Benazir UN Probe

UN probe a non-starter

New Indian Express, Saturday January 5 2008 07:40 IST

THE demand by Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) for an inquiry by the United Nations into the death of its leader and former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, has exposed not only the diminishing credibility of the Pakistani establishment under President Parvez Musharraf but also wider problems facing Pakistan.

Thanks to Musharraf’s strong-arm tactics against the senior judges, independent judicial investigation is no longer an option for Pakistan. By replacing independent-minded judges with his Men Fridays, Musharraf has systematically destroyed the impartially of the judiciary.

Even the minimal credibility of the government was lost when the establishment claimed that Ms. Bhutto was killed not by the assassin’s bullets but due to injuries she suffered from the sunroof lever of her Toyota Land Cruiser. Even if Ms. Bhutto’s body was eventually exhumed for post-mortem, any official explanation about the actual cause of her death would have few takers within the country. It was under these circumstances, the new leadership of PPP, has demanded a probe by the UN.

Such a far-reaching demand for an international intervention into a domestic situation highlights internal schism within the country. Ms. Bhutto pointing needle of suspicion at the President has only complicated the matter. If Musharraf was part of the plot against Ms. Bhutto, he cannot be a part of the investigation into her death! However, by demanding an inquiry by the UN, the Pakistani leaders have raised the stakes. Though unusual, this is not unprecedented. The UN is currently investigating the killing of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who was killed in a terror attack in February 2005.

The parallels between killing of Hariri and Benazir are rather interesting. Like Benazir, Hariri was a popular leader who remained a thorn in the Lebanese establishment. His policies were at odds with President Emile Lahoud, who was seen closer to Syria.

In a country rife with sectarian divisions, Hariri emerged as a unifying force. As a wealthy businessman with closer links with the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, he had considerable political clout abroad. In short, like Ms. Bhutto, even while out of office, he was popular both within and outside the country.

These qualifications, ironically made Hariri a threat to powerful sections of the Lebanese establishment tied to Damascus. His independence came in the way of large-scale Syrian military presence (some might say occupation) in Lebanon. His popularity undermined Syrian ability to dictate Lebanese politics.

There were apprehensions that Hariri could be victorious in the 2006 parliament elections and challenge the Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. It was under such circumstances Hariri was brutally killed in a car bomb in Beirut that also killed 22 others.

Widespread anger at Hariri’s killing however galvanised the popular opposition against Syria and eventually forced Damascus to pullout its troops which came to Lebanon following the outbreak of the Civil war in 1975. At the same time, prolonged Syrian military presence, coupled with the refusal of Damascus to recognize Lebanese independence and sovereignty, made official investigation into the killing of Hariri an impossible preposition.

Many attributed Hariri’s assassination to his anti-Syrian policies. Despite the formal withdrawal of its troops Syria maintained considerable influence and leverage in the country, especially through the Islamic militant group the Hezbollah. Under such circumstances, Lebanese investigation into Hariri’s death became a non-starter. Hence, supporters of Hariri demanded an international investigation into the killing of their leader.

The dissimilarities between the murders of Hariri and Ms. Bhutto are also interesting. The UN probe for Hariri however, enjoyed the unqualified support of the US and also of France, an erstwhile patron of Syria.

Capitalising on the popular sentiments within Lebanon, these two countries worked with others and prodded the UN to act. The anti-Syrian rhetoric of the Bush Administration and the hasty Syrian retreat from Lebanon enabled the UN Security Council to swiftly act. The spate of killings of anti-Syrian personalities following Hariri’s assassination had also helped the situation.

After months of behind-the-scene negotiations and arms twisting by Washington, in April 2005 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1595 that called for an International independent Investigation Commission into the killing of Hariri.

Initially it asked German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis to head the probe and he was later replaced by Belgian prosecutor Serge Brammertz. Their prolonged investigation implicated Lebanese and Syrian intelligence in the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister.

Such an international backing however is unlikely over Ms. Bhutto’s killing. Despite its strong criticisms, Washington is unlikely to exert similar pressure for an UN probe. Given the fragility of the situation in Pakistan and widespread violence, Washington can ill-afford to openly express no-confidence on Musharraf.

