Israel model for India

The Israeli model - Learn but observe the differences January 18, 2009 | RSS In recent weeks, many have drawn parallels between the Israel's ongoing war against the Hamas and the Indian response to Pakistan over the Mumbai terror attacks. For some, India has more valid grounds for an aggressive response than Israel; and for others Israel is a far too controversial and unsavoury model. But there are those who wish and demand that the Indian government emulates Israel in dealing with Pakistan. Not many countries and societies endorsed the Israeli action, especially the death of hundreds of Palestinians. India is not an exception in deploring Israel. However, the political disapproval of the Israel's policy towards the Palestinians should not prevent the professionals from examining Israel's experiences. Not learning from the successes and failures of others is often costlier. At the same time, if India were to adopt an Israel-type strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, a number of crucial issues have to be recognized and sorted out. 1. Israel is able to pursue an aggressive strategy against the Islamic militants primarily because of the unqualified support of the Bush administration. Whether it gave an official approval or merely signalled its understanding, the US support is crucial. Without it the massive operation would not have happened. Can India secure such a support from the US or any other power or a constellation of powers for an aggressive counter-terrorism strategy against Pakistan? 2. Likewise, thanks to the American support, Israel has managed to ward off any punitive measures by the UN Security Council. Does India enjoy such a guarantee if the friends of Pakistan were to lobby for international sanctions against it? 3. Mounting international criticism has not prevented the Israeli leaders from pursuing a course of action that they consider vital for the security of their citizens. They are prepared to stand to the widespread international disapprovals, large-scale protest rallies and adverse coverage by the international media. Do the Indian leaders have the stomach to withstand massive public demonstrations in different parts of the world? 4. Israel was able to launch an aggressive campaign because of its vast and at times unparalleled intelligence base. For example, it struck nearly 50 targets in the Gaza Strip within the first few minutes of the air campaign. As of now, real-time intelligence and successful surgical strikes are possible only in Bollywood movies. Actionable intelligence still remains a pipe dream and would be so for a long time. 5. Israel could launch its war because Hamas is a non-state actor that controls only a part of the Palestinian territories. The internal schism between the mainstream Fatah and the militant Islamic group came out clearly during the current crisis. While over a thousand Palestinians have been killed in the Gaza Strip, the Fatah-dominated West Bank remains relatively tranquil. This crucial divide has partly enabled Israel to pursue its military option. This is not the case in Pakistan. Despite all the internal tensions and acrimony, 'neutrality' over an Indian action is not an option for any Pakistani group. As highlighted by the recent statements, even jihadi groups opposed to the military crackdown would rally behind the Pakistani flag. 6. The military arsenal of Hamas is rather limited and largely consists of short range rockets. Its widely-published threats of turning the Gaza Strip in to a volcano if Israel were to launch a ground offensive has not materialized. There are signs of fatigue and internal divisions within its ranks. Pakistan is entirely different story. It is not a paper tiger but a nuclear power. Even the BJP-led NDA government refused to cross the LoC during the Kargil war, notwithstanding its past hard-line statements. Thus a militant counter-terrorism strategy against Pakistan is no longer the last option, unless one is prepared for thousands of civilian deaths on both sides. 7. Since mid-2005, the Hamas has launched over 5,000 rockets against Israel and despite the ongoing crisis, rockets continue to fall into Israel. Some had landed almost 40 km deep inside Israel. Yet, the major population and economic centres are beyond the range of Hamas rockets. This is not so for India. A number of critical economic targets are within the range of a Pakistani counter-offensive. This would mean large-scale destruction of economic assets accompanied by unacceptable human casualties. 8. Despite the accuracy of its military machine, Israel could not escape causing civilian deaths. Various human rights organisations agree that a bulk of the Palestinians who were killed in the Gaza Strip were civilians. Likewise, India would not be able to escape from a large scale 'collateral damage' which would have unbearable political consequences. 9. So far the campaign against Hamas enjoys widespread domestic support within Israel. Months of insecurity against rockets has made the wider public to rally around the government. Democratic societies cannot launch a war without such a strong backing of its citizens. Would there be a strong internal support within India for a war against Pakistan over Mumbai attacks? 10. Ultimately military campaign alone will not stop the Hamas violence. Israel has been seeking to end the rocket attacks by forcing Hamas to accept a ceasefire from a position of weakness. In the process Israel has squandered considerable international understanding and sympathy. Likewise, a military campaign will not end Pakistan's support for terrorism against India. At best it could make such a policy a costly enterprise, not just for Pakistan but also for India. Above all, military successes rarely ensure political victory. The Middle East had many such examples. In 1956, for example, Israel won the Suez war but handed over the leadership of the Arab world to President Gamal Abdul Nasser. President George Bush (Sr.) won the Kuwait war but lost his re-election bid in 1992. His son quickly overthrow of the Saddam Hussein in 2003 only to find himself in the Iraqi quagmire. Thus even if it achieves the impossible 'victory' over Hamas, Israel's search for peace would be settled only in the negotiating table. Likewise, any realistic end to terrorism in South Asia rests on Pakistan's cooperation and not its defeat, even if that were possible. Thus war is still an option. But look before you fire. (18.01.2009 - P.R. Kumaraswamy is a professor of West Asia studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He can be contacted at kumaraswamy.pr@gmail.com ) (IANS) For Web version click here

