of self-confidence and maturity. It is no longer uneasy let alone apologetic about its friendship with Israel.

Except for occasional jarring notes from Cairo, much of the Middle East have come to terms with India’s willingness to pursue closer ties with Israel, including strong military-security cooperation. Reflecting this even mainstream Palestinian leadership sings a different tune: will New Delhi use its leverage vis-à-vis Israel to further the peace process? Handled tactfully, Annapolis offers India the opportunity to recognise the nuanced and complex demands of a peace maker. Even if success remains elusive and even impossible, like others, India would have to strive for peace in the Middle East. Regional stability serves India’s larger interest, welfare and security.

To be taken seriously, however, India has to drop its blinkers. First and foremost, India should not have illusions about its role in Annapolis or beyond. New Delhi can’t dream of achieving what the US, with all its powers and influence, could not bring about: a comprehensive settlement. Nor should it kid itself into believing or propagating it as a model for others. Just like other models did not work for India, its model won’t work for others.

Thankfully, so far none asked India to be a model. Second, to be a credible player in the Middle East peace process, India would have to be more careful in expressing its views. This was highlighted during the second Lebanese war in the summer of last year. In the initial days, it adopted a balanced position and like much of the Arab world blamed the Hezbollah for kidnapping Israeli soldiers that precipitated the crisis.

Subsequently when the mood in the Middle East swung in favour of the militant group, India joined others in condemning Israel for attacking civilian population and infrastructure in Lebanon. The Indian parliament went on to adopt a onesided resolution that was silent on Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli civilians.

While this was perhaps unavoidable due to public pressures from the Left parties, Indian officials went a step further. When the post-ceasefire mediation efforts were on, Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to the region pointedly skipped Israel, whose role was central to the stability along the Israel-Lebanese border. While public criticisms might shore up some domestic support and garner some publicity abroad, they undermine India’s ability to play a meaningful role in the peace process.

New Delhi might conclude that airing strong views in public is more important than mediating the conflict. But if it wants a seat in the hightable, it would have to learn the art of silence. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told parliament during the Czech crisis, when you are in front of avalanches, even slight murmurs will unleash tons of ice.

Mediating the Middle East is not about rights and wrongs but the art of winning over enemies and influencing friends. If Sibal and his team recognise this, Indian presence in Annapolis would have been a worthwhile exercise.

Islam and Minorities

2007-09-06T04:45:00.000-07:00

In Islam and Minorities (Mediterranean Quarterly, summer 2007) I argue that Dhimmi, the only framework available in Islam, is inadequate to treat not only non-Islamic communities but also sects within Islam. If interested you can find the full text at: http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/3/94

India's Nucler Summer

2007-08-24T02:08:00.001-07:00

India's woeful mishandling of negotiations over the 123 Agreement leave some to wonder about the government's ability to manage itself on the international stage.

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (24/08/07)

"Running around like headless chickens."

This was how India's ambassador in Washington, Ronen Sen, described the domestic critics of India's nuclear deal with the US. This tasteless remark believed to be directed at Indian lawmakers might eventually cost him his job. Unfortunately, for him and the Indian government, the critics are growing by the day.

From the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the right to the communist parties on the left, a host of groups question the just-concluded agreement, commonly referred to as the 123 Agreement. Many argue that by including domestic US nonproliferation laws into the work, India has "surrendered" its sovereignty. While parliamentary ratification is not mandatory, should the deal be put to vote, the government would be shown the door.

If the BJP is the open adversary, the left parties have been a doubtful ally ever since Manmohan Singh became prime minister following the May 2004 elections. The left also demands that that the government not negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA toward implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal. Without such an agreement, India would not be able to convince the powerful Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) to accept the Indo-US deal and operationalize it. With internal “friends” like the left, Manmohan Singh does not need external enemies.

The problem however, is largely India's own making. From the very beginning, New Delhi did not factor in Washington's expectations while pursuing the nuclear deal. It never recognized let alone internalized US baggage vis-à-vis Iran. Even the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) was not taken into account when India started its energy strategy toward Iran.

The Indian leaders pretended that they could obtain energy supplies from Iran and civilian nuclear technology from the US without squaring the circle. They failed to recognize India's non-parallel interests with the US over Iran.

This ignorance proved to be costly. Having talked of "civilizational links" with that country, India voted against Iran at the IAEA in September 2005 and again in 2006 to refer the Iran file to the UN Security Council. The manner in which India handled and justified its vote gave an unmistakable impression that New Delhi acted under US pressures, if not dictates.

This lack of clarity and foresight is not the prerogative of the present government alone, but has become a bipartisan national disease. When it was in office, the BJP was more than eager to send troops to Iraq to shore up beleaguered US President George W Bush. It eventually backed out when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee recognized opposition from his own collation partners.

For its part, the left in India is more Maoist than the Chinese. It is blissfully happy to live under a nuclear China but could not accept India going nuclear in 1998. Some also fault the government for not joining hands with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), increasingly seen as a counterweight to NATO.

As it stands, a vast majority of the lawmakers, especially the communist allies whose support is essential for the survival of the government, are unlikely to accept the nuclear deal. At the same time, the Indian government would not be able renegotiate the deal with the US without losing its credibility. The international community, especially the NSG, would be reluctant to deal with such a sensitive issue when Indian government looks to be on its way out.

Ever since the nuclear deal was initialed in July 2005, Indian officials naively hoped that the US would bring about far-reaching changes in its domestic nonproliferation laws, silence the nuclear ayatollahs, convince other countries to accept the deal and work with key players like China not to oppose the deal at the NSG. The Bush administration would take these far-reaching steps, New Delhi hoped, while it was not prepared to accommodate American concerns over the nuclear stand off with Iran.