The US pushed for a UN probe over Hariri because it enabled Washington to heighten its pressures against Syria which was impeding some of American policies in the Middle East, especially over the peace process.

A similar move over Benazir however would not only alienate the Musharraf administration but also might accentuate further tensions within Pakistan. Without a resolute great power demand, the UN is unlikely to get involved in Benazir’s killing.

Second, it is not clear if the PPP leaders had a closer look similar UN involvement in Lebanon. More than anything else, the Hariri probe has accentuated internal tensions within Lebanon. Indeed, the country is functioning without a president ever since Lahoud completed his term on November 23 as both sides were unable to agree on a mutually acceptable candidate. Far from healing the wounds, a UN probe might only complicate things for Pakistan.

Three, the track record of the Hariri probe is not encouraging. Two chiefs, three years and four reports later, the Hariri file still remains open. Given the political nature of the UN as well as patronage enjoyed by Syria, it is extremely unlikely that anyone would ever be held personally responsible for Hariri’s killing, let alone be convicted.

Hence, there is no reason to believe that if and when the UN takes over the Benazir case, the end result would be any different.

However, the demand for an international probe underscores deep divisions within Pakistan. Through his short-sightedness, blatant nepotism and sheer inefficiency, President Musharraf has systematically destroyed major institutions of Pakistan.

While none, not even his friends in Washington, believed him to be a democrat, many had high hopes on his willingness and ability to fight terrorism in neighbouring Afghanistan.

Growing militancy and violence in different parts of Pakistan has severely undermined his usefulness for the American “war on terrorism.” Thanks to Musharraf even the army could no longer be looked upon to save the country. Benazir’s killing was the last straw.

By demanding the world body to investigate a domestic political killing, Pakistani leaders have raised the banner of helplessness. Whether one likes or not, Benazir’s death is a Pakistani problem. Hence solution would have be Pakistani one. No external power, however well intended, would be able to establish the real cause of her death. Meanwhile, Benazir’s assassination would only intensify conspiracy theories, hidden hands and unresolved mysteries.

India, Iran and the US

Delhi: Between Tehran and Washington

Middle East Quarterly, winter 2008

As the U.S.-Iranian dispute escalates, both Washington and Tehran seek friends and allies. New Delhi is caught in the middle. While the U.S.-Indian partnership has grown closer in recent years, New Delhi's approach toward Iran's suspected nuclear program causes concern in Washington. Overshadowing the debate is India's own nuclear program. With the July 2005 U.S.-Indian civilian nuclear deal yet to win U.S. Senate ratification, is India seeking to strengthen its energy security through Iran? Or is New Delhi pursuing the civilian nuclear deal without being sensitive to Washington's concerns vis-à-vis Iran?

Full text of the article can be found at:

http://www.meforum.org/article/1821

India and Annapolis

Ready to mediate at Annapolis?

New Indian Express, Friday November 30, 2007

EVEN the most optimistic in Washington do not visualise any major breakthrough at Annapolis but by organising the biggest game in town for over seven years, the Bush Administration does not wish to exclude anyone.

While widespread participation might not result in a fruitful outcome, exclusion would undoubtedly have ruffled many feathers and hurt egos. Like a major wedding in town, anyone who matters was invited to the Annapolis Middle East peace conference. So was India.

While the presence of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee might have provided an opportunity for India to interact with other leaders, it would have created unnecessary expectations.

Non-political representation would have made its presence symbolic and insignificant. Through Science Minister Kapil Sibal, who in recent months has emerged as the main, if not sole defender of the nuclear deal in public, the government also sends a subtle message to Washington on the bilateral front.

Some might conclude the invitation to be a sign of recognition of the Indian diversity and even as a “role model” for a lasting peace in the region. Washington has no such illusions.

During much of his tenure President George W Bush avoided the vexed Arab-Israeli conflict like a plague. It was growing anti-Americanism more than anything else that appeared to have catapulted him to act. So with less than a year before leaving the White House, the administration has invested considerable effort and political capital in organising the largest Middle East gathering since the Madrid conference of 1991.

Partly to answer his critics for his unilateralism, President Bush opted to make Annapolis as wide as possible and managed to rope in all major players in the Middle East and beyond. With the notable exception of Hamas which controls the Gaza Strip and Iran, the Administration secured the participation of all major powers, key Middle Eastern players and important regional powers, groups and institutions. The two radicals excluded themselves by opting out of the peace process and not because the US did not want them at Annapolis.

