Have Palestinians failed Palestine?

New Indian Express (Chennai), Friday June 22 2007


Two-State solution! The events of the past week in the Gaza Strip have given an ominous meaning to this expression. While the international community wishes the early establishment of Palestinian state that co-exists along with Israel, the failure of the Palestinian unity government opened the prospect of two Palestinian entities competing for power, legitimacy and loyalty. Family feud, power struggle, coup, civil war, anarchy or a point of no return?


It is immaterial how one characterises the violence in recent days and the complete overrun of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. It is obvious that the militant Islamic group is in complete control of the streets and has achieved a resemblance of normalcy in the Gaza Strip. Confined to their homes and shanty refugee camps for days, ordinary Palestinians are now able to move out freely without fearing about masked gunmen roaming in open jeeps or gunfights in the alley ways.


Important as it may, this temporary quietness would not hide deep divisions within the Palestinian society and among its leadership. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas responded to the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip by dissolving the national unity government and sworn in an emergency government with former Finance Minister Salam Fayyad as the new Prime Minister.


Hamas for its part is not ready to accept this and insists that Ismail Haniya still heads the Palestinian government. In short, there is a Fatah Prime Minister for the West Bank and a Hamas Prime Minister for the Gaza Strip. Not surprisingly both insist that they are the true representatives of all the Palestinians!


Rival power centres are not unique to Palestinians and many countries in the Middle East went through an intense struggle for power that often resulted in violent change of rulers. But as a people whose aspirations for statehood and sovereignty is yet to be realised, the factional fighting and violence is a costlier mistake. It would be extremely difficult for both Hamas and Fatah to forget the events of recent weeks and co-operate. At least in the short run, Fatah and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) are the major losers. That an organised group like Fatah could swiftly be overrun, overpowered and even made to flee from the Gaza Strip tells not only the military weakness of Fatah but also the growing strength of Hamas.


During the 1970s and 1980s, a complete military victory over Fatah was something Israel had always wanted but never managed to inflict. That Hamas could achieve this in a matter of weeks should be an eye opener for Fatah and the PLO.


It is obvious that Fatah has never recovered from the death of its founder-chairman Yasser Arafat in November 2004. The crushing electoral defeat at the hands of Hamas in January 2006 came as an additional blow. Even though it was cajoled into joining a unity government with Hamas, neither side were ready to work in harmony. Hamas also mishandled the situation. Its resounding electoral victory in 2006 was not only a vote against Fatah and its corrupt leadership but also a mandate for change.


Change not in the ideological sense of the word but in the socio-political situation of the occupied territories. Hamas which tasted victory however, did not recognise that power comes with responsibility. It wanted the international community, especially the West and the US, to recognise the 'will of the people' and recognise and negotiate with the Hamas-led Palestinian government.


But at the same time, it was not ready to transform itself as a political party that is prepared to seek political solution to the prolonged Arab-Israeli problem. Its desire for retaining its ideological purity meant that Hamas would not formally recognise the State of Israel, its adversary or seek a political settlement with it. While 'allowing' President Abbas to pursue peace negotiations, Hamas was not ready to go beyond offering 'temporary truce' with Israel.


By refusing to recognise and negotiate with Israel, Hamas exhibited its failure to make that critical transition: from being a militant group into a mainstream political party. By this mistake Hamas played into the hands of Israel and the US. Capitalising on its non-recognition of the Israel, they were able to institutionalise an international political as well as financial boycott of the Hamas-led government. Even the European Union leaders who are otherwise friendlier towards the Palestinians than their American counterparts could not wholeheartedly embrace the Hamasled arrangement. The formation of the fragile unity government did not mollify their stand.


Indeed, since the January 2006 elections, domestic tensions and rivalry have become the prime pre-occupation for the Palestinians. Arab leaders such as Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah Saudi Arabia have been busy brokering deals not between the Palestinians and Israel but between rival Palestinian factions. Seeking a working compromise between Hamas and Fatah became more insurmountable than the Israeli- Palestinian compromise. Each ceasefire arrangement broke down faster than the earlier one. Indeed, till the other day Egypt had a permanent security presence in the Gaza Strip should speak volumes of the tension between rival Palestinian factions.


