Thursday, May 22, 2008

India Ahmadinejad

Only Ahmadinejad gains
New Indian Express (Chennai), Thursday May 22 2008 09:27 IST
“Re-energizing, Playing the great game or defining moment.” This is how seasoned observers described the recent stop over visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. For some it was sign of ‘autonomy’ in foreign policy formulation and a reminder to Washington of its desire to pursue a policy that serves Indian and not American interests.
The visit was undoubtedly a diplomatic coup for Iran. Now the Iranian leader can claim his country’s increasing acceptance by all major non-Western powers. Was it due to the unexpected election of Ahmadinejad or growing Indian proximity with Washington? Either way for a while India remained the last Third World country which was trying to the Iranian leader. Hence, bilateral ties got into cold waters.
If the two votes at International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) were not sufficient, India gave a distinct impression that it was seeking to keep a distance from Iran. Tehran, however, was not disheartened by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh avoiding the meeting of Shanghai Cooperation Council in 2006. In a calculated move in February last year, it ambushed visiting Foreign Minister Pranab Kumar Mukherjee and suggested a summit meeting among the three leaders to resolve the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline. Thus, Iran turned the technical need for a stopover from Sri Lanka into a diplomatic accomplishment. An insignificant state visit was transformed into a visit of the sub-continent, with Pakistan hosting him on the way to Colombo.
The subdued manner in which Indian commentators reacted both before and after the visit, tells an interesting story. It was a defining moment for Iran, yes.Was it a defining moment for India? Signs are they are not. What was India trying to convey to the outside world by hosting the Iranian leader. Iran cannot be ignored but nor can one be blind to the belligerent and confrontationalist stands of its leaders. Many anti-India elements within the US administration could see this as an unfriendly act, especially when President George W Bush is seeking closer ties with India. Should the anti-Iranian rhetoric intensify in Washington the handshake would be used to torpedo many pro-India moves.
In more substantial terms, what was accomplished during the visit? To expect miracles in seven hours is outlandish even for those with fertile imagination. But having kept a distance from someone who has been increasingly becoming controversial not just in the West, one is tempted to ask: what were India’s expectations when it rolled out the red carpet?
Was there a breakthrough on the energy front? The press conference of Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon let the cat out of the bag. After Dr Singh-Ahmadinejad meet, he told reporters that from India’s viewpoint, “most important is to construct an economically, commercially viable project, to have assured supplies and to ensure the security of supply in various ways. Discussions will continue. They both agreed that the officials would continue to discuss how to craft such a project which would meet the various criteria that we have mentioned.”
Simple English? More than a decade after the idea originally began the pipeline option is worth trying. Informed observers feel that with the kind of price demanded by Iran, the pipeline would be a pipedream.
On the LNG front, Menon felt that negotiations are on but added: “… of the conditions of the agreement have changed since both countries signed the agreement in 2005.” Basically he was confessing that India would have to pay a higher price than the $ 3.215 per million British thermal units (mBtu) that was agreed in June 2005 during the visit of the then Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar.
One interesting development was that Menon’s press conference was dominated by the Israeli angle and the recent launching of an Israeli spy satellite by India. In the past such an obsession was confined to the Egyptians.
Is it a sign of independent foreign policy? For many, ‘independent’ foreign policy has been an euphemism for anti- Americanism. Not surprising, most of those who demand India to be assertive vis-à-vis Washington followed Kremlin during the Cold War. Not long ago those lamenting about the American quagmire in Iraq were justifying the Soviet ‘presence’ in Afghanistan.Above all, a single act rarely makes profound impact on foreign policy and the stopover visit is definitely not one of them. Onenight stands might bring fun but they never make an enduring relationship.
Is a sign of constructive engagement? Despite the official spin, it is essential to recognise the controversy surrounding Iran would be resolved without any role for India.
The problem primarily is between Tehran and Washington and having mishandled its vote at the IAEA, India is not in a position to mediate between the two. Iran cannot trust it and the US would take it for granted! Nor does India have the kind of leverages and incentives enjoyed by China and Russia especially their political clout in the UN Security Council.
Was it domestic politics? Unlike the past the UPA government has been more than willing to admit the role of domestic factors shaping India’s Iran policy. In September 2005 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told reporters in New York that India’s decision at the IAEA would also be governed by the Shia factor. The same spin was used when the National Security Advisor announced Ahmadinejad’s visit at an international conference in New Delhi. The verdict on the cynical use of foreign policy for electoral considerations would be known very shortly in Karnataka.
Iran is not only a regional power in the Middle East but also an important player in the global energy scene. At the same time, Tehran, especially since the election of Ahmadinejad, is also a quarrelsome player. By reneging on its earlier price agreement, it has raised doubts about its reliability. Some of its belligerent actions and statements have unnerved its Arab neighbours.
While developing a policy towards Iran, New Delhi could afford to ignore American or other Western concerns. But it could not ignore one third player: the Arab neighbours of Iran. They are equally, if not more, important than Iran. In short, nearly four million Indians are gainfully employed in the Arab countries and not in Iran. Any short-sighted move on Iran would boomerang heavily on India’s ties with the Arab world.
Iran is thus an enigma. Depicting it merely as a friend or foe of India could be ideologically satisfying but intellectually dishonest.
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Friday, May 16, 2008