Had India read US expectations early and clearly, it would have approached the nuclear deal more carefully and avoided the minefield. It would have understood the political price and prepared the domestic public accordingly. Even if India was not prepared to go all the way, it could have evolved reasonable redlines on the Iran front and convinced the domestic as well as US public. This however, did not happen and as it was forced to recognize, there are no free lunches in Washington.

The manner in which Indian leaders handled the Indo-US nuclear deal pose a fundamental challenge: Are they capable of making a cost-benefit analysis of India's national interest and to convince domestic skeptics before seeking international recognition and cooperation?

Weblink

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18028

India's nuclear dance over Iran

2007-08-22T01:00:00.000-07:00

The full text of India's Nuke Dance over Iran published in August 2007 issue of Strategic Insights (Monterey, CA) is available at:

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/kumaraswamyAug07.asp

Indo-Israel defense ties

2007-08-03T04:19:00.000-07:00

Indo-Israeli military ties enter next stage

A US$2.5 billion Indo-Israeli defense project marks a new phase in the two countries' relations.
Commentary by P R Kumaraswamy for ISN Security Watch (03/08/07)

India's recent decision to develop jointly a new generation of surface-to-air missile with Israel is a quantum leap in the two countries' relations.

In early July, India's Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved the US$2.5 billion defense project with Israel. The development of missiles capable of intercepting aircraft and other aerial targets at a range of 70 kilometers to be undertaken by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries.

This is not only the largest single deal involving Israel but also marks a new phase in defense-related cooperation between the two countries.

Ever since diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, both countries have actively cooperated in the defense arena, with India obtaining a large number of small arms, weapons, avionics, ship-launched Barak missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel.

Counter-terrorism and border management techniques figure prominently in these regular deliberations.

Within the next few weeks, India will launch the first Israeli satellite, and there is speculation in the Indian media that it will be a spy satellite.

In recent years, service chiefs and other senior military officials have been periodically visiting one another. In May this year, the Indian Defense Minister informed the parliament that from 2002-2007, India obtained over US$5 billion worth of military weapons and systems from Israel. Others suggest that in 2006 alone India's defense imports from Israel stood at US$1.6 billion.

The bourgeoning Indo-Israeli military ties are helped by favorable winds from Washington: its endorsement for the Israeli sale of Phalcon airborne early warning systems to India was a case in point. This deal estimated at over US$1 billion dollars came against the background of the US vetoing similar sale to China.

The new decision on missile development conveys a number of strong messages. Until now, Indo-Israeli military ties have largely been a cash-and-carry affair. India's desire to modernize its aging Soviet-made weapons and defense systems were made possible by Israeli expertise in upgrading and avionics. Though important, this approach has its limitations, especially when Israel does not develop major platforms that India requires for defense modernization.

Since normalization, there were suggestions that meaningful long-term cooperation would demand greater synergy between the two defense establishments. A number of on-going programs in India are not radically differently from their Israeli counterparts. These include plans to develop light combat aircraft, main battle tanks, missiles such as Prithvi and Agni, unmanned aerial vehicles and early warning radar systems. The joint missile research therefore signals that both countries are confident about moving beyond traditional arms sales and onto the next stage.

The timing of the decision is equally important. Ever since Manmohan Singh became India's prime minister in May 2004, the left-leaning parties have been demanding an end to military cooperation with Israel. Though they are not formally part of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), their support is vital for the survival of Singh's government.

In recent years, the communist parties have been critical of India moving closer to Israel. For them, seeking "strategic ties" with Israel represented a betrayal of the Palestinians and were harmful to India's interests. They even argued that closer military ties were the result of the "anti-Muslim agenda" of Israel and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Shortly after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, they demanded the recall of India's ambassador from Tel Aviv.

When Singh became prime minister, "a course correction" in New Delhi's Israel policy became a major foreign policy agenda for the Left. For them, military cooperation with Israel when the latter was brutally subjugating the Palestinians would make India a party to Israel's crimes.

Singh, who was leaning to the left on various domestic issues, could approve such a massive joint military research with Israel but it would also have to be considered within the domestic context. Partly to dispel apprehensions of the Left and silence the critics, a few days after the missile cooperation was approved on 23 July, Indian Defense Minister A K Antony told the media, "Successive governments since 1992 have had defense ties with Israel. This is not new. And the relation is not ideological, but purely based on our security requirements."

The decision indicates a growing Indian confidence vis-à-vis Israel. In the past, India was extremely apprehensive of any public display of friendship with Israel. By seeking greater military cooperation with Israel, New Delhi signals greater self-confidence and indicates that it does not anticipate any problems with Arab and Islamic countries over such relations.

New Delhi has not allowed its differences over the Palestinian issue to undermine its defense ties with Israel. For a while, there were suggestions that New Delhi would become the second most important partner for Israel after Washington. With its troubled relations with Europe, Israel is increasingly looking to other players like India for long-term relations. Seen in this larger context, the missile deal not only marks a synergy between the two defense establishments but also has all the ingredients of a strategic partnership.

Web link:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17937

Indo-Israel ties despite the Left

2007-07-27T22:53:00.000-07:00

India cozying up to Israel

New Indian Express (Chennai), Friday July 27 2007

As the CPM politburo member Sitaram Yechury was promising his party’s unwavering commitment to the Palestinians, the Government of India was singing a different song. He was attending the 25th Congress of the Israeli Communist Party (Hadash), in the Israeli town of Nazareth and the event also coincided with the 40th anniversary of the June 1967 war which resulted in the Israeli capture of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In his subsequent report to the party weekly People’s Democracy, Yechury described his visit to 'Palestinian territories’ even though Nazareth is an Israeli town. The Israel part of his trip apparently was treated as ‘private’ and even those sections of media which are friendly to him choose to remain visibly silent.