As some western and other leaders discovered in recent months, doing Washington’s bidding is a political liability. Hence the willingness of Syria to attend the event was a diplomatic coup and so was the reluctant attendance of Saudi Foreign Minister.

That most of the countries were represented by their Foreign Ministers was no mean achievement, especially for an Administration that has been vilified for months over its Middle East policy.

The conference also enabled the US to reach out its rivals, recognise regional importance of others and convey “Not-forgotten-you” thank you note to some. While the presence of many countries adds to the prestige and importance of the conference, the US knows that only the two principal parties and not others who could make that leap. Thus while the absence of key players would definitely sabotage the efforts, the presence of so many countries will not by itself make the settlement any closer.

Thus, one should not read too much into India’s presence at Annapolis. Its exclusion on the contrary, might have been viewed as a sign of American displeasure over India backtracking on the nuclear front or worse a pressure tactic. Especially with Pakistan also being there, Indian exclusion would be controversial. By inviting Delhi to Annapolis, the administration reiterates its willingness to recognise India's role in a major international event.

Annapolis also highlights changing times for India. Following normalisation of relations with Israel in 1992, India was supportive of various peace initiatives and in the early 1990s took part in the multilateral arms control talks. But its overall presence was marginal. Not having normal relations with the Jewish State for over four decades, its ability to influence the peace process was less than zero.

During a decade and half, as the bilateral relations improved, it had acquired considerable political capital and economic leverage vis-à-vis Israel.

The manner in which both Congress and non-Congress governments handled the relations exhibit a degree of self-confidence and maturity. It is no longer uneasy let alone apologetic about its friendship with Israel.

Except for occasional jarring notes from Cairo, much of the Middle East have come to terms with India’s willingness to pursue closer ties with Israel, including strong military-security cooperation. Reflecting this even mainstream Palestinian leadership sings a different tune: will New Delhi use its leverage vis-à-vis Israel to further the peace process? Handled tactfully, Annapolis offers India the opportunity to recognise the nuanced and complex demands of a peace maker. Even if success remains elusive and even impossible, like others, India would have to strive for peace in the Middle East. Regional stability serves India’s larger interest, welfare and security.

To be taken seriously, however, India has to drop its blinkers. First and foremost, India should not have illusions about its role in Annapolis or beyond. New Delhi can’t dream of achieving what the US, with all its powers and influence, could not bring about: a comprehensive settlement. Nor should it kid itself into believing or propagating it as a model for others. Just like other models did not work for India, its model won’t work for others.

Thankfully, so far none asked India to be a model. Second, to be a credible player in the Middle East peace process, India would have to be more careful in expressing its views. This was highlighted during the second Lebanese war in the summer of last year. In the initial days, it adopted a balanced position and like much of the Arab world blamed the Hezbollah for kidnapping Israeli soldiers that precipitated the crisis.

Subsequently when the mood in the Middle East swung in favour of the militant group, India joined others in condemning Israel for attacking civilian population and infrastructure in Lebanon. The Indian parliament went on to adopt a onesided resolution that was silent on Hezbollah rocket attacks against Israeli civilians.

While this was perhaps unavoidable due to public pressures from the Left parties, Indian officials went a step further. When the post-ceasefire mediation efforts were on, Prime Minister’s Special Envoy to the region pointedly skipped Israel, whose role was central to the stability along the Israel-Lebanese border. While public criticisms might shore up some domestic support and garner some publicity abroad, they undermine India’s ability to play a meaningful role in the peace process.

New Delhi might conclude that airing strong views in public is more important than mediating the conflict. But if it wants a seat in the hightable, it would have to learn the art of silence. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told parliament during the Czech crisis, when you are in front of avalanches, even slight murmurs will unleash tons of ice.

Mediating the Middle East is not about rights and wrongs but the art of winning over enemies and influencing friends. If Sibal and his team recognise this, Indian presence in Annapolis would have been a worthwhile exercise.