Bush Ambushes Israel

With good intentions Bush ambushes Israel
Rediff May 16, 2008 20:30 IST
Two State visits in less than five months are one too many for a world leader and more so if it is US President George W Bush. But that is what has happened when he came to Israel on Wednesday to take part in Israel's 60th Independence Day celebrations.
Unlike his previous visit in early January, this time Bush did not visit the Palestinian areas. Both sides were keen to make it an exclusive visit to a friendly country. Israel could not have asked for a friendlier American leader.
During the first term the American president consciously kept away from the complex Middle East peace process. Unlike his predecessor Bill Clinton, he was not keen to invest any political capital in the peace process. If Clinton could not accomplish much, why even try. Taking cue from their leader, senior American officials also opted for a hand-off policy towards the Arab-Israeli peace making.
Israel at 60: Surviving the odds
With the trauma of the September 11 attacks consuming much of his time and energy, President Bush had little interest in the peace process. His primary attention was devoted to fighting Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Subsequently, Iran and its suspected nuclear programme garnered his attention.
As a result, more than any other American leader, President Bush largely left the peace process to Israel and its leaders. He was quick to embrace Ariel Sharon who was elected prime minister weeks after the American election. They worked in tandem. Bush echoed when Sharon said Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat was 'no peace partner' and soon Arafat became persona non grata at the White House.
When Sharon unveiled his unilateral pullout from the Gaza Strip, the American leader was more than happy and conveniently forgot the more complicated West Bank. The security fence that Sharon ordered gravely violated the pre-June 1967 borders or the Green Line. But Bush would not take notice.
Even after Sharon left the political scene following a massive stroke in early 2006, Bush pursued the same course. Dismissing European advice, Bush joined Israel in isolating Hamas following the spectacular victory of the Islamic militants in the Palestinian election later that month. Bush found no contradiction between this and his campaign for democratising the Middle East.
During the second Lebanese war the US President gave a large leeway to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to 'clean up' the military operations against Hezbollah. He was not prepared to demand a ceasefire until the Israeli commanders admitted that they did not have a workable military option to secure the two Israeli soldiers captured by the Islamic militant group.
Furthermore, more than any other world leader, Bush has been taking a strong and belligerent position against Iran and its periodic outbursts against Israel. Suspicions over the Iranian nuclear programme brought Israel and the US closer.
Partly to regain credibility and party to secure Arab support for his policy on Iran and Iraq, he has been reiterating his support for a two-State solution; Israeli and Palestinian States living side by side with peace and security. With much fanfare last November he organised a Middle East conference in Annapolis where leaders from over 40 countries and organisations took part and reiterated their commitment to the Middle East peace process. With the sole exception of Iran every major player in the world was present at the jamboree.
To give an impression of seriousness, President Bush even promised tangible outcomes before he leaves office; in practical terms, before the US presidential election is held later this year. His two visits to Israel in quick succession have to be viewed within this self-imposed November 2008 deadline.
As many analysts have pointed out, by excessively identifying with the policies of Israel, Bush has actually worked against Israel's long-term interests.
Indeed, the Jewish State has become more unsure now than in it was in January 2001 when Bush became president. Since then Hamas and Hezbollah exposed the limitations of Israel's military options. The Palestinian Authority enamoured by Israel and Washington is friendlier, accommodative but ineffective. Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2006, Palestine President Mahmoud Abbas is not even a paper tiger. Abbas promises friendship but Hamas delivers Qassam rockets.
Furthermore, Iran, Israel's principal adversary, has gained from Bush's Middle East strategy. He removed two most dreaded enemies of Tehran; the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. By 'democratising' Iraq and handing over power to the majority, Bush has also created as Arab Shia State. When Iranian officials speak of a Shia crescent extending from Bahrain in the Persian Gulf to the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon, they would secretly thank Uncle Sam.
In tacking Iran, both the US and Israel are clueless. Informed analysts in both countries dismiss a military option as ineffective and counterproductive. At the same time, Israel and the US have not been able to evolve a viable politico-economic strategy that would be acceptable to other major players.
Meanwhile, the US-Europe divide over Iraq came handy to Iran and like the resurgent Moscow under Vladimir Putin, Tehran has managed to exploit its energy resources to create a severe wedge between the US and other energy-dependent economies like India and China.
If these are not enough, the Iraqi saga continues and there appears no honourable exit for the US from the quagmire it had created. If its continued presence intensifies resistance, its early exit would have unpredictable consequences of many of Iraq's Sunni neighbours, most of whom are friends of the US. Dammed if you pullout and dammed if you don't.
Bush's newly-found involvement in the peace process is a typical case of too-little-too-late. With the US election just months away, no one expects anything dramatic. As Clinton found out during the Camp David talks in the summer of 2000, a century-old vexed conflict can't be resolved in a few weeks.
Meanwhile, what about the two-State solution? Wait for a more sober US president, if not the next generation!
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Wednesday, April 30, 2008