The much-hyped unity agreement reached in the Islamic holy city of Mecca last March failed to bridge the gap. Ironically the current situation of two separate arrangements might offer a temporary space for both factions to re-evaluate their recent behaviour. The international community has swiftly rallied behind President Abbas and his emergency government. If Israel had expressed its willingness to de-freeze the money that it owes to the Palestinians, the US has renewed its aid to the non-Hamas Palestinian government.


The EU and others would follow the same example, while at the same time continuing with their humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip. Not even Israel wants a meltdown at its doorstep. But in the long run, Hamas and Fatah would have to come together and seek unity. Their problem is with Israel and not with one another. If there has to be one Palestinian rule in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, then there has to one government and one authority. The past few months clearly revealed that leadership of both Hamas and Fatah are consumed by internal differences and hatred. Hence, a Palestinian unity could be arranged only by the international community. This is easier said than done.


Some desperate Palestinians were quoted as saying, 'Even Israelis did not do this to us.' Such a view could be an exaggeration. But the world has watched the scenes of masked men pulling down the portraits of Arafat, Mr. Palestine for decades. This would inhibit the international community from getting into inter-Palestinian mediation anytime soon.

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Al Aqsa controversy

Al-Aqsa: A dangerous preoccupation

Islamic leaders should make some effort to depoliticize the controversy over the repair of a collapsed walkway to the al-Aqsa mosque.

Originally published in ISN Security Watch, 14 February 2007

What should be a routine repair of a collapsed walkway has exacerbated an already tense situation in the Middle East and raised international condemnation. Even though the work is taking place well outside the perimeter wall of the al-Aqsa mosque, Israel has been accused of "desecrating" an Islamic holy site. It has also been accused of attempting to consolidate its control over the third holiest place in Islam.

Israeli officials say that the walkway is in dire need of repairs after its partial collapse three years ago. Opponents of the refurbishing say that the work could damage the area's foundation. With the tension between both sides increasing, one may ask if any Islamic leaders have offered to de-politicize the matter and even offer technical assistance in repairing the bridge? It is safe to say that since the al-Aqsa mosque is one of their holiest sites, Islamic leaders should applaud any effort to keep the centuries-old building from falling into disrepair.

The reasons have to be found in the contested religious space in the city of Jerusalem. If one includes the Holy Sepulcher nearby, the walled city in east Jerusalem comprises some of the holiest sites to three monotheist religions - Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Known to the Jews as Har-ha-Bayit or The Temple Mount, the Harem al-Sharif stands upon what is believed to be the ruins of the First and the Second Jewish Temples. The Western Wall, sometimes known as Wailing Wall, on the southern end of the complex is the only remaining structure of the Second Temple destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD.

For Christians, the area is sacred because of the Holy Sepulcher, the place where Jesus Christ is said to have been resurrected.

For Muslims, Harem al Sharif, which includes the al-Aqsa mosque, is where Mohammed ascended to heaven.

In short, Old Jerusalem, has been intrinsically linked to the three major religions.

Due to a host of political developments, the religious significance and composition of the city has been changing since the 6th century. The city was captured by the armies of second caliph Umer around 637 shortly after the death of Prophet Mohammed. It was during the early years of Islam that the al-Aqsa mosque was built.

With the brief exception of the Crusades, Jerusalem remained under Islamic control until the entry of British forces led by General Edmund Allenby in December 1917. While the Jews were always allowed to pray, Harem al-Sharif always remained under strict the Islamic Waqf trust and control.

This political and religious control of the area became a major issue during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, which ended with East Jerusalem, including the Harem-al-Sharif area, the Western Wall and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher coming under the Jordanian control. During this period, the Hashemite Kingdom not only destroyed a number of ancient Jewish holy sites in the old city but also prevented even non-Israeli Jewish worshippers from praying near the Western Wall.

This situation changed following the Israeli capture of the West Bank including east Jerusalem during the June 1967 war. This in practical terms meant that for the first time in over 13 centuries, Harem al-Sharif, including the Western Wall came under non-Muslim Jewish control. While granting freedom of access to all, including Muslim worshippers, since the outbreak of the Intifada in 1987, Israel has been periodically restricted access to the al-Aqsa mosque.

