India Saudi Arabia

Wooing Gulf investments - End of Indian summer over Arabia?

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 30, 2008.

FOREIGN Minister Pranab Mukherjee was luckier the third time. On two previous occasions his visits to Saudi Arabia were cancelled at the last minute. During his two-day visit he met a host of Saudi officials. He also had an audience with the King Abdullah. Besides the customary remarks about the Middle East peace process, situation in Iraq and regional stability Mukherjee flagged in the , economic agenda. He was enticing Saudi investment in India's massive infrastructure plans which he felt could absorb upto "$ 500-600 billion."

During the last February visit of his Saudi counterpart Prince Saud al-Faisal, both countries agreed to pursue investments in energy, petro-chemical and infrastructure. Mukherjee was also trying to capitalise on the momentum set by the landmark visit of the King as the chief guest at the 2006 Republic Day celebrations.

At the bilateral level, Saudi Arabia has been a major supplier of energy and accounts for about a third of India's total oil imports. With a total trade turnover of just under $ 16 billion, it is India's major trading partner in the Middle East.

Out of an estimated four million Indian workers in the region, at least 1.6 million are gainfully employed in the kingdom. Through their employment and homeward remittances these workers contribute not only to the welfare of their dependent families but also help mitigate India's perennial trade deficit with the region.

However, the manner in which India has approached the political aspects of its relations with Saudi Arabia has been abysmal. The last state visit to Saudi Arabia took place in 1982 when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visited the kingdom. This was nearly quarter of a century after Jawaharlal Nehru's visit in 1956.

Mukherjee's visit came more than seven years after the visit of Jawant Singh in January 2001. Even the hype over King Abdullah's state visit did not usher in a sense of urgency.

In terms of education cooperation, the New Delhi-based Jamia Millia Islamia has emerged as the principal beneficiary of the Saudi largess. During his visit, King Abdullah was conferred an hon orary doctorate by Jamia for his contribution to peace and promotion of IndoSaudi relations. The Saudi monarch reciprocated this gesture by donating US $ 30 million for the construction of a library and research building.

However, the Indo-Saudi relations cannot be studied only through the energyeconomic prism. The desire of King Abdullah (since his earlier days as Crown Prince before ascending to the thrown in 2005), to reframe the traditional Saudi ties with the US through ‘Look East' policy also has security implications. Saudi Arabia would expect greater Indian transparency in dealing with the Gulf.

For example, did Mukherjee inform the King about the impending visit of Iranian President Ahmadinejad?

Furthermore, both are on a learning curve. The Saudi brand of Wahhabi Islam and Indian secularism are anti-thetical. Yet, geo-strategic compulsions and hardcore realism will force both to reexamine their past perception of one another. The ‘Look East' policy of Saudi Arabia fits well within the Indian desire for greater economic cooperation with the energy giant. While fundamental dif ferences would not be overcome suddenly both countries would have to make se , rious and concerted effort towards mutual understanding.

India has been extremely accommodative of some of Saudi sensitivities. During his State visit King Abdullah skipped the customary visit to the Rajghat. For the Saudi ruler, laying wreath on Mahatma Gandhi's memorial symbolised idol worship, something impermissible under the Wahhabi Islam.

Indeed, the Indian indifference is not particular to Saudi Arabia. Ever since Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister a host of rulers from the region including Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait and Jordan were in India. The top leadership of the country could not find time or inclination to organise reciprocal visits. Indeed this neglect of the Middle East comes against the backdrop of highsounding rhetoric about energy security .

If once excludes the recent visit of Vice President M H Ansari, even the energy rich Central Asia had not figured in the radar screen of senior Indian leaders.

The lack of sustained follow-up after King Abdullah's visit has to be located in the absence of a foreign minister who can devote his attention and energy exclusively to external affairs. From the days of Nehru, prime ministers often doubled as foreign ministers, thereby imposing organisational limitations on follow-up measures.

Mukherjee, however, faces different problems. Besides his own prime ministerial ambitions, he is the principal firefighter in the government. He heads scores of committees of Group of Ministers and countless number of official panels and party responsibilities. Of late, mediating with the cantankerous Left parties over the nuclear deal has become his principal function.