India Saudi Arabia

Wooing Gulf investments - End of Indian summer over Arabia?

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 30, 2008.

FOREIGN Minister Pranab Mukherjee was luckier the third time. On two previous occasions his visits to Saudi Arabia were cancelled at the last minute. During his two-day visit he met a host of Saudi officials. He also had an audience with the King Abdullah. Besides the customary remarks about the Middle East peace process, situation in Iraq and regional stability Mukherjee flagged in the , economic agenda. He was enticing Saudi investment in India's massive infrastructure plans which he felt could absorb upto "$ 500-600 billion."

During the last February visit of his Saudi counterpart Prince Saud al-Faisal, both countries agreed to pursue investments in energy, petro-chemical and infrastructure. Mukherjee was also trying to capitalise on the momentum set by the landmark visit of the King as the chief guest at the 2006 Republic Day celebrations.

At the bilateral level, Saudi Arabia has been a major supplier of energy and accounts for about a third of India's total oil imports. With a total trade turnover of just under $ 16 billion, it is India's major trading partner in the Middle East.

Out of an estimated four million Indian workers in the region, at least 1.6 million are gainfully employed in the kingdom. Through their employment and homeward remittances these workers contribute not only to the welfare of their dependent families but also help mitigate India's perennial trade deficit with the region.

However, the manner in which India has approached the political aspects of its relations with Saudi Arabia has been abysmal. The last state visit to Saudi Arabia took place in 1982 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the kingdom. This was nearly quarter of a century after Jawaharlal Nehru's visit in 1956.

Mukherjee's visit came more than seven years after the visit of Jawant Singh in January 2001. Even the hype over King Abdullah's state visit did not usher in a sense of urgency.