Hamas must get real

New Indian Express carries my peice on the ongoing crisis in the Gaza Strip. For full text click here.

The Gaza War

Israel's end game in Gaza

What are Israel's goals? The overthrow of the Hamas government is often mentioned as a potential long-term objective...

Even by West Asia standards, the scale of the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip and the magnitude of casualties are astounding. Ever since Israel launched the ‘Operation Cast Lead’ two days after Christmas, close to 400 Palestinians have been killed and over a thousand injured. In the retaliatory attacks by the Hamas four Israelis were killed, including a Druze soldier and an Arab citizen. With an immediate ceasefire not in sight the casualties are bound to increase. Prolonged rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip not only tested Israel’s deterrence but also have generated widespread domestic anger. With the Knesset elections just weeks away, Israeli politicians compete with one other as strong on security. The dwindling popularity of the Labour Party had put additional pressures upon Defence Minister Ehud Barak. What are Israel’s goals? The overthrow of the Hamas government is often mentioned as a potential long-term objective. It is colourful and might even be popular to talk of ending the militant control. At least in private many Fatah would like see such an outcome as a sweet revenge for the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007. To accomplish this far-reaching goal Israel would have to opt for, as Barak put it, boots on the ground. Israel cannot accomplish this without a full-scale ground offensive and the re-occupation of the Gaza Strip. There are signs in that direction. So far the army has called up about 9,000 reserve soldiers. This is one of the largest mobilisations in recent years. A large number tanks and artillery are stationed around the Gaza Strip. These make a ground offensive an extreme possibility. At the same time, Israeli leaders know the pitfalls of such an option. Pin-pointed operations and smaller incursions are more successful than a large-scale ground offensive. Hamas definitely has an upper hand in any conventional urban guerrilla war situation. In 1982 Israel needed days to reach Beirut but took more than quarter of a century to get out of Lebanon. The American experience is no better and before long the fall of Baghdad turned into an Iraqi quagmire. Hence, Barak would have to carefully weigh the pros and cons. This means that Israel’s campaign would largely be aerial raids accompanied by naval bombardments. That nearly 50 sites were attacked within the first few minutes of the campaign indicates that it had planned the offensive long and hard. The aerial offensive has its advantages. It can benefit from Israel’s technological superiority and minimise army casualties. The aerial campaign has its limits. The Gaza Strip is not a continent. The total area of this impoverished and most crowded place on earth is only 360 square km. The city of Bangalore, in contrasts, spans over 690 sq km. Therefore, even if it targets every known site associated with Hamas, before long Israel will run out of military targets. Despite the technological advances, aerial campaign comes with a price: civilian casualties. Even if unintended, air raids against a crowded place like the Gaza city invariably kill a number of innocent bystanders. According the UN and other agencies, nearly a fourth of all those Palestinians killed so far are women and children. Civilian deaths are always emotional and potentially damaging to Israel. Already there are protest rallies in various western capitals and cities and they would only increase if the conflict prolongs. Some Israeli estimates suggest that that only 220 out of 390 killed were members of Hamas. It is unclear if Israel distinguishes between members and militants of Hamas. With the Hamas leadership largely remaining underground, it is unclear if there are any political casualties. The scale and intensity of destruction would suggest that the military potential of Hamas has been considerably reduced and not eliminated. That Hamas could launch longer range rockets into Israel, with some of them reaching 40 km, highlight its military potential. It is down but not out. Green and not white flag still flies in Gaza. Thus, Israel would not be able to prevent the rocket attacks only by its military campaign. The massive deaths and devastation might persuade the Hamas to re-examine its strategy and seek a political understanding and renew the ceasefire. The maximum that Israel could expect from this campaign is this: a militarily weakened Hamas would be more willing for a political understanding. At the same time, Israel also would have to accommodate some of the demands of the Hamas. They are also Palestinian demands. It would have end the siege of the Gaza Strip and stop its periodic military incursions into the Gaza Strip. As one commentator reminded the Israelis, since the October war of 1973, each time Israel fought a war, the defence minister lost his job. The last one was Amir Peretz who led Israel into the disastrous second Lebanon war in 2006. If Barak were to avoid joining that company, he would require tangible results and a quick end to the military campaign. To accomplish this, whether he likes or not, Barak would need a helping hand from the Hamas. That is the irony of West Asia. For web link click here (The writer teaches at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi)