Over the centuries, Christianity has abandoned its political claims over the city. This has not been the case with Judaism and Islam. The formation of the Jewish state posed a fundamental challenge to Islam. The Jews, who were tolerated as protected "people of the book" had become independent and asserted their sovereignty and in 1967 took control over an Islamic site. Jews were no longer a protected people but a sovereign subject.

Theologically, Islam has been unable to handle such an unprecedented development. Thus, while other countries have been focusing their attention on the legality of the Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, Islamic countries have been preoccupied with the non-Islamic control over the Harem.

Because of their close geographic proximity, even Israeli control over the Western Wall is not recognized by them. A vast majority of Muslims do not even admit that the Harem al-Sharif, including the al-Aqsa mosque, stand upon the ruins of the pre-Islamic Jewish temple.

As long as Islam and Judaism fail to come to terms with each other's claims over holy sites in Jerusalem, even smaller issues will continue to snowball into major political controversies invoking passionate attention and emotional responses from Muslims and Jews alike.

This contested religious significance makes the city of Jerusalem and its holy sites one of the most controversial and explosive place on this planet.

Web link: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=17249

China and Russia abandons Iran

China, Russia on road to abandoning Iran

ISN Security Watch 10 January 2007 China and Russia have agreed to UNSC Resolution 1737. Though watered down, it still sends a strong signal to Iran that its friends are not completely against joining hands with Western "devils."

Originally published in ISN Security Watch (10/01/07)

The unanimous United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1737 clearly puts Iran on the dock. Outwardly, it merely seeks to restrict Iran’s ability to trade in sensitive nuclear materials and to freeze the assets of 22 Iranian officials and institutions linked to its nuclear and missile programs. However, the willingness of friendly countries such as China and Russia to abandon their erstwhile hesitancy and endorse limited sanctions against Iran should be seen as a small but decisive victory for the beleaguered Bush administration.

The vote should also be an eye opener for those who have periodically stressed and hoped that China would adopt an independent policy vis-à-vis the US on Iran. While not ready to join the Western chorus against Tehran, Beijing is also not willing to embrace the ayatollahs’ nuclear ambitions.

For quite some time, it was clear that China was not prepared to accept a nuclear Iran. Its refusal to endorse US demands for punitive sanctions was coupled by its determination that Iran should peacefully resolve its dispute with the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Partly due to its past involvement in missile and nuclear proliferation, Beijing has been extremely weary of another nuclear power in its neighborhood.

Likewise, the vote also underscored the fundamental priority of Chinese foreign policy. Its desire to adopt assertive foreign policy postures on issues such as Taiwan are always accompanied by its deep desire to maintain close political ties with Washington. This shift on Iran was clearly manifested at the IAEA. While it abstained in September 2004, it voted with the majority in February 2006. The shift clearly indicated that China was merely seeking adequate price and compensation for its accommodation of Western concerns over Iran.

Western willingness to settle for a watered-down resolution that lacks any real teeth also underscores Washington’s desire for an international consensus on Iran. Any tougher wording of the resolution could have resulted in China and Russia abstaining if not vetoing such a move. The US would rather have an international consensus against Iran than drive for a tougher resolution that might be seen as a sign of ganging up against Tehran.

Despite the limited nature of sanctions, the resolution pits Iran against the rest of the international community. Even if the real impact is marginal, the vote signals Iran’s isolation. Not many countries even in the West endorsed Bush’s axis of evil theory against Iran. But now even friendlier powers like China and Russia have sided with the US in isolating Iran.

National interests also continue to play a primary role in the Iran issue. Both Russia and China have strong economic interests in Iran. The former is committed to the construction of a nuclear power plant near Bushehr, originally started by the German company Siemens in the 1970s. Literally days before the UNSC vote, Iranian media reported that the Bushehr plant was on schedule.

China sees Iran as a major and stable source of energy supplies. Its galloping economy and the resulting increase in demand for hydrocarbon compel Beijing to look for long-term arrangements. China is committed to developing the Yadavaran oil fields. In October 2004, both countries signed a memorandum of understanding for the supply of 250 million tons of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Iran over the next 25 years. It also includes the supply of 150,000 barrels of oil per day during the same period. The total deal is estimated at over US$120 billion.

In December, just days before the UNSC vote, the two countries signed another agreement for the supply of three million tons of LNG a year. This 25-year contract will begin with the flow of gas in 2011.