In terms of education cooperation, the New Delhi-based Jamia Millia Islamia has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the Saudi largess. During his visit, King Abdullah was conferred an hon orary doctorate by Jamia for his contribution to peace and promotion of IndoSaudi relations. The Saudi monarch reciprocated this gesture by donating US $ 30 million for the construction of a library and research building.

However, the Indo-Saudi relations cannot be studied only through the energyeconomic prism. The desire of King Abdullah (since his earlier days as Crown Prince before ascending to the thrown in 2005), to reframe the traditional Saudi ties with the US through ‘Look East' policy also has security implications. Saudi Arabia would expect greater Indian transparency in dealing with the Gulf.

For example, did Mukherjee inform the King about the impending visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad?

Furthermore, both are on a learning curve. The Saudi brand of Wahhabi Islam and Indian secularism are anti-thetical. Yet, geo-strategic compulsions and hardcore realism will force both to reexamine their past perception of one another. The ‘Look East' policy of Saudi Arabia fits well within the Indian desire for greater economic cooperation with the energy giant. While fundamental dif ferences would not be overcome suddenly both countries would have to make se , rious and concerted effort towards mutual understanding.

India has been extremely accommodative of some of Saudi sensitivities. During his State visit King Abdullah skipped the customary visit to the Rajghat. For the Saudi ruler, laying wreath on Mahatma Gandhi's memorial symbolised idol worship, something impermissible under the Wahhabi Islam.

Indeed, the Indian indifference is not particular to Saudi Arabia. Ever since Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister a host of rulers from the region including Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan were in India. The top leadership of the country could not find time or inclination to organise reciprocal visits. Indeed this neglect of the Middle East comes against the backdrop of highsounding rhetoric about energy security .

If once excludes the recent visit of Vice President M H Ansari, even the energy rich Central Asia had not figured in the radar screen of senior Indian leaders.

The lack of sustained follow-up after King Abdullah's visit has to be located in the absence of a foreign minister who can devote his attention and energy exclusively to external affairs. From the days of Nehru, prime ministers often doubled as foreign ministers, thereby imposing organisational limitations on follow-up measures.

Mukherjee, however, faces different problems. Besides his own prime ministerial ambitions, he is the principal firefighter in the government. He heads scores of committees of Group of Ministers and countless number of official panels and party responsibilities. Of late, mediating with the cantankerous Left parties over the nuclear deal has become his principal function.

With a powerful section of the Congress party now rooting for Rahul Gandhi as the next Prime Minister, Mukherjee perhaps will find more time and energy to the external area. Time has come for him to use his rich political acumen to provide a much needed but a long absent leadership to the South Block. Will he now the play the role Manmohan Singh played when heading the North Block in the 1990s?
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Sunday, April 27, 2008

India and Ahmadinejad's visit

Friends with Iran or kiss of death?
Rediff News April 28, 2008 15:01 IST
As he touches down in New Delhi on Tuesday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be having the last laugh. Not long ago Prime Minister Manmohan Singh skipped a summit meeting just to avoid being seen with the Iranian leader. What began as a stopover en route from Sri Lanka has blossomed into a hectic State visit.
This is a compromise between a full-fledged State visit and keeping distance from Iran. Not to be left behind, Pakistan hosts the Iranian leader on his way to Sri Lanka. During the few hours in the capital, the visitor would be meeting top Indian leaders, including President Pratibha Patil, Vice President and former ambassador to Iran M H Ansari, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and perhaps Congress President Sonia Gandhi. It is still not clear if Leader of Opposition L K Advani would be meeting the visitor separately.