With a powerful section of the Congress party now rooting for Rahul Gandhi as the next Prime Minister, Mukherjee perhaps will find more time and energy to the external area. Time has come for him to use his rich political acumen to provide a much needed but a long absent leadership to the South Block. Will he now the play the role Manmohan Singh played when heading the North Block in the 1990s?

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India and Ahmadinejad's visit

Friends with Iran or kiss of death?

Rediff News April 28, 2008 15:01 IST
As he touches down in New Delhi on Tuesday, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be having the last laugh. Not long ago Prime Minister Manmohan Singh skipped a summit meeting just to avoid being seen with the Iranian leader. What began as a stopover en route from Sri Lanka has blossomed into a hectic State visit.

This is a compromise between a full-fledged State visit and keeping distance from Iran. Not to be left behind, Pakistan hosts the Iranian leader on his way to Sri Lanka. During the few hours in the capital, the visitor would be meeting top Indian leaders, including President Pratibha Patil, Vice President and former ambassador to Iran M H Ansari, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and perhaps Congress President Sonia Gandhi. It is still not clear if Leader of Opposition L K Advani would be meeting the visitor separately.

The visit marks an interesting phase in India's foreign policy. This is the first formal meeting between the mercurial Iranian leader and Prime Minister Singh. Ever since he was elected President in July 2005, Ahmadinejad has been trying to consolidate his stature and international acceptance. With Western criticisms and disapprovals getting louder, he needed to be seen in different parts of the world and courted by prominent world leaders.�He visited all major non-Western powers such as China, Russia and of course Venezuela, which has emerged as the torchbearer of growing anti-Americanism in the Third World.

Partly to further Indo-Iranian ties, but primarily to enhance his international profile and acceptance, Ahmadinejad has been keen to meet Indian leaders. Such an opportunity came in June 2006 during the summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Council where both India and Iran are 'observers'. Timing, however, was bad. Photo opportunity with Ahmadinejad, the Indian leader feared, would have hardened the critics of the nuclear deal then on Capitol Hill. Hence, Dr Singh skipped that meeting and instead sent Petroleum Minister Murli Deora.

Indeed when Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee went to Teheran in February last year, the Iranian officials ambushed him by suggesting a summit meeting among leaders of India, Iran and Pakistan to sort out their differences over the gas pipeline.

Thus, by hosting the Iranian leader, what does India convey to the outside world? Going by the working of the UPA government, one can infer a few possible explanations.

The visit is most likely to be used by the government to exhibit its 'independent' foreign policy vis-a-vis the US. This would partially assuage the Left and its supporters within the establishment. Spin doctors might stretch it further and hope that by hosting the Iranian leader the government could make the Left 'flexible' on the nuclear deal.

The sudden silence adopted by the US following its initial displeasure over the Indian decision should also be seen within this context. Washington might see the visit as a small price for larger cooperation with India. Unfortunately, Ahmadinejad's visit would not turn things around.

It is more likely that the visit is a signal that the UPA government has given up on the nuclear deal. India courting the Iranian leader is the last thing US President George Bush needed to pacify the critics of the nuclear deal, especially when the Administration is preparing tougher economic sanctions against the Iranian banking system. With the American presidential elections only weeks away, New Delhi is perhaps least concerned about needling Washington.

Two, as a host of developments such as loan waivers, pay commission report, creamy layer debate etc indicate, India is definitely in election mode. Diplomatic parlays with Islamic countries are politically sensible and advantageous to the Congress party. This visit comes within days after Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee's much delayed trip to Saudi Arabia.

As National Security Advisor M K Narayanan unabashedly admitted, there is a Shia angle to Ahmadinejad's visit. In simple English, do not forget the elections in Karnataka!

Three, as Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi recognised in 1989, anti-Americanism plays well during Lok Sabha elections. A person who was keen to promote closer ties with Washington, he suddenly threw caution to the winds and publicly warned: naani yaad dilayenge. Hence, one should not rule out the possibility of negative reactions from the US after the visit playing a prominent role in electioneering in India.

Four, there are suggestions that outstanding disputes with Iran over the energy supplies could be resolved during the visit. All the three major energy deals with Iran -- namely, pipeline via Pakistan, LNG supplies and energy exploration -- are entangled in price disputes, technological difficulties or other controversies. They cannot be resolved amicably during the short visit but both sides might establish a mechanism for resolution and claim 'breakthrough or win-win deal'.