Reasons are not difficult to fathom. In the summer of 2000 veteran Communist leader and the then Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu went to Israel as part of his last foreign trip before demitting office. Coming against the background of prolonged opposition and reservations over the normalisation of relations with Israel, this was seen as a political coup. While many Central and State leaders had visited Israel since relations were established in January 1992, the visit of Basu symbolised the broad consensus towards normalisation. It was seen by many that despite reservations about Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, there was widespread agreement on improving the bilateral ties.

The outbreak of al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, however, complicated the matters and bilateral ties came under stress, especially in the public domain. Meanwhile, the visit of Basu was used by critics on the far Left to question the pro-Palestinian credentials of the CPM. Yechury therefore, does not wish to create another controversy over his ‘visit’ to Israel, even if it was to attend events organised by the Israeli Communist Party. However, the Left faces a far more serious challenge over India’s Israel policy. For the past few years various Left parties including the CPM have been demanding India to reverse its policy.

The BJP’s moving India closer to Israel and its rolling out a red-carpet welcome to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 came under severe criticism, condemnation and protests. When Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister, a visible change in India’s policy towards Israel was one of their principle demands vis-a-vis the UPA. Largely due to pressures from the Left the Common Minimum Programme of the ruling coalition spoke of India’s 'decades-old commitment to the cause of the Palestinian people for a homeland of their own.’Soon after UPA came to power Prakash Karat reiterated his party’s demand that India should end its ‘special relationship’ with Israel.

In April 2005 during the 18th Congress of the CPM West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattcharjee moved a resolution that condemned Israel for its ‘‘brutal occupation’’ of Palestinian territories and demanded that India should snap all military ties with Israel. At periodic intervals various leaders of the Indian Left have been demanding a departure from the policies of the previous NDA government vis-a-vis Israel.

The response of the UPA government has been entirely different. Wherever possible it was accommodative of the Left even on Israel. In 2005, speaking at the UN, as part of the Indian delegation Yechury underscored the basic Indian objections to the security fence/wall that Israel has been constructing. According to him, ‘‘As we have stated in the past, no one could have objections to the construction of the wall in areas coinciding with the green line. However, its encroachment on Palestinian land and interests creates great hardship for the people affected by its construction and exacerbates the situation.’

Likewise, during the Lebanese war in the summer of last year, India was initially critical of the Hezbollah and demanded the unconditionl release of two Israeli soldiers whose kidnapping precipitated the crisis. In subsequent days, partly due to pressures from the Left, the UPA modified its stand. The unanimous resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha on July 31 was highly critical of Israel and its attacks on the Lebanese civilians and infrastructures. It was, however, silent on the Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli civilian population. However, on the more substantial issue of military cooperation, Manmohan Singh could not accommodate the Left.

On May 16, Defence Minister A K Antony informed the Rajya Sabha that defence ’’purchases from Israel during the period 2002-2007 have been over US$ 5 billion.‘‘ Ingenious ones could argue that much of the contracts were signed during the previous NDA government and were delivered during the past three years of the UPA rule. However, this was the first time that India has put an official number to the defence acquisitions from Israel.

Any doubts about the reluctance of the present government to deal seek military ties with Israel were dispelled by the Cabinet Committee on Security. On July 12, chaired by the Prime Minister the supreme decision making body cleared a Rs 10,000 crores (US $ 2.5 billion) joint venture with Israel on a new generation of missiles capable of striking at aircraft and other aerial targets. This marks a new beginning in Indo-Israeli military cooperation. From its erstwhile cash-and-carry-approach, both countries are now entering a new phase of joint research and development. Last summer what would have been the first visit of a Defence Minister to Israel was cancelled due to the Lebanese war.

In short, the Indian defence establishment not only rejected the demands of the Left to distance itself from Israel but also took additional steps to consolidate and strengthen defence cooperation with Israel. In the past such decisions could have been blamed on the Hindutva factor and the desire of the BJP to bring India closer to the Jewish State. Unfortunately for the Left, it is the UPA, especially the Congress party, which is bringing India closer to the Israeli defence establishment.

In 1992 it was Congress leader P V Narasimha Rao who normalised relations with Israel and 15 years later, it was another Congress Prime Minister who endorsed joint defence research with Israel. These developments highlight the limitations of the Left in influencing India’s Israel policy. At the same time, they also highlight that blinded by ideology, these parties are not able to see bigger picture clearly. Their stand is not only at variance with the Indian Government but also with the wider Middle East. As one Palestinian official told the Indian media in April 2005, "’We are not asking our friends to cut relations with Israel. What is important for us is the full support of India towards peace, towards the legality, towards the international resolution of the Palestine dispute.”

Web link:

Have Palestinians failed Palestine?

2007-06-22T23:05:00.000-07:00

New Indian Express (Chennai), Friday June 22 2007

Two-State solution! The events of the past week in the Gaza Strip have given an ominous meaning to this expression. While the international community wishes the early establishment of Palestinian state that co-exists along with Israel, the failure of the Palestinian unity government opened the prospect of two Palestinian entities competing for power, legitimacy and loyalty. Family feud, power struggle, coup, civil war, anarchy or a point of no return?

It is immaterial how one characterises the violence in recent days and the complete overrun of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. It is obvious that the militant Islamic group is in complete control of the streets and has achieved a resemblance of normalcy in the Gaza Strip. Confined to their homes and shanty refugee camps for days, ordinary Palestinians are now able to move out freely without fearing about masked gunmen roaming in open jeeps or gunfights in the alley ways.

Important as it may, this temporary quietness would not hide deep divisions within the Palestinian society and among its leadership. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas responded to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip by dissolving the national unity government and sworn in an emergency government with former Finance Minister Salam Fayyad as the new Prime Minister.