The visit marks an interesting phase in India's foreign policy. This is the first formal meeting between the mercurial Iranian leader and Prime Minister Singh. Ever since he was elected President in July 2005, Ahmadinejad has been trying to consolidate his stature and international acceptance. With Western criticisms and disapprovals getting louder, he needed to be seen in different parts of the world and courted by prominent world leaders.�He visited all major non-Western powers such as China, Russia and of course Venezuela, which has emerged as the torchbearer of growing anti-Americanism in the Third World.
Partly to further Indo-Iranian ties, but primarily to enhance his international profile and acceptance, Ahmadinejad has been keen to meet Indian leaders. Such an opportunity came in June 2006 during the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council where both India and Iran are 'observers'. Timing, however, was bad. Photo opportunity with Ahmadinejad, the Indian leader feared, would have hardened the critics of the nuclear deal then on Capitol Hill. Hence, Dr Singh skipped that meeting and instead sent Petroleum Minister Murli Deora.
Indeed when Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee went to Teheran in February last year, the Iranian officials ambushed him by suggesting a summit meeting among leaders of India, Iran and Pakistan to sort out their differences over the gas pipeline.
Thus, by hosting the Iranian leader, what does India convey to the outside world? Going by the working of the UPA government, one can infer a few possible explanations.
The visit is most likely to be used by the government to exhibit its 'independent' foreign policy vis-a-vis the US. This would partially assuage the Left and its supporters within the establishment. Spin doctors might stretch it further and hope that by hosting the Iranian leader the government could make the Left 'flexible' on the nuclear deal.
The sudden silence adopted by the US following its initial displeasure over the Indian decision should also be seen within this context. Washington might see the visit as a small price for larger cooperation with India. Unfortunately, Ahmadinejad's visit would not turn things around.
It is more likely that the visit is a signal that the UPA government has given up on the nuclear deal. India courting the Iranian leader is the last thing US President George Bush needed to pacify the critics of the nuclear deal, especially when the Administration is preparing tougher economic sanctions against the Iranian banking system. With the American presidential elections only weeks away, New Delhi is perhaps least concerned about needling Washington.
Two, as a host of developments such as loan waivers, pay commission report, creamy layer debate etc indicate, India is definitely in election mode. Diplomatic parlays with Islamic countries are politically sensible and advantageous to the Congress party. This visit comes within days after Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's much delayed trip to Saudi Arabia.
As National Security Advisor M K Narayanan unabashedly admitted, there is a Shia angle to Ahmadinejad's visit. In simple English, do not forget the elections in Karnataka!
Three, as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi recognised in 1989, anti-Americanism plays well during Lok Sabha elections. A person who was keen to promote closer ties with Washington, he suddenly threw caution to the winds and publicly warned: naani yaad dilayenge. Hence, one should not rule out the possibility of negative reactions from the US after the visit playing a prominent role in electioneering in India.
Four, there are suggestions that outstanding disputes with Iran over the energy supplies could be resolved during the visit. All the three major energy deals with Iran -- namely, pipeline via Pakistan, LNG supplies and energy exploration -- are entangled in price disputes, technological difficulties or other controversies. They cannot be resolved amicably during the short visit but both sides might establish a mechanism for resolution and claim 'breakthrough or win-win deal'.
Whatever the outcome, India would be paying more for the LNG deal than what then Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar signed in January 2005.
Five, Ahmadinejad is the third Iranian President to visit India since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The visits by Hashemi Rafsanjani in April 1995 and Mohammed Khatami in January 2003 happened when Iran abandoned its belligerency towards the outside world and was adopting a more conciliatory policy towards its Arab neighbours.

Ahmadinejad is literally antithetical to both these leaders. Not only he is moving the country back to radicalism, but has adopted stands that unnerve a number of Iran's Arab and non-Arab neighbours. His periodic Holocaust denials have displeased even Khatami who publicly rebuked the Iranian President.
The nuclear bellicosity has put Iran on a confrontationist path not just with the West. The three resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (two of them unanimously) do not speak well of Iran's international stature. Even friendly countries such as Russia and China are no longer willing to accept the Iranian version on the nuclear issue.