Islam and Minorities

In Islam and Minorities (Mediterranean Quarterly, summer 2007) I argue that Dhimmi, the only framework available in Islam, is inadequate to treat not only non-Islamic communities but also sects within Islam. If interested you can find the full text at: http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/18/3/94

India's Nucler Summer

India's woeful mishandling of negotiations over the 123 Agreement leave some to wonder about the government's ability to manage itself on the international stage.

Commentary for ISN Security Watch (24/08/07)

"Running around like headless chickens."

This was how India's ambassador in Washington, Ronen Sen, described the domestic critics of India's nuclear deal with the US. This tasteless remark believed to be directed at Indian lawmakers might eventually cost him his job. Unfortunately, for him and the Indian government, the critics are growing by the day.

From the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) on the right to the communist parties on the left, a host of groups question the just-concluded agreement, commonly referred to as the 123 Agreement. Many argue that by including domestic US nonproliferation laws into the work, India has "surrendered" its sovereignty. While parliamentary ratification is not mandatory, should the deal be put to vote, the government would be shown the door.

If the BJP is the open adversary, the left parties have been a doubtful ally ever since Manmohan Singh became prime minister following the May 2004 elections. The left also demands that that the government not negotiate a safeguards agreement with the IAEA toward implementing the Indo-US nuclear deal. Without such an agreement, India would not be able to convince the powerful Nuclear Suppliers Groups (NSG) to accept the Indo-US deal and operationalize it. With internal “friends” like the left, Manmohan Singh does not need external enemies.

The problem however, is largely India's own making. From the very beginning, New Delhi did not factor in Washington's expectations while pursuing the nuclear deal. It never recognized let alone internalized US baggage vis-à-vis Iran. Even the Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA) was not taken into account when India started its energy strategy toward Iran.

The Indian leaders pretended that they could obtain energy supplies from Iran and civilian nuclear technology from the US without squaring the circle. They failed to recognize India's non-parallel interests with the US over Iran.

This ignorance proved to be costly. Having talked of "civilizational links" with that country, India voted against Iran at the IAEA in September 2005 and again in 2006 to refer the Iran file to the UN Security Council. The manner in which India handled and justified its vote gave an unmistakable impression that New Delhi acted under US pressures, if not dictates.

This lack of clarity and foresight is not the prerogative of the present government alone, but has become a bipartisan national disease. When it was in office, the BJP was more than eager to send troops to Iraq to shore up beleaguered US President George W Bush. It eventually backed out when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee recognized opposition from his own collation partners.

For its part, the left in India is more Maoist than the Chinese. It is blissfully happy to live under a nuclear China but could not accept India going nuclear in 1998. Some also fault the government for not joining hands with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), increasingly seen as a counterweight to NATO.

As it stands, a vast majority of the lawmakers, especially the communist allies whose support is essential for the survival of the government, are unlikely to accept the nuclear deal. At the same time, the Indian government would not be able renegotiate the deal with the US without losing its credibility. The international community, especially the NSG, would be reluctant to deal with such a sensitive issue when Indian government looks to be on its way out.

Ever since the nuclear deal was initialed in July 2005, Indian officials naively hoped that the US would bring about far-reaching changes in its domestic nonproliferation laws, silence the nuclear ayatollahs, convince other countries to accept the deal and work with key players like China not to oppose the deal at the NSG. The Bush administration would take these far-reaching steps, New Delhi hoped, while it was not prepared to accommodate American concerns over the nuclear stand off with Iran.

Had India read US expectations early and clearly, it would have approached the nuclear deal more carefully and avoided the minefield. It would have understood the political price and prepared the domestic public accordingly. Even if India was not prepared to go all the way, it could have evolved reasonable redlines on the Iran front and convinced the domestic as well as US public. This however, did not happen and as it was forced to recognize, there are no free lunches in Washington.

The manner in which Indian leaders handled the Indo-US nuclear deal pose a fundamental challenge: Are they capable of making a cost-benefit analysis of India's national interest and to convince domestic skeptics before seeking international recognition and cooperation?