Hamas for its part is not ready to accept this and insists that Ismail Haniya still heads the Palestinian government. In short, there is a Fatah Prime Minister for the West Bank and a Hamas Prime Minister for the Gaza Strip. Not surprisingly both insist that they are the true representatives of all the Palestinians!

Rival power centres are not unique to Palestinians and many countries in the Middle East went through an intense struggle for power that often resulted in violent change of rulers. But as a people whose aspirations for statehood and sovereignty is yet to be realised, the factional fighting and violence is a costlier mistake. It would be extremely difficult for both Hamas and Fatah to forget the events of recent weeks and co-operate. At least in the short run, Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) are the major losers. That an organised group like Fatah could swiftly be overrun, overpowered and even made to flee from the Gaza Strip tells not only the military weakness of Fatah but also the growing strength of Hamas.

During the 1970s and 1980s, a complete military victory over Fatah was something Israel had always wanted but never managed to inflict. That Hamas could achieve this in a matter of weeks should be an eye opener for Fatah and the PLO.

It is obvious that Fatah has never recovered from the death of its founder-chairman Yasser Arafat in November 2004. The crushing electoral defeat at the hands of Hamas in January 2006 came as an additional blow. Even though it was cajoled into joining a unity government with Hamas, neither side were ready to work in harmony. Hamas also mishandled the situation. Its resounding electoral victory in 2006 was not only a vote against Fatah and its corrupt leadership but also a mandate for change.

Change not in the ideological sense of the word but in the socio-political situation of the occupied territories. Hamas which tasted victory however, did not recognise that power comes with responsibility. It wanted the international community, especially the West and the US, to recognise the 'will of the people' and recognise and negotiate with the Hamas-led Palestinian government.

But at the same time, it was not ready to transform itself as a political party that is prepared to seek political solution to the prolonged Arab-Israeli problem. Its desire for retaining its ideological purity meant that Hamas would not formally recognise the State of Israel, its adversary or seek a political settlement with it. While 'allowing' President Abbas to pursue peace negotiations, Hamas was not ready to go beyond offering 'temporary truce' with Israel.

By refusing to recognise and negotiate with Israel, Hamas exhibited its failure to make that critical transition: from being a militant group into a mainstream political party. By this mistake Hamas played into the hands of Israel and the US. Capitalising on its non-recognition of the Israel, they were able to institutionalise an international political as well as financial boycott of the Hamas-led government. Even the European Union leaders who are otherwise friendlier towards the Palestinians than their American counterparts could not wholeheartedly embrace the Hamasled arrangement. The formation of the fragile unity government did not mollify their stand.

Indeed, since the January 2006 elections, domestic tensions and rivalry have become the prime pre-occupation for the Palestinians. Arab leaders such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah Saudi Arabia have been busy brokering deals not between the Palestinians and Israel but between rival Palestinian factions. Seeking a working compromise between Hamas and Fatah became more insurmountable than the Israeli- Palestinian compromise. Each ceasefire arrangement broke down faster than the earlier one. Indeed, till the other day Egypt had a permanent security presence in the Gaza Strip should speak volumes of the tension between rival Palestinian factions.

The much-hyped unity agreement reached in the Islamic holy city of Mecca last March failed to bridge the gap. Ironically the current situation of two separate arrangements might offer a temporary space for both factions to re-evaluate their recent behaviour. The international community has swiftly rallied behind President Abbas and his emergency government. If Israel had expressed its willingness to de-freeze the money that it owes to the Palestinians, the US has renewed its aid to the non-Hamas Palestinian government.

The EU and others would follow the same example, while at the same time continuing with their humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. Not even Israel wants a meltdown at its doorstep. But in the long run, Hamas and Fatah would have to come together and seek unity. Their problem is with Israel and not with one another. If there has to be one Palestinian rule in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, then there has to one government and one authority. The past few months clearly revealed that leadership of both Hamas and Fatah are consumed by internal differences and hatred. Hence, a Palestinian unity could be arranged only by the international community. This is easier said than done.

Some desperate Palestinians were quoted as saying, 'Even Israelis did not do this to us.' Such a view could be an exaggeration. But the world has watched the scenes of masked men pulling down the portraits of Arafat, Mr. Palestine for decades. This would inhibit the international community from getting into inter-Palestinian mediation anytime soon.

Web link:
http://www.newindpress.com/newspages.asp?page=m&Title=Main+Article&aDate=6%2F22%2F2007

Al Aqsa controversy

2007-02-14T03:34:00.000-08:00

Al-Aqsa: A dangerous preoccupation

Islamic leaders should make some effort to depoliticize the controversy over the repair of a collapsed walkway to the al-Aqsa mosque.

Originally published in ISN Security Watch, 14 February 2007

What should be a routine repair of a collapsed walkway has exacerbated an already tense situation in the Middle East and raised international condemnation. Even though the work is taking place well outside the perimeter wall of the al-Aqsa mosque, Israel has been accused of "desecrating" an Islamic holy site. It has also been accused of attempting to consolidate its control over the third holiest place in Islam.

Israeli officials say that the walkway is in dire need of repairs after its partial collapse three years ago. Opponents of the refurbishing say that the work could damage the area's foundation. With the tension between both sides increasing, one may ask if any Islamic leaders have offered to de-politicize the matter and even offer technical assistance in repairing the bridge? It is safe to say that since the al-Aqsa mosque is one of their holiest sites, Islamic leaders should applaud any effort to keep the centuries-old building from falling into disrepair.

The reasons have to be found in the contested religious space in the city of Jerusalem. If one includes the Holy Sepulcher nearby, the walled city in east Jerusalem comprises some of the holiest sites to three monotheist religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Known to the Jews as Har-ha-Bayit or The Temple Mount, the Harem al-Sharif stands upon what is believed to be the ruins of the First and the Second Jewish Temples. The Western Wall, sometimes known as Wailing Wall, on the southern end of the complex is the only remaining structure of the Second Temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD.