Six, though they could never say it in public due to geo-political compulsions, the Arab countries are equally worried about Iran. Even without the nuclear genie, Iran has not hesitated to be a regional bully and ready to play the Shia card whenever necessary. Many Iranian officials are gleeful about the failure of American policy in Iraq and the resultant Shia crescent that extends from Bahrain to Bekaa valley in Lebanon.
Not long ago Saudi King Abdullah accused Teheran of 'converting' Iraqi Sunnis into Shia faith. Indeed, Ahmadinejad's stopover which comes within days after Mukherjee's Saudi visit would cause anxieties in Riyadh.
The foreign policy establishment has often got things wrong, and its 'reading' of the Nepalese elections is the latest example. Wishful thinking often masquerades as assessment. Iran should not be different. Driven by short term gains, India is rolling out the red carpet to Ahmadinejad.
There is nothing wrong if the Indian government concluded that friendship with Iran is more important than the nuclear deal or closer ties with the US. One can recognise, discover and if necessary even invent Iranian virtues. But if India pretends that it would be business as usual the day after, then it would find Ahmadinejad's visit to be a kiss of death.
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Monday, April 14, 2008

Mubarak's Chutzpah

Cairo treating India with contempt
New Indian Express (Chennai), Monday April 14 2008 16:39 IST
On Thursday a section of the Indian media reported that Egyptian diplomats in New Delhi were hoping for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries before India goes to polls sometime next year. Following Tuesday Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the first summit meeting with a host of African heads of states. Later that evening an eminent panel headed by Vice President M H Ansari announced that the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 2007 would be bestowed upon India's long-time friend and President of Iceland Dr Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.
What is common to all the three developments that happened in the first week of April is Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak! Cairo's hope for a summit "before" the next Lok Sabha election is an unconcealed euphuism for its leader being the chief guest at the 2009 Republic Day celebrations. If other Middle Eastern leaders such as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2001), Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (2003) and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2006) were given such honours, how could India ignore Mubarak?
At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.
Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.
This is in quiet contrast to his attitude towards others where Mubarak uses his charm offensive. He was in Beijing 2006 when China hosted a summit meeting with African leaders in November 2006. Indeed just weeks ago, he had a highly successful visit to Moscow. For long New Delhi, however, has not figured in his radar screen.
Thirdly, the panel which announced the Nehru award for 2007 could not be unaware that for over a decade the prize money and citation for 1995 is gathering dust because Mubarak could not find time to come to New Delhi and receive the honour.
In July 1997 with much fanfare and also with some diplomatic calculations, a panel headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan selected the Egyptian leader for the Nehru award for 1995. Besides recognising his contribution to international peace, especially to the Middle East peace process, the move was aimed at garnering some diplomatic mileage.
Ever since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.
More than a decade later, however, the Nehru award is yet to be conferred upon Mubarak. On two occasions his visit was cancelled at the last minute. Once President Narayanan was indisposed and on another occasion, turbulent events in the region prevented Mubarak from making his trip. But ten years is far too long even for genuine diplomatic excuses.
As per the procedure, the panel that selects the Nehru award is headed by the Vice President with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court functioning as the ex-officio member. Since July 1997 when the award for Mubarak was announced, India had three Vice Presidents and as many as ten new Chief Justices.
Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997. Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."
For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.
The behaviour of Egyptian leader is in complete contrast to the attitude of many other leaders and figures. During the past decade New Delhi has become the favourite destination of many world leaders, East and West and Developed and Developing.
Among others, it has hosted two sitting US Presidents, heads of states of all the major powers, scores of western leaders and Third World personalities. Many countries of the Middle East have discovered the growing importance of India and want to capitalise on its economic growth through high-profiled visits. Egypt was not one of them. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to galvanise the Egyptian indifference.
By conferring honours named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to promote its interests and influence in different parts of world. Unlike political leverages and economic clout, cultural diplomacy resents the soft power and is both effective and harmonising. The attitude of Mubarak, thus, raises serious questions about the rationale behind such cultural diplomacy.
The Egyptian failure to arrange Mubarak's visit for nearly a decade also indicates the current status of Indo-Egyptian relations. This is in contrast to the heydays of friendship between Nehru and President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both leaders met over a dozen times and Cairo was a constant stopover for many of Nehru's sojourns to Europe.
World has changed a lot and so is the Egyptian attitude. While Mubarak could not be forced to come to India, the latter could learn something out of this bitter experience. If India and its leaders are less important, there is no reason for New Delhi to be generous towards Cairo. Having treated the award named after India's first Prime Minister with such distain and contempt, Egypt now wants a sweetener.
But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.
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India Egypt

