India, Iran and the US

Delhi: Between Tehran and Washington

Middle East Quarterly, winter 2008

As the U.S.-Iranian dispute escalates, both Washington and Tehran seek friends and allies. New Delhi is caught in the middle. While the U.S.-Indian partnership has grown closer in recent years, New Delhi's approach toward Iran's suspected nuclear program causes concern in Washington. Overshadowing the debate is India's own nuclear program. With the July 2005 U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal yet to win U.S. Senate ratification, is India seeking to strengthen its energy security through Iran? Or is New Delhi pursuing the civilian nuclear deal without being sensitive to Washington's concerns vis-à-vis Iran?

Full text of the article can be found at:

http://www.meforum.org/article/1821

India and Annapolis

Ready to mediate at Annapolis?

New Indian Express, Friday November 30, 2007

EVEN the most optimistic in Washington do not visualise any major breakthrough at Annapolis but by organising the biggest game in town for over seven years, the Bush Administration does not wish to exclude anyone.

While widespread participation might not result in a fruitful outcome, exclusion would undoubtedly have ruffled many feathers and hurt egos. Like a major wedding in town, anyone who matters was invited to the Annapolis Middle East peace conference. So was India.

While the presence of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee might have provided an opportunity for India to interact with other leaders, it would have created unnecessary expectations.

Non-political representation would have made its presence symbolic and insignificant. Through Science Minister Kapil Sibal, who in recent months has emerged as the main, if not sole defender of the nuclear deal in public, the government also sends a subtle message to Washington on the bilateral front.

Some might conclude the invitation to be a sign of recognition of the Indian diversity and even as a “role model” for a lasting peace in the region. Washington has no such illusions.

During much of his tenure President George W Bush avoided the vexed Arab-Israeli conflict like a plague. It was growing anti-Americanism more than anything else that appeared to have catapulted him to act. So with less than a year before leaving the White House, the administration has invested considerable effort and political capital in organising the largest Middle East gathering since the Madrid conference of 1991.

Partly to answer his critics for his unilateralism, President Bush opted to make Annapolis as wide as possible and managed to rope in all major players in the Middle East and beyond. With the notable exception of Hamas which controls the Gaza Strip and Iran, the Administration secured the participation of all major powers, key Middle Eastern players and important regional powers, groups and institutions. The two radicals excluded themselves by opting out of the peace process and not because the US did not want them at Annapolis.

As some western and other leaders discovered in recent months, doing Washington’s bidding is a political liability. Hence the willingness of Syria to attend the event was a diplomatic coup and so was the reluctant attendance of Saudi Foreign Minister.

That most of the countries were represented by their Foreign Ministers was no mean achievement, especially for an Administration that has been vilified for months over its Middle East policy.

The conference also enabled the US to reach out its rivals, recognise regional importance of others and convey “Not-forgotten-you” thank you note to some. While the presence of many countries adds to the prestige and importance of the conference, the US knows that only the two principal parties and not others who could make that leap. Thus while the absence of key players would definitely sabotage the efforts, the presence of so many countries will not by itself make the settlement any closer.

Thus, one should not read too much into India’s presence at Annapolis. Its exclusion on the contrary, might have been viewed as a sign of American displeasure over India backtracking on the nuclear front or worse a pressure tactic. Especially with Pakistan also being there, Indian exclusion would be controversial. By inviting Delhi to Annapolis, the administration reiterates its willingness to recognise India's role in a major international event.

Annapolis also highlights changing times for India. Following normalisation of relations with Israel in 1992, India was supportive of various peace initiatives and in the early 1990s took part in the multilateral arms control talks. But its overall presence was marginal. Not having normal relations with the Jewish State for over four decades, its ability to influence the peace process was less than zero.

During a decade and half, as the bilateral relations improved, it had acquired considerable political capital and economic leverage vis-à-vis Israel.

The manner in which both Congress and non-Congress governments handled the relations exhibit a degree of self-confidence and maturity. It is no longer uneasy let alone apologetic about its friendship with Israel.