For Christians, the area is sacred because of the Holy Sepulcher, the place where Jesus Christ is said to have been resurrected.

For Muslims, Harem al Sharif, which includes the al-Aqsa mosque, is where Mohammed ascended to heaven.

In short, Old Jerusalem, has been intrinsically linked to the three major religions.

Due to a host of political developments, the religious significance and composition of the city has been changing since the 6th century. The city was captured by the armies of second caliph Umer around 637 shortly after the death of Prophet Mohammed. It was during the early years of Islam that the al-Aqsa mosque was built.

With the brief exception of the Crusades, Jerusalem remained under Islamic control until the entry of British forces led by General Edmund Allenby in December 1917. While the Jews were always allowed to pray, Harem al-Sharif always remained under strict the Islamic Waqf trust and control.

This political and religious control of the area became a major issue during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, which ended with East Jerusalem, including the Harem-al-Sharif area, the Western Wall and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher coming under the Jordanian control. During this period, the Hashemite Kingdom not only destroyed a number of ancient Jewish holy sites in the old city but also prevented even non-Israeli Jewish worshippers from praying near the Western Wall.

This situation changed following the Israeli capture of the West Bank including east Jerusalem during the June 1967 war. This in practical terms meant that for the first time in over 13 centuries, Harem al-Sharif, including the Western Wall came under non-Muslim Jewish control. While granting freedom of access to all, including Muslim worshippers, since the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, Israel has been periodically restricted access to the al-Aqsa mosque.

Over the centuries, Christianity has abandoned its political claims over the city. This has not been the case with Judaism and Islam. The formation of the Jewish state posed a fundamental challenge to Islam. The Jews, who were tolerated as protected "people of the book" had become independent and asserted their sovereignty and in 1967 took control over an Islamic site. Jews were no longer a protected people but a sovereign subject.

Theologically, Islam has been unable to handle such an unprecedented development. Thus, while other countries have been focusing their attention on the legality of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, Islamic countries have been preoccupied with the non-Islamic control over the Harem.

Because of their close geographic proximity, even Israeli control over the Western Wall is not recognized by them. A vast majority of Muslims do not even admit that the Harem al-Sharif, including the al-Aqsa mosque, stand upon the ruins of the pre-Islamic Jewish temple.

As long as Islam and Judaism fail to come to terms with each other's claims over holy sites in Jerusalem, even smaller issues will continue to snowball into major political controversies invoking passionate attention and emotional responses from Muslims and Jews alike.

This contested religious significance makes the city of Jerusalem and its holy sites one of the most controversial and explosive place on this planet.

Web link: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17249

China and Russia abandons Iran

2007-01-10T03:37:00.000-08:00

China, Russia on road to abandoning Iran

ISN Security Watch 10 January 2007 China and Russia have agreed to UNSC Resolution 1737. Though watered down, it still sends a strong signal to Iran that its friends are not completely against joining hands with Western "devils."

Originally published in ISN Security Watch (10/01/07)

The unanimous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1737 clearly puts Iran on the dock. Outwardly, it merely seeks to restrict Iran’s ability to trade in sensitive nuclear materials and to freeze the assets of 22 Iranian officials and institutions linked to its nuclear and missile programs. However, the willingness of friendly countries such as China and Russia to abandon their erstwhile hesitancy and endorse limited sanctions against Iran should be seen as a small but decisive victory for the beleaguered Bush administration.

The vote should also be an eye opener for those who have periodically stressed and hoped that China would adopt an independent policy vis-à-vis the US on Iran. While not ready to join the Western chorus against Tehran, Beijing is also not willing to embrace the ayatollahs’ nuclear ambitions.

For quite some time, it was clear that China was not prepared to accept a nuclear Iran. Its refusal to endorse US demands for punitive sanctions was coupled by its determination that Iran should peacefully resolve its dispute with the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Partly due to its past involvement in missile and nuclear proliferation, Beijing has been extremely weary of another nuclear power in its neighborhood.

Likewise, the vote also underscored the fundamental priority of Chinese foreign policy. Its desire to adopt assertive foreign policy postures on issues such as Taiwan are always accompanied by its deep desire to maintain close political ties with Washington. This shift on Iran was clearly manifested at the IAEA. While it abstained in September 2004, it voted with the majority in February 2006. The shift clearly indicated that China was merely seeking adequate price and compensation for its accommodation of Western concerns over Iran.

Western willingness to settle for a watered-down resolution that lacks any real teeth also underscores Washington’s desire for an international consensus on Iran. Any tougher wording of the resolution could have resulted in China and Russia abstaining if not vetoing such a move. The US would rather have an international consensus against Iran than drive for a tougher resolution that might be seen as a sign of ganging up against Tehran.

Despite the limited nature of sanctions, the resolution pits Iran against the rest of the international community. Even if the real impact is marginal, the vote signals Iran’s isolation. Not many countries even in the West endorsed Bush’s axis of evil theory against Iran. But now even friendlier powers like China and Russia have sided with the US in isolating Iran.

National interests also continue to play a primary role in the Iran issue. Both Russia and China have strong economic interests in Iran. The former is committed to the construction of a nuclear power plant near Bushehr, originally started by the German company Siemens in the 1970s. Literally days before the UNSC vote, Iranian media reported that the Bushehr plant was on schedule.

China sees Iran as a major and stable source of energy supplies. Its galloping economy and the resulting increase in demand for hydrocarbon compel Beijing to look for long-term arrangements. China is committed to developing the Yadavaran oil fields. In October 2004, both countries signed a memorandum of understanding for the supply of 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran over the next 25 years. It also includes the supply of 150,000 barrels of oil per day during the same period. The total deal is estimated at over US$120 billion.