Pretoria-based CiPS carries my brief commentary on Hamas and 1967 borders: Enough to induce Obama?. For full text please click here

Obama Foreign policy Challenge

Pretoria-based CiPS carries my brief commentary on Obama's real challenge: Iraq, Stupid. For full text please click here.

Delink terrorism from religion

November 10 issue of South Asia Monitor carries my brief commentary on the need to delink terrorism from religion. For the full text please click here

India Obama Victory

It may be premature to rejoice

New Indian Express,07 Nov 2008 12:14:00 AM IST

HISTORIC. Landslide. Popular.
Whichever way you say it, one thing is certain. The much-awaited change has occurred with the spectacular victory of Barack Obama, and the disinherited of the world celebrate his arrival. But should India be elated or worried over the return of a Democrat to the White House? At least in the short run, the bonhomie that marked Indo-US relations under the Bush administration will be missed in New Delhi. Though improvements in bilateral relations began with the visit of President Bill Clinton in March 2000, post-Pokhran India had to invest considerable political and diplomatic capital to overcome bilateral tensions, misgivings and sanctions.

In recent days anti-Bush voices in the US got a new boost: Economy stupid! Naturally the economic meltdown and fears over recession will be the top priority of the new administration.

For India this financial crisis means that its economic clout will be significantly dented.

Given his limited international exposure, foreign policy would be the last thing on Obama’s mind; South Asia far less so. The importance of the region emanates from the travails of Afghanistan and the need to keep the Taliban at bay. So the critical question Obama might ask would be: Who can serve me better, is it India or Pakistan? News on the Kashmir front is also disturbing. Media reports suggest that Obama wants to appoint a special mediator. This would make Pakistanis feel happier especially after Obama’s comments about terrorism and jihadi elements, not India, being the serious threats facing Islamabad at present.

Likewise, the traditional Democrats’ agenda — democracy, human rights and minority treatment— would become vocal and intrusive, causing some unpleasant moments for India. But the overall picture is not bleak. On the critical issue of Iran, New Delhi will heave a sigh of relief. The Bush administration’s anti-Iran obsession will be a thing of the past as the Democrats are eager to open direct talks with the Islamic republic. Even if US-Iran normalisation is not imminent, there will be a lessening of tension between the two erstwhile allies. This should enable India to be more ‘independent’ while dealing with Iran. And anti-American rhetoric within India may be considerably muted and less shrill.

The wider world will be watching the new shifts on Iraq. During the campaign Obama harped on his opposition to the Iraqi invasion. As president he will have to come up with a workable strategy. How does he plan to get the boys home early when regional powers are apprehensive over a post-withdrawal political vacuum in Iraq? American policy on Iraq would remove the enigma surrounding Senator Obama.

Obama’s decisive electoral victory is thus a huge responsibility. Having raised public expectations within and outside the US, he will have to deliver, and swiftly. Otherwise the massive mandate will become a millstone around his neck.