Except for occasional jarring notes from Cairo, much of the Middle East have come to terms with India’s willingness to pursue closer ties with Israel, including strong military-security cooperation. Reflecting this even mainstream Palestinian leadership sings a different tune: will New Delhi use its leverage vis-à-vis Israel to further the peace process? Handled tactfully, Annapolis offers India the opportunity to recognise the nuanced and complex demands of a peace maker. Even if success remains elusive and even impossible, like others, India would have to strive for peace in the Middle East. Regional stability serves India’s larger interest, welfare and security.

To be taken seriously, however, India has to drop its blinkers. First and foremost, India should not have illusions about its role in Annapolis or beyond. New Delhi can’t dream of achieving what the US, with all its powers and influence, could not bring about: a comprehensive settlement. Nor should it kid itself into believing or propagating it as a model for others. Just like other models did not work for India, its model won’t work for others.

Thankfully, so far none asked India to be a model. Second, to be a credible player in the Middle East peace process, India would have to be more careful in expressing its views. This was highlighted during the second Lebanese war in the summer of last year. In the initial days, it adopted a balanced position and like much of the Arab world blamed the Hezbollah for kidnapping Israeli soldiers that precipitated the crisis.

Subsequently when the mood in the Middle East swung in favour of the militant group, India joined others in condemning Israel for attacking civilian population and infrastructure in Lebanon. The Indian parliament went on to adopt a onesided resolution that was silent on Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli civilians.

While this was perhaps unavoidable due to public pressures from the Left parties, Indian officials went a step further. When the post-ceasefire mediation efforts were on, Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to the region pointedly skipped Israel, whose role was central to the stability along the Israel-Lebanese border. While public criticisms might shore up some domestic support and garner some publicity abroad, they undermine India’s ability to play a meaningful role in the peace process.

New Delhi might conclude that airing strong views in public is more important than mediating the conflict. But if it wants a seat in the hightable, it would have to learn the art of silence. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told parliament during the Czech crisis, when you are in front of avalanches, even slight murmurs will unleash tons of ice.

Mediating the Middle East is not about rights and wrongs but the art of winning over enemies and influencing friends. If Sibal and his team recognise this, Indian presence in Annapolis would have been a worthwhile exercise.

Islam and Minorities

In Islam and Minorities (Mediterranean Quarterly, summer 2007) I argue that Dhimmi, the only framework available in Islam, is inadequate to treat not only non-Islamic communities but also sects within Islam. If interested you can find the full text at: http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/3/94

India's Nucler Summer

India's woeful mishandling of negotiations over the 123 Agreement leave some to wonder about the government's ability to manage itself on the international stage.

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (24/08/07)

"Running around like headless chickens."

This was how India's ambassador in Washington, Ronen Sen, described the domestic critics of India's nuclear deal with the US. This tasteless remark believed to be directed at Indian lawmakers might eventually cost him his job. Unfortunately, for him and the Indian government, the critics are growing by the day.

From the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the right to the communist parties on the left, a host of groups question the just-concluded agreement, commonly referred to as the 123 Agreement. Many argue that by including domestic US nonproliferation laws into the work, India has "surrendered" its sovereignty. While parliamentary ratification is not mandatory, should the deal be put to vote, the government would be shown the door.

If the BJP is the open adversary, the left parties have been a doubtful ally ever since Manmohan Singh became prime minister following the May 2004 elections. The left also demands that that the government not negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA toward implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal. Without such an agreement, India would not be able to convince the powerful Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) to accept the Indo-US deal and operationalize it. With internal “friends” like the left, Manmohan Singh does not need external enemies.

The problem however, is largely India's own making. From the very beginning, New Delhi did not factor in Washington's expectations while pursuing the nuclear deal. It never recognized let alone internalized US baggage vis-à-vis Iran. Even the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) was not taken into account when India started its energy strategy toward Iran.

The Indian leaders pretended that they could obtain energy supplies from Iran and civilian nuclear technology from the US without squaring the circle. They failed to recognize India's non-parallel interests with the US over Iran.