In December, just days before the UNSC vote, the two countries signed another agreement for the supply of three million tons of LNG a year. This 25-year contract will begin with the flow of gas in 2011.

Such strong economic interests and investments in Iran prevent China from completely siding with the West. Any Chinese support to the West on Iran would thus have to be courted and compensated adequately.

At the same time, a number of countries in the Middle East are increasingly concerned about Iran and its defiant attitude toward the international community. The recent decision of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council to seek the help and cooperation of the IAEA in developing nuclear energy and the ongoing debates in Egypt over the revival of nuclear power generation should be seen within this larger context. Iran is not just a threat to the West and its interests in the Middle East, but to an increasing number of Arab states.

As such, countries like China have to weigh their sympathies for Iran against their interests in the wider Arab world. As US officials declared, the limited sanctions are merely the first step toward more severe measures against Iran. So, when a friend like China abandons it, the ayatollahs in Iran get a shrill message: Comply or we will join hands with the “devil.”

Web version:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17098Online

Jordan and Hamas

2006-07-13T03:28:00.000-07:00

Tension Returns Between Jordan and Hamas

Originally published in PINR 13 JULY 2006

Jordanian accusations that the Palestinian militant group Hamas has been planning terrorist attacks in the Hashemite kingdom have rekindled the ongoing tensions between the two. On April 18, 2006, literally hours before the first visit of the Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar, Amman disclosed that some members of Hamas were arrested in Jordan and that their terrorist plot was uncovered. Citing this, it called off the visit of Zahar who was on his maiden visit to the various Arab countries to drum up financial support for the near bankrupt Palestinian Authority.

Jordan disclosed that the large weapons cache that was discovered included Iranian-made Katyusha rockets and anti-tank missiles, explosives and machineguns, which Hamas activists allegedly stockpiled for use in attacks against Jordanian public institutions and officials. According to Jordanian officials, these weapons were smuggled into the country from across the border.

Amman blamed an unnamed Hamas leader based in Damascus, presumably Khalid Mashaal, as the mastermind behind this plot. The government, however, was careful not to blame the governments of Syria and Iran openly. This was soon followed by a televised confession by three men who admitted to being trained in Syria and sent to Jordan to carry out terrorist attacks.

Amman was quick to reject an offer by Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh to send Zahar to personally sort out the problem. Instead, it demanded a security team from Hamas that was "capable of disclosing additional information and other hidden weapons...[that] threaten [Jordanian] national security."

In the immediate context, the row underscores internal divisions within the Palestinian leadership. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be siding with the Jordanian version of events. He described the development as "dangerous and surprising" and, during a visit to Jordan in early May, he conceded that the incident "has serious repercussions for the security and stability of the kingdom." A few days later, in an interview to al-Jazeera, he remarked: "The information I got from Jordan was not just staggering, but also dangerous."

The reaction of Hamas was rather different. Already facing mounting international pressure over its refusal to recognize Israel and the Oslo Accords, the Hamas-led Palestinian government could not afford to open another front. Dismissively, it labeled the Jordanian accusation as "falsehood and mendacity." In a statement issued in Gaza, it said that these "arguments are excuses for Jordan's last minute withdrawal from receiving Zahar following the attack in Tel Aviv and the Israeli-American threats on the Palestinian government."

Hamas maintains that it had never targeted any other country, Arab or non-Arab, especially Jordan, but had always limited its battle to "the Zionist enemy." It called the whole affair a Jordanian plot to "isolate the elected Palestinian government and force it to change its positions in accordance with the Zionist and American conditions."

Partly to defuse the tension, in May Abbas sent a security team to Amman headed by intelligence chief Major General Tareq Abu Rajab, a Fatah loyalist, to examine the issue. Indeed, a few days after he returned to Gaza, an attempt was made on his life. He was seriously injured when a bomb placed at the entrance of the elevator in his office exploded. Even though it is difficult to establish a link between the two, Abu Rabaj has been known as a staunch adversary of Hamas.

Growing Tension
While some Arab commentators have raised doubts about the timing of the accusation and the veracity of the public confessions, the whole episode underscores the deep divisions between Jordan and Hamas. In recent years, especially after the ascendance of King Abdullah in 1999, Jordan began viewing Hamas as a threat to the Hashemite kingdom.

This was in contrast to the position of his father, King Hussein, who perceived the militant group as a potential ally in checkmating Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Never truly giving up on the idea of regaining control of the West Bank that he had lost during the June 1967 war, Hussein always sought to secure the loyalty of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Hussein's efforts to seek and secure a special role for Jordan in Jerusalem under the Israel-Jordan peace treaty signed in 1994 were a reflection of his prolonged longing for the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

His desire to use Hamas against the Arafat-led Palestinian Authority received a boost in September 1997 when Israeli agents sought to assassinate Mashaal, who was then the Hamas spokesperson in Jordan. Not only did he survive the attack, but the Israeli agents were captured. Capitalizing on the situation -- since the operation was ordered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- King Hussein demanded the release of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, was serving a life term in Israel after being charged with terrorism.

To secure the release of its agents, in October 1997 Israel freed Yassin who soon returned to Gaza and emerged as an alternative power center to Arafat, Fatah and the Palestinian National Authority. Until his assassination in March 2004 by Israel, Yassin remained a major threat to Arafat and his ability to dominate the Palestinian resistance.

Jordan-Hamas Divorce
King Abdullah, however, viewed the situation differently. Unlike his father, he has no emotional bondage to the West Bank and was more interested in consolidating the cohesion of Jordan, or the erstwhile Transjordan. He perceived the Palestinian Authority and Arafat as an ally and not a rival. He was, therefore, less prepared to tolerate Hamas' activities inside Jordan, especially when the organization had been carrying out suicide attacks inside Israel with the purpose of sabotaging the peace process.