Such strong economic interests and investments in Iran prevent China from completely siding with the West. Any Chinese support to the West on Iran would thus have to be courted and compensated adequately.

At the same time, a number of countries in the Middle East are increasingly concerned about Iran and its defiant attitude toward the international community. The recent decision of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council to seek the help and cooperation of the IAEA in developing nuclear energy and the ongoing debates in Egypt over the revival of nuclear power generation should be seen within this larger context. Iran is not just a threat to the West and its interests in the Middle East, but to an increasing number of Arab states.

As such, countries like China have to weigh their sympathies for Iran against their interests in the wider Arab world. As US officials declared, the limited sanctions are merely the first step toward more severe measures against Iran. So, when a friend like China abandons it, the ayatollahs in Iran get a shrill message: Comply or we will join hands with the “devil.”

Web version:
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17098Online

Jordan and Hamas

Tension Returns Between Jordan and Hamas

Originally published in PINR 13 JULY 2006

Jordanian accusations that the Palestinian militant group Hamas has been planning terrorist attacks in the Hashemite kingdom have rekindled the ongoing tensions between the two. On April 18, 2006, literally hours before the first visit of the Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud al-Zahar, Amman disclosed that some members of Hamas were arrested in Jordan and that their terrorist plot was uncovered. Citing this, it called off the visit of Zahar who was on his maiden visit to the various Arab countries to drum up financial support for the near bankrupt Palestinian Authority.

Jordan disclosed that the large weapons cache that was discovered included Iranian-made Katyusha rockets and anti-tank missiles, explosives and machineguns, which Hamas activists allegedly stockpiled for use in attacks against Jordanian public institutions and officials. According to Jordanian officials, these weapons were smuggled into the country from across the border.

Amman blamed an unnamed Hamas leader based in Damascus, presumably Khalid Mashaal, as the mastermind behind this plot. The government, however, was careful not to blame the governments of Syria and Iran openly. This was soon followed by a televised confession by three men who admitted to being trained in Syria and sent to Jordan to carry out terrorist attacks.

Amman was quick to reject an offer by Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh to send Zahar to personally sort out the problem. Instead, it demanded a security team from Hamas that was "capable of disclosing additional information and other hidden weapons...[that] threaten [Jordanian] national security."

In the immediate context, the row underscores internal divisions within the Palestinian leadership. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas appears to be siding with the Jordanian version of events. He described the development as "dangerous and surprising" and, during a visit to Jordan in early May, he conceded that the incident "has serious repercussions for the security and stability of the kingdom." A few days later, in an interview to al-Jazeera, he remarked: "The information I got from Jordan was not just staggering, but also dangerous."

The reaction of Hamas was rather different. Already facing mounting international pressure over its refusal to recognize Israel and the Oslo Accords, the Hamas-led Palestinian government could not afford to open another front. Dismissively, it labeled the Jordanian accusation as "falsehood and mendacity." In a statement issued in Gaza, it said that these "arguments are excuses for Jordan's last minute withdrawal from receiving Zahar following the attack in Tel Aviv and the Israeli-American threats on the Palestinian government."

Hamas maintains that it had never targeted any other country, Arab or non-Arab, especially Jordan, but had always limited its battle to "the Zionist enemy." It called the whole affair a Jordanian plot to "isolate the elected Palestinian government and force it to change its positions in accordance with the Zionist and American conditions."

Partly to defuse the tension, in May Abbas sent a security team to Amman headed by intelligence chief Major General Tareq Abu Rajab, a Fatah loyalist, to examine the issue. Indeed, a few days after he returned to Gaza, an attempt was made on his life. He was seriously injured when a bomb placed at the entrance of the elevator in his office exploded. Even though it is difficult to establish a link between the two, Abu Rabaj has been known as a staunch adversary of Hamas.

Growing Tension
While some Arab commentators have raised doubts about the timing of the accusation and the veracity of the public confessions, the whole episode underscores the deep divisions between Jordan and Hamas. In recent years, especially after the ascendance of King Abdullah in 1999, Jordan began viewing Hamas as a threat to the Hashemite kingdom.