Whatever the outcome, India would be paying more for the LNG deal than what then Oil Minister Mani Shankar Aiyar signed in January 2005.

Five, Ahmadinejad is the third Iranian President to visit India since the 1979 Islamic revolution. The visits by Hashemi Rafsanjani in April 1995 and Mohammed Khatami in January 2003 happened when Iran abandoned its belligerency towards the outside world and was adopting a more conciliatory policy towards its Arab neighbours.

Ahmadinejad is literally antithetical to both these leaders. Not only he is moving the country back to radicalism, but has adopted stands that unnerve a number of Iran's Arab and non-Arab neighbours. His periodic Holocaust denials have displeased even Khatami who publicly rebuked the Iranian President.

The nuclear bellicosity has put Iran on a confrontationist path not just with the West. The three resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (two of them unanimously) do not speak well of Iran's international stature. Even friendly countries such as Russia and China are no longer willing to accept the Iranian version on the nuclear issue.

Six, though they could never say it in public due to geo-political compulsions, the Arab countries are equally worried about Iran. Even without the nuclear genie, Iran has not hesitated to be a regional bully and ready to play the Shia card whenever necessary. Many Iranian officials are gleeful about the failure of American policy in Iraq and the resultant Shia crescent that extends from Bahrain to Bekaa valley in Lebanon.

Not long ago Saudi King Abdullah accused Teheran of 'converting' Iraqi Sunnis into Shia faith. Indeed, Ahmadinejad's stopover which comes within days after Mukherjee's Saudi visit would cause anxieties in Riyadh.

The foreign policy establishment has often got things wrong, and its 'reading' of the Nepalese elections is the latest example. Wishful thinking often masquerades as assessment. Iran should not be different. Driven by short term gains, India is rolling out the red carpet to Ahmadinejad.

There is nothing wrong if the Indian government concluded that friendship with Iran is more important than the nuclear deal or closer ties with the US. One can recognise, discover and if necessary even invent Iranian virtues. But if India pretends that it would be business as usual the day after, then it would find Ahmadinejad's visit to be a kiss of death.

Web version:

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Mubarak's Chutzpah

Cairo treating India with contempt
New Indian Express (Chennai), Monday April 14 2008 16:39 IST

On Thursday a section of the Indian media reported that Egyptian diplomats in New Delhi were hoping for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries before India goes to polls sometime next year. Following Tuesday Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the first summit meeting with a host of African heads of states. Later that evening an eminent panel headed by Vice President M H Ansari announced that the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 2007 would be bestowed upon India's long-time friend and President of Iceland Dr Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.

What is common to all the three developments that happened in the first week of April is Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak! Cairo's hope for a summit "before" the next Lok Sabha election is an unconcealed euphuism for its leader being the chief guest at the 2009 Republic Day celebrations. If other Middle Eastern leaders such as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2001), Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (2003) and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2006) were given such honours, how could India ignore Mubarak?

At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.

Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.

This is in quiet contrast to his attitude towards others where Mubarak uses his charm offensive. He was in Beijing 2006 when China hosted a summit meeting with African leaders in November 2006. Indeed just weeks ago, he had a highly successful visit to Moscow. For long New Delhi, however, has not figured in his radar screen.

Thirdly, the panel which announced the Nehru award for 2007 could not be unaware that for over a decade the prize money and citation for 1995 is gathering dust because Mubarak could not find time to come to New Delhi and receive the honour.

In July 1997 with much fanfare and also with some diplomatic calculations, a panel headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan selected the Egyptian leader for the Nehru award for 1995. Besides recognising his contribution to international peace, especially to the Middle East peace process, the move was aimed at garnering some diplomatic mileage.

Ever since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

More than a decade later, however, the Nehru award is yet to be conferred upon Mubarak. On two occasions his visit was cancelled at the last minute. Once President Narayanan was indisposed and on another occasion, turbulent events in the region prevented Mubarak from making his trip. But ten years is far too long even for genuine diplomatic excuses.

As per the procedure, the panel that selects the Nehru award is headed by the Vice President with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court functioning as the ex-officio member. Since July 1997 when the award for Mubarak was announced, India had three Vice Presidents and as many as ten new Chief Justices.

Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997. Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."

For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.

The behaviour of Egyptian leader is in complete contrast to the attitude of many other leaders and figures. During the past decade New Delhi has become the favourite destination of many world leaders, East and West and Developed and Developing.

