Lebanon Syria normalisation

A New Dawn in Lebanon

New Indian Express (Channai), 2 September 2008

Lebanese President Michel Suleiman made history when he visited Damascus on August 13.

The visit not only marked an end to recent tensions in the region but also transformed the very nature of relations between the two Middle East neighbours. Despite some scepticism the visit is truly historic and signals a formal end to Syrian denial of and disregard for Lebanese independence. During the visit Presidents Bashar al-Assad and Suleiman agreed to establish normal diplomatic relations and initiate the process of border demarcation.

Even though Syria and its leadership have to take a lot of concrete measures, a good beginning has been made.

First and foremost, Suleiman’s visit and his earlier meeting with Assad in Paris a few years ago clearly indicate a fundamental change in Syrian attitude towards Lebanese existence as a sovereign entity.

Syria had a historic grievance against the French when the Mandate authorities carved out Mount Lebanon and its surrounding areas to form an independent Lebanese state in 1943.

Such historic claims over others are not new to the Middle East. For long, other countries such Egypt, Jordan, Iran and Iraq had coveted their weaker neighbours. What however made the Lebanese case rather unique was the steadfastness with which Damascus maintained its opposition to recognising Lebanon as a sovereign entity .

For over six decades Damascus had political influence, economic interests and strategic presence in Lebanon but not diplomatic representation. When the Lebanese civil war broke out in 1975, Damascus found an opportunity. In the name of preventing a virtual blood bath, the Ba’athist leadership consolidated its presence. As the factional fight ended in 1989, Syrian presence and influence was legitimised and guaranteed.

Damascus ended up having thousands of troops in Lebanon but never an embassy . Its emissary in Beirut was ironically called ‘Governor’, thereby symbolising Syrian claims over Lebanon.

Such was its influence, Syria set the Lebanese domestic agenda and according to seasoned observers Bashar Assad was personally looking after the ‘Lebanon file’ prior to his election as president in June 2000. Disregarding popular sentiments in Lebanon, he ensured the re-election of President Emile Lahoud in 2004 through a constitutional amendment. Subsequent disputes over this election led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. This was followed by the killing of a number of politicians and other Lebanese personalities who were critical of Syria and its domination. The needle of suspicion continues to point towards Damascus.

Popular revulsion over Hariri’s assassination eventually made the Syrian military presence untenable and forced it to pull out its troops from Lebanon in April. Despite this, as highlighted by the prolonged delay in the election of Lahoud’s successor, Syria continues to wield considerable clout in Lebanon, especially through its erstwhile proxies such as the Hezbollah.

Syrian recognition however was not forthcoming. Keeping up the pressure, in May 2005 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1680 that explicitly called on Damascus “to establish full diplomatic relations and representation” with Beirut. The resolution was endorsed by 13 members of the Council while China and Russia abstained.

Syria also faced criticisms from its erstwhile friends such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Hezbollah’s military activities culminated in the second Lebanon war of 2006 that brought further death and destruction.

Syria was not prepared to abandon the Hezbollah.

Syrian inflexibility over Lebanon dis pleased many Arab countries and resulted in their boycott of the Arab summit hosted by President Assad in March this year. Soon accusations were flying between Damascus and other Arab capitals. However, the Syrian leadership recognised that reconciliation with the wider Arab world depends on meaningful progress on Lebanon.

For its part, France the former colonial power, has been active in promoting Lebanese-Syrian reconciliation. As part of the Mediterranean summit, French President Nicolas Sarkozy hosted Lebanese and Syrian leaders in July . Though his dream of a photo opportunity involving Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Syrian President Assad did not materialise, the Suleiman-Assad meeting broke the ice. This paved the way for Suleiman’s visit to Damascus a month later.
A modicum of relations with Lebanon would not only enhance Syrian influence in that country but also would increase its regional status.

For its part, this is a historic moment for Lebanon. The Syrian recognition is far more valuable than India’s recognition by Great Britain, Pakistan by India, Bangladesh by Pakistan in 1974 or the Israeli recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in 1993. Indeed one could even suggest that this is far more historic than the unlikely recognition of the breakaway Taiwanese republic by the People’s Republic of China.

To be meaningful, however, the Syrian recognition has to be formal and substantial. Recognition and normalisation would have to be accompanied by a formal Syrian renunciation of its territorial or other claims over Lebanon. Such an abandonment of past claims would have to be internalised through significant revision in the educational system. Otherwise, recognition would be no more than a political gimmick and would be a Damocles’ sword over Lebanon. Since Syria took more than six decades to recognise the independence of Lebanon, such a decision would have to be endorsed and guaranteed by the international community, especially the United Nations.

Likewise demarcation of borders would not be easy . For long Damascus has argued that the disputed Sheba farms currently held by Israel is a Syrian territory. However, during Israel’s withdrawal in 2000, both Syria and Lebanon claimed this to be a Lebanese territory. Syria even claimed that it had ‘transferred’ this to Lebanon. So far Syria has not provided any legal documents substantiating this claim. Given the recent tension and acrimony, Damascus would be in no hurry to resolve the problem.

Syrian recognition, normalisation of diplomatic relations and the presence of a full-fledged embassy would not however change the fundamental problem facing Lebanon. It is haunted by factional interests and infighting among the three principal groups, namely, Maronite Christians, Sunni and Shia Muslims. Hence, Lebanese ability to enjoy the fruits of this historic moment ironically depends on the leeway and space provided by Damascus. Hence, at least in the short run, Lebanon would continue to be at the mercy of Syria.