On August 31, 1999, in a swift and surprise move, a number of Hamas offices in Jordan were closed down and a number of functionaries arrested. They were initially charged with misdemeanors, such as affiliation with an illegal organization and possession of light arms. Later they were charged with a host of much more serious charges, some punishable by death, including maintaining a military training camp, illegal fundraising, weapons storage, armed activities against Israel and the use of forged official stamps.

In an unprecedented development, Jordan also issued arrest warrants against four Hamas leaders, including Mashaal, who were in Iran at the time. When they returned a few days later, they were arrested. In an eventual compromise worked out by Qatar, in November 1999 the Hamas leaders, who were citizens of Jordan, were voluntarily deported to Doha.

Meanwhile, Hamas was declared to be an "illegal and non-Jordanian" organization whose presence would not be tolerated; additionally, Jordanian citizens were banned from becoming members of Hamas.

In the summer of 2001, after some prolonged drama at the Amman airport, former Hamas spokesperson Ibrahim Ghawshah was allowed to return to Jordan when he renounced his membership in Hamas. The fate of others, however, was different. In recent years, Egypt was prepared to host and negotiate with Mashaal as part of its strategy to secure a temporary halt in suicide attacks against Israel. Jordan, however, has been unrelenting.

Conclusion
The present accusations by Jordan against Hamas are merely a repeat of this historical narrative. The majority of Jordanians are of Palestinian origin and this demographic reality is weighing heavily on the Hashemite kingdom, which is determined to make a clean break with the West Bank and the Palestinians. The victory of Hamas and its unrelenting views vis-à-vis the peace process could ignite the existing tension inside the kingdom and further radicalize the Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoys the support of the Palestinians in the refugee camps.

Hamas was an ally when Jordan sought to compete with Arafat. The times, however, have changed. Seeking domestic stability and long-term survival, King Abdullah sees Hamas as an adversary especially if its hard-line polices were to radicalize the region further and start another cycle of violence. Any sympathy for Hamas in Jordan, especially among the Palestinian segment of the population, is a sure recipe for trouble. This, perhaps, explains the ongoing tension between Jordan and Hamas over the uncovered arms cache. The Hashemite Jordanian apprehensions over Hamas and its negative influences within Jordan are real and cannot be dismissed easily.

Web Link
http://pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=525&language_id=1

ICRC: Secular symbols

2006-07-07T03:24:00.000-07:00

ICRC 'crystallizes' late in the game

The International Committee of the Red Cross' decision after years of negotiations to allow Israel's Red Star of David to join the club is a welcome move, but one that should have come much sooner and without partisanship.

Originally published in ISN Security Watch (07/07/06)

The International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) much-belated June decision to admit Israel’s Magen David Adom (Red Star of David) as a full member alongside the Palestinian Red Crescent society has raised so me fundamental questions about the ICRC, its relevance and its mission.

It was only after years of negotiations that a compromise in the form of a rRed cCrystal that could be used by national bodies came about to allow the rRed Star of David full ICRC membership.

While the move is a welcome one, the ICRC's prolonged refusal to admit an organization that had been functioning since 1930 seems to have had more to do with religious conservatism and political calculations than ethical considerations.

Established in 1863, the ICRC claims to be “an impartial, neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.”

But when it comes to admitting non-Christian emblems, it seems to have tended toward the partisan and parochial. The single exception was the Red Crescent - which it admitted in 1929. Ostensibly to oppose the "proliferation" of symbols, the ICRC seems to have disregarded the religious sentiments of millions of others.

Though the Red Cross symbol never was intended as a religious one, the refusal of the humanitarian organization to admit other religious motifs has served to betray that intention - a betrayal underscored by its delay in admitting the Red Star of David.

There are a number of reasons why the ICRC needs to abandon its explicitly Christian symbol and adopt the newly devised Red Crystalred crystal as its name and symbol.

The use of the cross, irrespective of the original motives and intentions, does not represent the truly global nature of organization. To be credible and non-partisan, the Committee will first and foremost need to present itself in non-religious terms. Its refusal to admit the Israeli organization was nothing to do with the credibility of Magen David Adom but it was more to do with the inherent but unstated religious prejudice. If an Islamic motif can be included, why not the symbols of other religions and faiths?

Second, the problem with Magen David Adom symbolizes the dilemma facing minorities. Israel’s Arab minority hashave great difficulty in accepting this explicitly Jewish symbol, especially within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The same can be said about non-Muslims in the Middle East as well as the non-Christian population in Europe. Cross, cCrescent, or sStar, these symbols of the national humanitarian groups do not represent the minorities. These humanitarian organizations could not be considered ‘national’ within the context of the societies, which are increasingly becoming multi-cultural and multi-religious. How can the British Red Cross, for example, represent the millions of non-Christians living in that country?

Third, the reservations of the ICRC to accept the symbols of other cultures went to obscenity when it refused to accept alternatives for countries like China, India, and Japan where the Christian cCross represents only a miniscule population. Either these countries had to accept the cross or be excluded from the ICRC. The arguments of proliferation of symbols had to be mitigated by the diversity of the population. The desire of the ICRC to "standardize" its symbols went against the basic grain of tolerance and diversity. If the world’s religions are diverse, why should the ICRC look for a single symbol, especially with a strong Christian connotation?

Lastly, the essence of modern Europe lays in its refusal to allow religious beliefs to dominate public life. As the controversy over Danish cartoons highlighted, for the vast majority of the Europeans, religious sentiments are valid as long as they remain private and individual. The French desire to proscribe explicit religious symbols in schools and the reservations of the Prince Charles to be known as the defender of ‘the’ faith when Britain has other equally valid faiths, symbolize the church-state dilemma and strive for secularism. When these states are no longer tolerating public display of religious symbols, how can their national humanitarian organizations be excluded from this liberal trend.