Mubarak's chutzpah

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080414061744&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

Mubarak's Chutzpah

Mubarak's Chutzpah - Cairo treating India with contempt
New Delhi hopes that an award named after Nehru might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 14, 2008

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http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080414061744&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

On Thursday a section of the Indian media reported that Egyptian diplomats in New Delhi were hoping for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries before India goes to polls sometime next year. Following Tuesday Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the first summit meeting with a host of African heads of states. Later that evening an eminent panel headed by Vice President M H Ansari announced that the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 2007 would be bestowed upon India's long-time friend and President of Iceland Dr Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.

What is common to all the three developments that happened in the first week of April is Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak! Cairo's hope for a summit "before" the next Lok Sabha election is an unconcealed euphuism for its leader being the chief guest at the 2009 Republic Day celebrations. If other Middle Eastern leaders such as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2001), Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (2003) and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2006) were given such honours, how could India ignore Mubarak?

At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.

Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.

This is in quiet contrast to his attitude towards others where Mubarak uses his charm offensive. He was in Beijing 2006 when China hosted a summit meeting with African leaders in November 2006. Indeed just weeks ago, he had a highly successful visit to Moscow. For long New Delhi, however, has not figured in his radar screen.

Thirdly, the panel which announced the Nehru award for 2007 could not be unaware that for over a decade the prize money and citation for 1995 is gathering dust because Mubarak could not find time to come to New Delhi and receive the honour.

In July 1997 with much fanfare and also with some diplomatic calculations, a panel headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan selected the Egyptian leader for the Nehru award for 1995. Besides recognising his contribution to international peace, especially to the Middle East peace process, the move was aimed at garnering some diplomatic mileage.

Even since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

More than a decade later, however, the Nehru award is yet to be conferred upon Mubarak. On two occasions his visit was cancelled at the last minute. Once President Narayanan was indisposed and on another occasion, turbulent events in the region prevented Mubarak from making his trip. But ten years is far too long even for genuine diplomatic excuses.

As per the procedure, the panel that selects the Nehru award is headed by the Vice President with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court functioning as the ex-officio member. Since July 1997 when the award for Mubarak was announced, India had three Vice Presidents and as many as ten new Chief Justices.

Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997.

Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."

For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.

The behaviour of Egyptian leader is in complete contrast to the attitude of many other leaders and figures. During the past decade New Delhi has become the favourite destination of many world leaders, East and West and Developed and Developing.

Among others, it has hosted two sitting US Presidents, heads of states of all the major powers, scores of western leaders and Third World personalities. Many countries of the Middle East have discovered the growing importance of India and want to capitalise on its economic growth through high-profiled visits. Egypt was not one of them. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to galvanise the Egyptian indifference.

By conferring honours named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to promote its interests and influence in different parts of world. Unlike political leverages and economic clout, cultural diplomacy resents the soft power and is both effective and harmonising. The attitude of Mubarak, thus, raises serious questions about the rationale behind such cultural diplomacy.

The Egyptian failure to arrange Mubarak's visit for nearly a decade also indicates the current status of Indo-Egyptian relations. This is in contrast to the heydays of friendship between Nehru and President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both leaders met over a dozen times and Cairo was a constant stopover for many of Nehru's sojourns to Europe.

World has changed a lot and so is the Egyptian attitude. While Mubarak could not be forced to come to India, the latter could learn something out of this bitter experience. If India and its leaders are less important, there is no reason for New Delhi to be generous towards Cairo. Having treated the award named after India's first Prime Minister with such distain and contempt, Egypt now wants a sweetener.

But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.