This was in contrast to the position of his father, King Hussein, who perceived the militant group as a potential ally in checkmating Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Never truly giving up on the idea of regaining control of the West Bank that he had lost during the June 1967 war, Hussein always sought to secure the loyalty of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Hussein's efforts to seek and secure a special role for Jordan in Jerusalem under the Israel-Jordan peace treaty signed in 1994 were a reflection of his prolonged longing for the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

His desire to use Hamas against the Arafat-led Palestinian Authority received a boost in September 1997 when Israeli agents sought to assassinate Mashaal, who was then the Hamas spokesperson in Jordan. Not only did he survive the attack, but the Israeli agents were captured. Capitalizing on the situation -- since the operation was ordered by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu -- King Hussein demanded the release of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas, was serving a life term in Israel after being charged with terrorism.

To secure the release of its agents, in October 1997 Israel freed Yassin who soon returned to Gaza and emerged as an alternative power center to Arafat, Fatah and the Palestinian National Authority. Until his assassination in March 2004 by Israel, Yassin remained a major threat to Arafat and his ability to dominate the Palestinian resistance.

Jordan-Hamas Divorce
King Abdullah, however, viewed the situation differently. Unlike his father, he has no emotional bondage to the West Bank and was more interested in consolidating the cohesion of Jordan, or the erstwhile Transjordan. He perceived the Palestinian Authority and Arafat as an ally and not a rival. He was, therefore, less prepared to tolerate Hamas' activities inside Jordan, especially when the organization had been carrying out suicide attacks inside Israel with the purpose of sabotaging the peace process.

On August 31, 1999, in a swift and surprise move, a number of Hamas offices in Jordan were closed down and a number of functionaries arrested. They were initially charged with misdemeanors, such as affiliation with an illegal organization and possession of light arms. Later they were charged with a host of much more serious charges, some punishable by death, including maintaining a military training camp, illegal fundraising, weapons storage, armed activities against Israel and the use of forged official stamps.

In an unprecedented development, Jordan also issued arrest warrants against four Hamas leaders, including Mashaal, who were in Iran at the time. When they returned a few days later, they were arrested. In an eventual compromise worked out by Qatar, in November 1999 the Hamas leaders, who were citizens of Jordan, were voluntarily deported to Doha.

Meanwhile, Hamas was declared to be an "illegal and non-Jordanian" organization whose presence would not be tolerated; additionally, Jordanian citizens were banned from becoming members of Hamas.

In the summer of 2001, after some prolonged drama at the Amman airport, former Hamas spokesperson Ibrahim Ghawshah was allowed to return to Jordan when he renounced his membership in Hamas. The fate of others, however, was different. In recent years, Egypt was prepared to host and negotiate with Mashaal as part of its strategy to secure a temporary halt in suicide attacks against Israel. Jordan, however, has been unrelenting.

Conclusion
The present accusations by Jordan against Hamas are merely a repeat of this historical narrative. The majority of Jordanians are of Palestinian origin and this demographic reality is weighing heavily on the Hashemite kingdom, which is determined to make a clean break with the West Bank and the Palestinians. The victory of Hamas and its unrelenting views vis-à-vis the peace process could ignite the existing tension inside the kingdom and further radicalize the Muslim Brotherhood, which enjoys the support of the Palestinians in the refugee camps.

Hamas was an ally when Jordan sought to compete with Arafat. The times, however, have changed. Seeking domestic stability and long-term survival, King Abdullah sees Hamas as an adversary especially if its hard-line polices were to radicalize the region further and start another cycle of violence. Any sympathy for Hamas in Jordan, especially among the Palestinian segment of the population, is a sure recipe for trouble. This, perhaps, explains the ongoing tension between Jordan and Hamas over the uncovered arms cache. The Hashemite Jordanian apprehensions over Hamas and its negative influences within Jordan are real and cannot be dismissed easily.

Web Link
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ICRC: Secular symbols

ICRC 'crystallizes' late in the game

The International Committee of the Red Cross' decision after years of negotiations to allow Israel's Red Star of David to join the club is a welcome move, but one that should have come much sooner and without partisanship.

Originally published in ISN Security Watch (07/07/06)

The International Committee of the Red Cross' (ICRC) much-belated June decision to admit Israel’s Magen David Adom (Red Star of David) as a full member alongside the Palestinian Red Crescent society has raised so me fundamental questions about the ICRC, its relevance and its mission.