Irrespective of the original motives, the ICRC has devised a new symbol that is non-religious, non-exclusivist, and non-partisan, but still represents the basic values for which the organization has stood for over a century. Ideally, this could be the symbol for all the national organizations, especially where there are people following different religions. States which abhor official sanctity to religious might find Crystal representing their true character.

Until such a time, either the ICRC must embrace the secular, liberal, and non-religious crystal as its symbol or become embroiled in controversies that serve only to undermine its credibility as a humanitarian organization. The irony is that the very attempt to avoid the use and reliance upon religious symbols has made them all the more significant an issue - an issue that first began with a religious symbol itself, the Christian cross.

The ICRC itself has recognized the irony, understanding, though perhaps a little late in the game, that the emblems are "sometimes wrongly perceived as having religious, cultural, or political connotations" that have "affected respect for the emblems" and "diminished the protection the emblems offer to victims and to humanitarian and medical personnel."

Web Link:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16357

Arab League fails again

2006-07-05T03:17:00.000-07:00

Arab League Fails Again

The fact that the Security Council has had to step in to ensure Lebanon's independence signals the failure, yet again, of the Arab League.

Originally published in ISN Security Watch (05/07/06)

The near-unanimous adoption in May of UN Security Council Resolution 1680 demanding that Syria recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon more than anything further demonstrated the impotence and marginalization of the Arab League.

Formed in March 1945 by seven Arab states, with Egypt hosting the permanent headquarters, the Arab League's charter vows to, among other things, "guarantee the future of all Arab countries" and ensure their inviolability and territorial integrity - a commitment it has been unable to fulfill, resulting in calls from some quarters for the group to be disbanded.

Resolution 1680 was adopted on 17 May against the backdrop of growing US determination to isolate the Ba’athist regime, and the willingness of France, erstwhile Western patron of Damascus, to go along with it. While Russia abstained to ensure its leverage vis-à-vis its former client state, China had often abstained on sensitive UN decisions concerning the Middle East. Both Moscow and Beijing would prefer to take advantage of Syrian vulnerability to secure greater political concessions from Washington over any future vote on Iran.

But the real loser in the game is the Arab League.

The resolution explicitly calls on Syria to delineate its borders with Lebanon “especially in those areas where the border is uncertain or disputed.” This is not a major problem as most of the countries of the Middle East have serious border problems with their neighbors. At the height of imperialism, the European powers not only created new states in the Middle East but also disregarded ethno-national considerations. As a result, members of the same ethnic groups were scattered among different states (Kurds) or different groups were clubbed into one country (Iraq). As such, border disputes are a recurrent phenomenon in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

However, a far more devastating threat to the League came from the Security Council demand that Syria “establish full diplomatic relations and representation” with Beirut and recognize “Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.” Such a demand should not have had to come from a UN Security Council resolution, when both Syria and Lebanon are members of the same Arab fraternity.

Syria has never recognized Lebanese sovereignty, considering the latter to be a part of historic Syria that was artificially ceded from the motherland. It treated Lebanon merely as a province and its representative in Beirut was known as "governor" rather than as ambassador. The prolonged civil war partly enabled Syria to treat Lebanon as its serfdom rather than as a sovereign entity. Indeed, even when it maintained over 30,000 troops, ostensibly to uphold domestic order in Lebanon, Syria never had an ambassador.

It has exercised complete control over every aspect of Lebanese polity. The continuation of Emile Lahoud as president underscores this Syrian stronghold. Under pressure from Damascus in 2004, the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution and extended his term by three years. Internal dissent eventually culminated in the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. Yet, even after the withdrawal of Syrian forces in the summer of last year, Lahoud is still president.

All of this has gone on uninterrupted by the Arab League.

The Lebanese case was not the only occasion when the Arab League failed to ensure the inviolability of national sovereignty and integrity. The League never managed to evolve a strategy against such blatant disregard for national independence. Unlike other regional organizations, it was unable to adopt a firm stand against the sanctity of national sovereignty. Article One of the Arab League charter clearly states that membership is open to all “independent Arab states.” But it has had no mechanism to ensure that independence. Not only has the League been unable to prevent conflict between its member states, but it also has failed to ensure the inviolability of their sovereignty.

The Organization of African Union (OAU), the forerunner of the African Union (AU), for example, explicitly vowed to its member states “to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.” The League has no similar provision or tradition. Of course, Africa has not been free from inter-state wars, but no state has threatened to swallow another and gotten away with it. The critical issue is not territorial aggrandizement, rather the disappearance of the sovereignty of member states.

Whenever a small state has been threatened by its bigger Arab neighbor, the League has invariably failed to come to the rescue – a problem that began as far back as the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.

Vast areas that were allotted to an independent Arab state under the UN partition plan for Palestine came under the control of Transjordan (now Jordan). Despite protests from all other Arab states, they were subsequently annexed by Jordan and became the West Bank. The Arab League merely reconciled itself to the disappearance of the Palestinian state and pretended that these areas were being held in "trust" by the Hashemites.

In August 1990, when Saddam Hussein claimed Kuwait to be the 17th province of Iraq, the League once again showed its incompetence. A majority of members did condemn the invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait and actively joined the US-led coalition. However, the League did not suspend Iraq for violating the independence of Kuwait. Egypt, on the other hand, was suspended from the League in 1979 for making peace with Israel.

In the current situation involving Lebanon, the League once again exhibits its limitations. In its desire to rally around a beleaguered member state, the League has trampled on Lebanese aspirations to be a normal independent state.

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