This ignorance proved to be costly. Having talked of "civilizational links" with that country, India voted against Iran at the IAEA in September 2005 and again in 2006 to refer the Iran file to the UN Security Council. The manner in which India handled and justified its vote gave an unmistakable impression that New Delhi acted under US pressures, if not dictates.

This lack of clarity and foresight is not the prerogative of the present government alone, but has become a bipartisan national disease. When it was in office, the BJP was more than eager to send troops to Iraq to shore up beleaguered US President George W Bush. It eventually backed out when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee recognized opposition from his own collation partners.

For its part, the left in India is more Maoist than the Chinese. It is blissfully happy to live under a nuclear China but could not accept India going nuclear in 1998. Some also fault the government for not joining hands with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), increasingly seen as a counterweight to NATO.

As it stands, a vast majority of the lawmakers, especially the communist allies whose support is essential for the survival of the government, are unlikely to accept the nuclear deal. At the same time, the Indian government would not be able renegotiate the deal with the US without losing its credibility. The international community, especially the NSG, would be reluctant to deal with such a sensitive issue when Indian government looks to be on its way out.

Ever since the nuclear deal was initialed in July 2005, Indian officials naively hoped that the US would bring about far-reaching changes in its domestic nonproliferation laws, silence the nuclear ayatollahs, convince other countries to accept the deal and work with key players like China not to oppose the deal at the NSG. The Bush administration would take these far-reaching steps, New Delhi hoped, while it was not prepared to accommodate American concerns over the nuclear stand off with Iran.

Had India read US expectations early and clearly, it would have approached the nuclear deal more carefully and avoided the minefield. It would have understood the political price and prepared the domestic public accordingly. Even if India was not prepared to go all the way, it could have evolved reasonable redlines on the Iran front and convinced the domestic as well as US public. This however, did not happen and as it was forced to recognize, there are no free lunches in Washington.

The manner in which Indian leaders handled the Indo-US nuclear deal pose a fundamental challenge: Are they capable of making a cost-benefit analysis of India's national interest and to convince domestic skeptics before seeking international recognition and cooperation?

Weblink

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18028

India's nuclear dance over Iran

The full text of India's Nuke Dance over Iran published in August 2007 issue of Strategic Insights (Monterey, CA) is available at:

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/kumaraswamyAug07.asp

Indo-Israel defense ties

Indo-Israeli military ties enter next stage

A US$2.5 billion Indo-Israeli defense project marks a new phase in the two countries' relations.
Commentary by P R Kumaraswamy for ISN Security Watch (03/08/07)

India's recent decision to develop jointly a new generation of surface-to-air missile with Israel is a quantum leap in the two countries' relations.

In early July, India's Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved the US$2.5 billion defense project with Israel. The development of missiles capable of intercepting aircraft and other aerial targets at a range of 70 kilometers to be undertaken by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries.

This is not only the largest single deal involving Israel but also marks a new phase in defense-related cooperation between the two countries.

Ever since diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, both countries have actively cooperated in the defense arena, with India obtaining a large number of small arms, weapons, avionics, ship-launched Barak missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel.

Counter-terrorism and border management techniques figure prominently in these regular deliberations.

Within the next few weeks, India will launch the first Israeli satellite, and there is speculation in the Indian media that it will be a spy satellite.

In recent years, service chiefs and other senior military officials have been periodically visiting one another. In May this year, the Indian Defense Minister informed the parliament that from 2002-2007, India obtained over US$5 billion worth of military weapons and systems from Israel. Others suggest that in 2006 alone India's defense imports from Israel stood at US$1.6 billion.

The bourgeoning Indo-Israeli military ties are helped by favorable winds from Washington: its endorsement for the Israeli sale of Phalcon airborne early warning systems to India was a case in point. This deal estimated at over US$1 billion dollars came against the background of the US vetoing similar sale to China.