It was only after years of negotiations that a compromise in the form of a rRed cCrystal that could be used by national bodies came about to allow the rRed Star of David full ICRC membership.

While the move is a welcome one, the ICRC's prolonged refusal to admit an organization that had been functioning since 1930 seems to have had more to do with religious conservatism and political calculations than ethical considerations.

Established in 1863, the ICRC claims to be “an impartial, neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance.”

But when it comes to admitting non-Christian emblems, it seems to have tended toward the partisan and parochial. The single exception was the Red Crescent - which it admitted in 1929. Ostensibly to oppose the "proliferation" of symbols, the ICRC seems to have disregarded the religious sentiments of millions of others.

Though the Red Cross symbol never was intended as a religious one, the refusal of the humanitarian organization to admit other religious motifs has served to betray that intention - a betrayal underscored by its delay in admitting the Red Star of David.

There are a number of reasons why the ICRC needs to abandon its explicitly Christian symbol and adopt the newly devised Red Crystalred crystal as its name and symbol.

The use of the cross, irrespective of the original motives and intentions, does not represent the truly global nature of organization. To be credible and non-partisan, the Committee will first and foremost need to present itself in non-religious terms. Its refusal to admit the Israeli organization was nothing to do with the credibility of Magen David Adom but it was more to do with the inherent but unstated religious prejudice. If an Islamic motif can be included, why not the symbols of other religions and faiths?

Second, the problem with Magen David Adom symbolizes the dilemma facing minorities. Israel’s Arab minority hashave great difficulty in accepting this explicitly Jewish symbol, especially within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The same can be said about non-Muslims in the Middle East as well as the non-Christian population in Europe. Cross, cCrescent, or sStar, these symbols of the national humanitarian groups do not represent the minorities. These humanitarian organizations could not be considered ‘national’ within the context of the societies, which are increasingly becoming multi-cultural and multi-religious. How can the British Red Cross, for example, represent the millions of non-Christians living in that country?

Third, the reservations of the ICRC to accept the symbols of other cultures went to obscenity when it refused to accept alternatives for countries like China, India, and Japan where the Christian cCross represents only a miniscule population. Either these countries had to accept the cross or be excluded from the ICRC. The arguments of proliferation of symbols had to be mitigated by the diversity of the population. The desire of the ICRC to "standardize" its symbols went against the basic grain of tolerance and diversity. If the world’s religions are diverse, why should the ICRC look for a single symbol, especially with a strong Christian connotation?

Lastly, the essence of modern Europe lays in its refusal to allow religious beliefs to dominate public life. As the controversy over Danish cartoons highlighted, for the vast majority of the Europeans, religious sentiments are valid as long as they remain private and individual. The French desire to proscribe explicit religious symbols in schools and the reservations of the Prince Charles to be known as the defender of ‘the’ faith when Britain has other equally valid faiths, symbolize the church-state dilemma and strive for secularism. When these states are no longer tolerating public display of religious symbols, how can their national humanitarian organizations be excluded from this liberal trend.

Irrespective of the original motives, the ICRC has devised a new symbol that is non-religious, non-exclusivist, and non-partisan, but still represents the basic values for which the organization has stood for over a century. Ideally, this could be the symbol for all the national organizations, especially where there are people following different religions. States which abhor official sanctity to religious might find Crystal representing their true character.

Until such a time, either the ICRC must embrace the secular, liberal, and non-religious crystal as its symbol or become embroiled in controversies that serve only to undermine its credibility as a humanitarian organization. The irony is that the very attempt to avoid the use and reliance upon religious symbols has made them all the more significant an issue - an issue that first began with a religious symbol itself, the Christian cross.

The ICRC itself has recognized the irony, understanding, though perhaps a little late in the game, that the emblems are "sometimes wrongly perceived as having religious, cultural, or political connotations" that have "affected respect for the emblems" and "diminished the protection the emblems offer to victims and to humanitarian and medical personnel."

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Arab League fails again

Arab League Fails Again

The fact that the Security Council has had to step in to ensure Lebanon's independence signals the failure, yet again, of the Arab League.

Originally published in ISN Security Watch (05/07/06)

The near-unanimous adoption in May of UN Security Council Resolution 1680 demanding that Syria recognize the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon more than anything further demonstrated the impotence and marginalization of the Arab League.