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Communist Foreign Hand

Communist foreign hand

Tuesday August 12 2008 00:58 IST

New Indian Express (Chennai), 12 August 2008

Foreign financial contributions to political activities in India have always been controversial and many have used this to settle personal, organisational and ideological scores with their political rivals and competitors. At one time or another, various foreign countries have been accused of patronising their supporters and fellow travellers in India. Many were seen as ‘agents’ of this or that power.

While the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union hogged much of the attention, others were not far behind. Oil-rich countries in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia have been accused of funding extremist Islamic groups in India. Likewise at the height of the Ayodhya controversy, wealthy Indians in the West were charged with transferring funds to Hindutva forces. Indeed at times, ‘foreign agent’ has become a too common refrain in Indian politics.

Unfortunately, most of them remained allegations with little documentary evidence and far little follow up actions. Hence, they were quickly dismissed as nothing more than a political blot or external conspiracy to discredit a particular individual, group or political party.

This however is changing. The end of the Cold War has opened up a wealth of credible archival materials of the bygone era. As part of the Cold War Project, the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Centre is publishing large quantities of declassified Soviet documents. One such document throws some interesting insights into the question of the Soviet financial contribution to the then united Communist Party of India (CPI) just before the 1962 Lok Sabha elections.

On 17 January 1962 the Soviet ambassador in New Delhi I A Benediktov wrote a brief note on his meet earlier that day. It presents a summary of his meeting with Bhupesh Gupta, the Secretary of the National Council of the CPI. The meeting took place on the day the CPI ended its two-day meeting of the Secretariat in New Delhi to chalk out plans for the impending elections to the Lok Sabha.

Gupta was greatly disturbed by the sudden demise of Ajoy Kumar Ghosh. The death of the Secretary General of the CPI could not have come at a worse time because it deprived the party of not only its greatest organiser and orator, but also its important fund-raiser. Bhupesh Gupta had a twin-objective in initiating this meeting with the Soviet envoy. One, to ensure the continuation of close ties between the CPI and the Communist Part of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and two, to work out a mechanism for uninterrupted Soviet financial contribution to the CPI.

According to the Soviet ambassador, Ghosh candidly admitted that the party was suffering from “an acute insufficiency of funds for the pre-election campaign” and was apprehensive that “with the death of Ghosh, the source for receiving means for the communist party” from the CPSU might be closed.

Gupta was also worried about further complications. Until his death, A K Ghosh had singularly handled the financial contributions from Moscow and according to Gupta, the late leader had never consulted other party stalwarts such as E M S Nambudiripad (India’s first communist Chief Minister). They merely assisted in the distribution of funds. Ghosh monopolised funding to such an extent that he withheld this issue “from other leaders of the party and members of the National Council.” Because of this ‘strict secrecy’, Gupta proudly claimed, “not a single report on this question has appeared in the press.”

Admitting his own limitations, Gupta disclosed that unlike Ghosh, he would not be able to “single-handedly take on responsibility in questions of assistance” but would involve other leaders such as Nambudiripad. He confided that trade union leader Shripad Amrit Dange once sought exclusive responsibility for “all matters connected with foreign aid.”

Gupta vehemently denied suggestions that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was giving financial assistance to the CPI. Proclaiming that the CCP was not aware of the Soviet aid, he declared that the National Council “has not received, is not receiving and will not receive assistance” from the Chinese Communist Party but admitted that the party was receiving some aid from Sikhs living in England.

In the words of Benediktov, “Gupta repeated several times that the aid is needed precisely now” because the election campaign must be completed by the first week of February 1962. During this campaign, the main task of the CPI would be “to make clear to the population that the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to India, is its true friend.” After the elections however, “we would like to receive your support in the matter of theoretical preparation of party cadres.”

Gupta held another round of meeting with the Soviet envoy on January 27 and expressed his gratitude for the readiness of the CPSU to assist the CPI. Both documents however are silent about the quantum and modus operandi of the Soviet “financial assistance” to the CPI. Interestingly, the party only marginally improved its tally and won 29 seats as against 27 seats five years earlier.

It is common knowledge that the Soviets had provided more than ideological and theoretical support to the communist movements in various countries including India. Through a host of outlets such as friendship societies, media outlets and cultural associations they befriended influential segments of the public. The rupee-rouble trade was also used to prop-up a pro-Soviet constituency within India. Nonetheless, it is safe to assume that the CPI was not the only Indian recipient of foreign contributions.

Thanks to the end of the Cold War, however, there are documentary evidences to prove that the Communist leadership had sought and received funds from Moscow for its political activities in India. These Soviet documents cannot be dismissed as an imperial conspiracy merely because they were obtained, translated, annotated and published by a Washington-based think tank.

What is the need to address an archaic issue that is more than three decades old, especially when the country is facing more serious problems of today? Likewise, it is too tempting to dismiss the issue as a manifestation of McCarthyism.

However, by definition political parties including the communist parties, shoulder a heavier responsibility than individuals, organisations or lobbying groups that receive foreign financial contributions. Furthermore, the Communist parties often project themselves as role models in the otherwise corrupt Indian political climate.

One cannot expect much from the political parties, partisan scholars or activists. They all will be dismissive and condescending. India still has some non-partisan Sovietologists who should ponder over the central issue: What was the nature of Soviet 'financial assistance' to the Communists?

Web link:
http://www.newindpress.com/NewsItems.asp?ID=IEM20080812005740&Title=Main+Article&rLink=0

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