Among others, it has hosted two sitting US Presidents, heads of states of all the major powers, scores of western leaders and Third World personalities. Many countries of the Middle East have discovered the growing importance of India and want to capitalise on its economic growth through high-profiled visits. Egypt was not one of them. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to galvanise the Egyptian indifference.

By conferring honours named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to promote its interests and influence in different parts of world. Unlike political leverages and economic clout, cultural diplomacy resents the soft power and is both effective and harmonising. The attitude of Mubarak, thus, raises serious questions about the rationale behind such cultural diplomacy.

The Egyptian failure to arrange Mubarak's visit for nearly a decade also indicates the current status of Indo-Egyptian relations. This is in contrast to the heydays of friendship between Nehru and President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both leaders met over a dozen times and Cairo was a constant stopover for many of Nehru's sojourns to Europe.

World has changed a lot and so is the Egyptian attitude. While Mubarak could not be forced to come to India, the latter could learn something out of this bitter experience. If India and its leaders are less important, there is no reason for New Delhi to be generous towards Cairo. Having treated the award named after India's first Prime Minister with such distain and contempt, Egypt now wants a sweetener.

But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.

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India Egypt

Mubarak's chutzpah

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Mubarak's Chutzpah

Mubarak's Chutzpah - Cairo treating India with contempt
New Delhi hopes that an award named after Nehru might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 14, 2008

Web Link:

http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IE720080414061744&Page=7&Title=TheOped&Topic=0

On Thursday a section of the Indian media reported that Egyptian diplomats in New Delhi were hoping for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries before India goes to polls sometime next year. Following Tuesday Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the first summit meeting with a host of African heads of states. Later that evening an eminent panel headed by Vice President M H Ansari announced that the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 2007 would be bestowed upon India's long-time friend and President of Iceland Dr Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.

What is common to all the three developments that happened in the first week of April is Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak! Cairo's hope for a summit "before" the next Lok Sabha election is an unconcealed euphuism for its leader being the chief guest at the 2009 Republic Day celebrations. If other Middle Eastern leaders such as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2001), Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (2003) and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2006) were given such honours, how could India ignore Mubarak?

At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.

Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.

This is in quiet contrast to his attitude towards others where Mubarak uses his charm offensive. He was in Beijing 2006 when China hosted a summit meeting with African leaders in November 2006. Indeed just weeks ago, he had a highly successful visit to Moscow. For long New Delhi, however, has not figured in his radar screen.

Thirdly, the panel which announced the Nehru award for 2007 could not be unaware that for over a decade the prize money and citation for 1995 is gathering dust because Mubarak could not find time to come to New Delhi and receive the honour.

In July 1997 with much fanfare and also with some diplomatic calculations, a panel headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan selected the Egyptian leader for the Nehru award for 1995. Besides recognising his contribution to international peace, especially to the Middle East peace process, the move was aimed at garnering some diplomatic mileage.

Even since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

More than a decade later, however, the Nehru award is yet to be conferred upon Mubarak. On two occasions his visit was cancelled at the last minute. Once President Narayanan was indisposed and on another occasion, turbulent events in the region prevented Mubarak from making his trip. But ten years is far too long even for genuine diplomatic excuses.

As per the procedure, the panel that selects the Nehru award is headed by the Vice President with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court functioning as the ex-officio member. Since July 1997 when the award for Mubarak was announced, India had three Vice Presidents and as many as ten new Chief Justices.

Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997.

Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."

For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.

The behaviour of Egyptian leader is in complete contrast to the attitude of many other leaders and figures. During the past decade New Delhi has become the favourite destination of many world leaders, East and West and Developed and Developing.

Among others, it has hosted two sitting US Presidents, heads of states of all the major powers, scores of western leaders and Third World personalities. Many countries of the Middle East have discovered the growing importance of India and want to capitalise on its economic growth through high-profiled visits. Egypt was not one of them. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to galvanise the Egyptian indifference.

By conferring honours named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to promote its interests and influence in different parts of world. Unlike political leverages and economic clout, cultural diplomacy resents the soft power and is both effective and harmonising. The attitude of Mubarak, thus, raises serious questions about the rationale behind such cultural diplomacy.