Formed in March 1945 by seven Arab states, with Egypt hosting the permanent headquarters, the Arab League's charter vows to, among other things, "guarantee the future of all Arab countries" and ensure their inviolability and territorial integrity - a commitment it has been unable to fulfill, resulting in calls from some quarters for the group to be disbanded.

Resolution 1680 was adopted on 17 May against the backdrop of growing US determination to isolate the Ba’athist regime, and the willingness of France, erstwhile Western patron of Damascus, to go along with it. While Russia abstained to ensure its leverage vis-à-vis its former client state, China had often abstained on sensitive UN decisions concerning the Middle East. Both Moscow and Beijing would prefer to take advantage of Syrian vulnerability to secure greater political concessions from Washington over any future vote on Iran.

But the real loser in the game is the Arab League.

The resolution explicitly calls on Syria to delineate its borders with Lebanon “especially in those areas where the border is uncertain or disputed.” This is not a major problem as most of the countries of the Middle East have serious border problems with their neighbors. At the height of imperialism, the European powers not only created new states in the Middle East but also disregarded ethno-national considerations. As a result, members of the same ethnic groups were scattered among different states (Kurds) or different groups were clubbed into one country (Iraq). As such, border disputes are a recurrent phenomenon in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

However, a far more devastating threat to the League came from the Security Council demand that Syria “establish full diplomatic relations and representation” with Beirut and recognize “Lebanon’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.” Such a demand should not have had to come from a UN Security Council resolution, when both Syria and Lebanon are members of the same Arab fraternity.

Syria has never recognized Lebanese sovereignty, considering the latter to be a part of historic Syria that was artificially ceded from the motherland. It treated Lebanon merely as a province and its representative in Beirut was known as "governor" rather than as ambassador. The prolonged civil war partly enabled Syria to treat Lebanon as its serfdom rather than as a sovereign entity. Indeed, even when it maintained over 30,000 troops, ostensibly to uphold domestic order in Lebanon, Syria never had an ambassador.

It has exercised complete control over every aspect of Lebanese polity. The continuation of Emile Lahoud as president underscores this Syrian stronghold. Under pressure from Damascus in 2004, the Lebanese parliament amended the constitution and extended his term by three years. Internal dissent eventually culminated in the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005. Yet, even after the withdrawal of Syrian forces in the summer of last year, Lahoud is still president.

All of this has gone on uninterrupted by the Arab League.

The Lebanese case was not the only occasion when the Arab League failed to ensure the inviolability of national sovereignty and integrity. The League never managed to evolve a strategy against such blatant disregard for national independence. Unlike other regional organizations, it was unable to adopt a firm stand against the sanctity of national sovereignty. Article One of the Arab League charter clearly states that membership is open to all “independent Arab states.” But it has had no mechanism to ensure that independence. Not only has the League been unable to prevent conflict between its member states, but it also has failed to ensure the inviolability of their sovereignty.

The Organization of African Union (OAU), the forerunner of the African Union (AU), for example, explicitly vowed to its member states “to defend their sovereignty, their territorial integrity and independence.” The League has no similar provision or tradition. Of course, Africa has not been free from inter-state wars, but no state has threatened to swallow another and gotten away with it. The critical issue is not territorial aggrandizement, rather the disappearance of the sovereignty of member states.

Whenever a small state has been threatened by its bigger Arab neighbor, the League has invariably failed to come to the rescue – a problem that began as far back as the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict.

Vast areas that were allotted to an independent Arab state under the UN partition plan for Palestine came under the control of Transjordan (now Jordan). Despite protests from all other Arab states, they were subsequently annexed by Jordan and became the West Bank. The Arab League merely reconciled itself to the disappearance of the Palestinian state and pretended that these areas were being held in "trust" by the Hashemites.

In August 1990, when Saddam Hussein claimed Kuwait to be the 17th province of Iraq, the League once again showed its incompetence. A majority of members did condemn the invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait and actively joined the US-led coalition. However, the League did not suspend Iraq for violating the independence of Kuwait. Egypt, on the other hand, was suspended from the League in 1979 for making peace with Israel.

In the current situation involving Lebanon, the League once again exhibits its limitations. In its desire to rally around a beleaguered member state, the League has trampled on Lebanese aspirations to be a normal independent state.

Web Link: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16341