Weblink

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18028

India's nuclear dance over Iran

The full text of India's Nuke Dance over Iran published in August 2007 issue of Strategic Insights (Monterey, CA) is available at:

http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2007/Aug/kumaraswamyAug07.asp

Indo-Israel defense ties

Indo-Israeli military ties enter next stage

A US$2.5 billion Indo-Israeli defense project marks a new phase in the two countries' relations.
Commentary by P R Kumaraswamy for ISN Security Watch (03/08/07)

India's recent decision to develop jointly a new generation of surface-to-air missile with Israel is a quantum leap in the two countries' relations.

In early July, India's Cabinet Committee on Security chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh approved the US$2.5 billion defense project with Israel. The development of missiles capable of intercepting aircraft and other aerial targets at a range of 70 kilometers to be undertaken by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries.

This is not only the largest single deal involving Israel but also marks a new phase in defense-related cooperation between the two countries.

Ever since diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, both countries have actively cooperated in the defense arena, with India obtaining a large number of small arms, weapons, avionics, ship-launched Barak missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles from Israel.

Counter-terrorism and border management techniques figure prominently in these regular deliberations.

Within the next few weeks, India will launch the first Israeli satellite, and there is speculation in the Indian media that it will be a spy satellite.

In recent years, service chiefs and other senior military officials have been periodically visiting one another. In May this year, the Indian Defense Minister informed the parliament that from 2002-2007, India obtained over US$5 billion worth of military weapons and systems from Israel. Others suggest that in 2006 alone India's defense imports from Israel stood at US$1.6 billion.

The bourgeoning Indo-Israeli military ties are helped by favorable winds from Washington: its endorsement for the Israeli sale of Phalcon airborne early warning systems to India was a case in point. This deal estimated at over US$1 billion dollars came against the background of the US vetoing similar sale to China.

The new decision on missile development conveys a number of strong messages. Until now, Indo-Israeli military ties have largely been a cash-and-carry affair. India's desire to modernize its aging Soviet-made weapons and defense systems were made possible by Israeli expertise in upgrading and avionics. Though important, this approach has its limitations, especially when Israel does not develop major platforms that India requires for defense modernization.

Since normalization, there were suggestions that meaningful long-term cooperation would demand greater synergy between the two defense establishments. A number of on-going programs in India are not radically differently from their Israeli counterparts. These include plans to develop light combat aircraft, main battle tanks, missiles such as Prithvi and Agni, unmanned aerial vehicles and early warning radar systems. The joint missile research therefore signals that both countries are confident about moving beyond traditional arms sales and onto the next stage.

The timing of the decision is equally important. Ever since Manmohan Singh became India's prime minister in May 2004, the left-leaning parties have been demanding an end to military cooperation with Israel. Though they are not formally part of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA), their support is vital for the survival of Singh's government.

In recent years, the communist parties have been critical of India moving closer to Israel. For them, seeking "strategic ties" with Israel represented a betrayal of the Palestinians and were harmful to India's interests. They even argued that closer military ties were the result of the "anti-Muslim agenda" of Israel and the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Shortly after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000, they demanded the recall of India's ambassador from Tel Aviv.

When Singh became prime minister, "a course correction" in New Delhi's Israel policy became a major foreign policy agenda for the Left. For them, military cooperation with Israel when the latter was brutally subjugating the Palestinians would make India a party to Israel's crimes.

Singh, who was leaning to the left on various domestic issues, could approve such a massive joint military research with Israel but it would also have to be considered within the domestic context. Partly to dispel apprehensions of the Left and silence the critics, a few days after the missile cooperation was approved on 23 July, Indian Defense Minister A K Antony told the media, "Successive governments since 1992 have had defense ties with Israel. This is not new. And the relation is not ideological, but purely based on our security requirements."

The decision indicates a growing Indian confidence vis-à-vis Israel. In the past, India was extremely apprehensive of any public display of friendship with Israel. By seeking greater military cooperation with Israel, New Delhi signals greater self-confidence and indicates that it does not anticipate any problems with Arab and Islamic countries over such relations.

New Delhi has not allowed its differences over the Palestinian issue to undermine its defense ties with Israel. For a while, there were suggestions that New Delhi would become the second most important partner for Israel after Washington. With its troubled relations with Europe, Israel is increasingly looking to other players like India for long-term relations. Seen in this larger context, the missile deal not only marks a synergy between the two defense establishments but also has all the ingredients of a strategic partnership.

Web link:

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17937