The new decision on missile development conveys a number of strong messages. Until now, Indo-Israeli military ties have largely been a cash-and-carry affair. India's desire to modernize its aging Soviet-made weapons and defense systems were made possible by Israeli expertise in upgrading and avionics. Though important, this approach has its limitations, especially when Israel does not develop major platforms that India requires for defense modernization.

Since normalization, there were suggestions that meaningful long-term cooperation would demand greater synergy between the two defense establishments. A number of on-going programs in India are not radically differently from their Israeli counterparts. These include plans to develop light combat aircraft, main battle tanks, missiles such as Prithvi and Agni, unmanned aerial vehicles and early warning radar systems. The joint missile research therefore signals that both countries are confident about moving beyond traditional arms sales and onto the next stage.

The timing of the decision is equally important. Ever since Manmohan Singh became India's prime minister in May 2004, the left-leaning parties have been demanding an end to military cooperation with Israel. Though they are not formally part of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), their support is vital for the survival of Singh's government.

In recent years, the communist parties have been critical of India moving closer to Israel. For them, seeking "strategic ties" with Israel represented a betrayal of the Palestinians and were harmful to India's interests. They even argued that closer military ties were the result of the "anti-Muslim agenda" of Israel and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Shortly after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, they demanded the recall of India's ambassador from Tel Aviv.

When Singh became prime minister, "a course correction" in New Delhi's Israel policy became a major foreign policy agenda for the Left. For them, military cooperation with Israel when the latter was brutally subjugating the Palestinians would make India a party to Israel's crimes.

Singh, who was leaning to the left on various domestic issues, could approve such a massive joint military research with Israel but it would also have to be considered within the domestic context. Partly to dispel apprehensions of the Left and silence the critics, a few days after the missile cooperation was approved on 23 July, Indian Defense Minister A K Antony told the media, "Successive governments since 1992 have had defense ties with Israel. This is not new. And the relation is not ideological, but purely based on our security requirements."

The decision indicates a growing Indian confidence vis-à-vis Israel. In the past, India was extremely apprehensive of any public display of friendship with Israel. By seeking greater military cooperation with Israel, New Delhi signals greater self-confidence and indicates that it does not anticipate any problems with Arab and Islamic countries over such relations.

New Delhi has not allowed its differences over the Palestinian issue to undermine its defense ties with Israel. For a while, there were suggestions that New Delhi would become the second most important partner for Israel after Washington. With its troubled relations with Europe, Israel is increasingly looking to other players like India for long-term relations. Seen in this larger context, the missile deal not only marks a synergy between the two defense establishments but also has all the ingredients of a strategic partnership.

Web link:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17937

Indo-Israel ties despite the Left

India cozying up to Israel

New Indian Express (Chennai), Friday July 27 2007

As the CPM politburo member Sitaram Yechury was promising his party’s unwavering commitment to the Palestinians, the Government of India was singing a different song. He was attending the 25th Congress of the Israeli Communist Party (Hadash), in the Israeli town of Nazareth and the event also coincided with the 40th anniversary of the June 1967 war which resulted in the Israeli capture of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

In his subsequent report to the party weekly People’s Democracy, Yechury described his visit to 'Palestinian territories’ even though Nazareth is an Israeli town. The Israel part of his trip apparently was treated as ‘private’ and even those sections of media which are friendly to him choose to remain visibly silent.

Reasons are not difficult to fathom. In the summer of 2000 veteran Communist leader and the then Chief Minister of West Bengal Jyoti Basu went to Israel as part of his last foreign trip before demitting office. Coming against the background of prolonged opposition and reservations over the normalisation of relations with Israel, this was seen as a political coup. While many Central and State leaders had visited Israel since relations were established in January 1992, the visit of Basu symbolised the broad consensus towards normalisation. It was seen by many that despite reservations about Israel’s policies towards the Palestinians, there was widespread agreement on improving the bilateral ties.