The Egyptian failure to arrange Mubarak's visit for nearly a decade also indicates the current status of Indo-Egyptian relations. This is in contrast to the heydays of friendship between Nehru and President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both leaders met over a dozen times and Cairo was a constant stopover for many of Nehru's sojourns to Europe.

World has changed a lot and so is the Egyptian attitude. While Mubarak could not be forced to come to India, the latter could learn something out of this bitter experience. If India and its leaders are less important, there is no reason for New Delhi to be generous towards Cairo. Having treated the award named after India's first Prime Minister with such distain and contempt, Egypt now wants a sweetener.

But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.

Bribes threaten Indo-Israeli military ties

Investigations into corruption and bribes surrounding the Barak missile deal threatens to upset growing Indo-Israeli ties, ISN Security Watch (01/04/08)

Military ties, the most visible manifestation of Indo-Israeli relations, are being undermined from within by corruption and bribery. To ensure the smooth functioning of its growing military exports, leading Israeli companies have greased a few Indian palms – actions that are now threatening to blow up into a major controversy.

In October 2000, under the government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, India signed a US$250 million Barak missile deal with Israel. Within months, media began revealing large-scale corruption involving senior political figures and arms merchants.

Besides the usual defense agents and greedy politicians, the scandal has also involved members of the naval fraternity. Suresh Nanda - son of the former naval chief who headed the Indian navy during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war - is the prime suspect. He is estimated to have earned about US$100 million in commissions for the Barak deal, while some smaller amounts went to the friends of George Fernandes, India's defense minister at the time the deal was signed. The investigative agencies have also questioned Admiral Sushil Kumar, the then-commander of the Indian Navy.

Furthermore, recommendations against the procurement of Barak by APJ Abdul Kalam, the-then scientific advisor and later on president, worked against the deal, especially when bribes appeared to have tilted the scales.

Defense deals have always been controversial, especially since New Delhi sought to lessen its dependency on Russia. Because its ties with Moscow were tightly controlled and managed, one never heard of money changing hands even when the USSR remained India's most favored arms supplier. Its desire to diversify defense procurements brought in arms merchants who understood and worked within the pulses of the Indian establishment.

In the 1980s, a bribery scandal involving the Swedish Bofors Company adversely affected the electoral prospects of then-prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and cost the Congress party dearly. The long-drawn controversy was largely responsible for the party losing its nation-wide appeal and popularity.

Since then, Indian leaders have been arguing against using middlemen and agents in defense contrast. However, given the complexity of the process, legendary Indian bureaucratic bottlenecks and cut throat completions, conducting major defense deals without agents is nearly impossible.

For its part, the Indian defense establishment is maintaining that the Barak deal was a good acquisition that was badly executed. Similar arguments were put forth by the army at the height of the Bofors scandal: good gun, bad procedure.

Partly with political calculations in mind, upon coming to power in May 2004, the government of Manmohan Singh instituted probes into 48 major defense contracts signed by the previous government. And the Barak deal is not the only one under scrutiny.

According to media reports, Israeli Attorney General Menachem Mazuz is investigating Moshe Keret - the CEO of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for 20 year until 2005 for his role in the Phalcon spy plane deal. The judiciary in Israel has issued a gag order against disclosing the identity of another arms dealer involved in the probe.

As per the original deal signed with China, Israel was to supply four spy planes for US$1 billion. When the US scuttled that deal, Israel found a new buyer in India and agreed to sell three planes for US$1.1 billion. According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, though the Indian deal is still in the implementation phase, "the agent has received an advance of millions of dollars with many more millions promised."

The investigative agencies are closing in on the Indian beneficiaries of the Barak deal, but at the same time, the Indian government will not be able to remain silent on the role played by the Israeli companies.

Already the communist parties who are highly critical of India's defense ties with Israel have jumped at the opportunity and have demanded the blacklisting of Israeli companies involved in the scam. Should the Indian government accept their plea, leading firms such as the state-owned Rafael will be affected as it is involved in a number of defense deals with India.

Within a short span of 15 years, Israel has emerged as the second largest arms supplier to India and New Delhi the prime export destination for Israeli arms. In recent months, both countries are moving into joint defense research and other forms of security cooperation. Despite some disquiet in countries such as Iran and Egypt, both are keen to establish a long-term defense partnership.

Seen in this larger context, the Barak scandal is a major setback and will haunt both defense establishments for a long time to come.

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