The outbreak of al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, however, complicated the matters and bilateral ties came under stress, especially in the public domain. Meanwhile, the visit of Basu was used by critics on the far Left to question the pro-Palestinian credentials of the CPM. Yechury therefore, does not wish to create another controversy over his ‘visit’ to Israel, even if it was to attend events organised by the Israeli Communist Party. However, the Left faces a far more serious challenge over India’s Israel policy. For the past few years various Left parties including the CPM have been demanding India to reverse its policy.

The BJP’s moving India closer to Israel and its rolling out a red-carpet welcome to Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 came under severe criticism, condemnation and protests. When Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister, a visible change in India’s policy towards Israel was one of their principle demands vis-a-vis the UPA. Largely due to pressures from the Left the Common Minimum Programme of the ruling coalition spoke of India’s 'decades-old commitment to the cause of the Palestinian people for a homeland of their own.’Soon after UPA came to power Prakash Karat reiterated his party’s demand that India should end its ‘special relationship’ with Israel.

In April 2005 during the 18th Congress of the CPM West Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadeb Bhattcharjee moved a resolution that condemned Israel for its ‘‘brutal occupation’’ of Palestinian territories and demanded that India should snap all military ties with Israel. At periodic intervals various leaders of the Indian Left have been demanding a departure from the policies of the previous NDA government vis-a-vis Israel.

The response of the UPA government has been entirely different. Wherever possible it was accommodative of the Left even on Israel. In 2005, speaking at the UN, as part of the Indian delegation Yechury underscored the basic Indian objections to the security fence/wall that Israel has been constructing. According to him, ‘‘As we have stated in the past, no one could have objections to the construction of the wall in areas coinciding with the green line. However, its encroachment on Palestinian land and interests creates great hardship for the people affected by its construction and exacerbates the situation.’

Likewise, during the Lebanese war in the summer of last year, India was initially critical of the Hezbollah and demanded the unconditionl release of two Israeli soldiers whose kidnapping precipitated the crisis. In subsequent days, partly due to pressures from the Left, the UPA modified its stand. The unanimous resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha on July 31 was highly critical of Israel and its attacks on the Lebanese civilians and infrastructures. It was, however, silent on the Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli civilian population. However, on the more substantial issue of military cooperation, Manmohan Singh could not accommodate the Left.

On May 16, Defence Minister A K Antony informed the Rajya Sabha that defence ’’purchases from Israel during the period 2002-2007 have been over US$ 5 billion.‘‘ Ingenious ones could argue that much of the contracts were signed during the previous NDA government and were delivered during the past three years of the UPA rule. However, this was the first time that India has put an official number to the defence acquisitions from Israel.

Any doubts about the reluctance of the present government to deal seek military ties with Israel were dispelled by the Cabinet Committee on Security. On July 12, chaired by the Prime Minister the supreme decision making body cleared a Rs 10,000 crores (US $ 2.5 billion) joint venture with Israel on a new generation of missiles capable of striking at aircraft and other aerial targets. This marks a new beginning in Indo-Israeli military cooperation. From its erstwhile cash-and-carry-approach, both countries are now entering a new phase of joint research and development. Last summer what would have been the first visit of a Defence Minister to Israel was cancelled due to the Lebanese war.

In short, the Indian defence establishment not only rejected the demands of the Left to distance itself from Israel but also took additional steps to consolidate and strengthen defence cooperation with Israel. In the past such decisions could have been blamed on the Hindutva factor and the desire of the BJP to bring India closer to the Jewish State. Unfortunately for the Left, it is the UPA, especially the Congress party, which is bringing India closer to the Israeli defence establishment.

In 1992 it was Congress leader P V Narasimha Rao who normalised relations with Israel and 15 years later, it was another Congress Prime Minister who endorsed joint defence research with Israel. These developments highlight the limitations of the Left in influencing India’s Israel policy. At the same time, they also highlight that blinded by ideology, these parties are not able to see bigger picture clearly. Their stand is not only at variance with the Indian Government but also with the wider Middle East. As one Palestinian official told the Indian media in April 2005, "’We are not asking our friends to cut relations with Israel. What is important for us is the full support of India towards peace, towards the legality, towards the international resolution of the Palestine dispute.”

Web link: