India Egypt

Mubarak's chutzpah

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Mubarak's Chutzpah

Mubarak's Chutzpah - Cairo treating India with contempt
New Delhi hopes that an award named after Nehru might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities

New Indian Express (Chennai), April 14, 2008

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On Thursday a section of the Indian media reported that Egyptian diplomats in New Delhi were hoping for a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries before India goes to polls sometime next year. Following Tuesday Prime Minister Manmohan Singh inaugurated the first summit meeting with a host of African heads of states. Later that evening an eminent panel headed by Vice President M H Ansari announced that the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 2007 would be bestowed upon India's long-time friend and President of Iceland Dr Olafur Ragnar Grimsson.

What is common to all the three developments that happened in the first week of April is Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak! Cairo's hope for a summit "before" the next Lok Sabha election is an unconcealed euphuism for its leader being the chief guest at the 2009 Republic Day celebrations. If other Middle Eastern leaders such as Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (2001), Iranian President Mohammed Khatami (2003) and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia (2006) were given such honours, how could India ignore Mubarak?

At the African summit, Egyptian President was the most noticeable absentee. Some leaders make powerful statements by their presence and some by their conspicuous absence.

Mubarak opted for the latter. His action is yet another reminder of not only the state of IndoEgyptian relations but also the contempt with which Cairo treats India and its leadership.

This is in quiet contrast to his attitude towards others where Mubarak uses his charm offensive. He was in Beijing 2006 when China hosted a summit meeting with African leaders in November 2006. Indeed just weeks ago, he had a highly successful visit to Moscow. For long New Delhi, however, has not figured in his radar screen.

Thirdly, the panel which announced the Nehru award for 2007 could not be unaware that for over a decade the prize money and citation for 1995 is gathering dust because Mubarak could not find time to come to New Delhi and receive the honour.

In July 1997 with much fanfare and also with some diplomatic calculations, a panel headed by the then Vice President K R Narayanan selected the Egyptian leader for the Nehru award for 1995. Besides recognising his contribution to international peace, especially to the Middle East peace process, the move was aimed at garnering some diplomatic mileage.

Even since India normalised relations with Israel in January 1992, a chill wind was blowing from Nile as Cairo emerged a major critic of India's new-found fondness for Israel. Hence, New Delhi hoped that an award named after Nehru, who is still remembered and revered in the region, might mitigate and assuage Egyptian sensitivities. Partly for this reason soon after the normalisation of relations with Israel, it opened the Maulana Azad Centre for Indian Culture in Cairo.

More than a decade later, however, the Nehru award is yet to be conferred upon Mubarak. On two occasions his visit was cancelled at the last minute. Once President Narayanan was indisposed and on another occasion, turbulent events in the region prevented Mubarak from making his trip. But ten years is far too long even for genuine diplomatic excuses.

As per the procedure, the panel that selects the Nehru award is headed by the Vice President with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court functioning as the ex-officio member. Since July 1997 when the award for Mubarak was announced, India had three Vice Presidents and as many as ten new Chief Justices.

Avoiding names, in December 2002 the government told Rajya Sabha that the Nehru award for 1995 "was awarded in the year 1997.

Despite concerted efforts having been made, the Awardee has not yet been able to come to India to receive the award."

For their part, the Egyptian diplomats were equally ingenious. Without offering any reason or explanation for the inordinate delays, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry proudly claims that New Delhi "continuously renews the invitation to President Mubarak to … receive the prize." Indeed, Mubarak has also skipped or avoided multilateral summits organised by India such as the G 15 summit in 1994.

The behaviour of Egyptian leader is in complete contrast to the attitude of many other leaders and figures. During the past decade New Delhi has become the favourite destination of many world leaders, East and West and Developed and Developing.

Among others, it has hosted two sitting US Presidents, heads of states of all the major powers, scores of western leaders and Third World personalities. Many countries of the Middle East have discovered the growing importance of India and want to capitalise on its economic growth through high-profiled visits. Egypt was not one of them. Even the highly publicised visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in September 2003 was insufficient to galvanise the Egyptian indifference.

By conferring honours named after leaders such as Nehru, India hopes to promote its interests and influence in different parts of world. Unlike political leverages and economic clout, cultural diplomacy resents the soft power and is both effective and harmonising. The attitude of Mubarak, thus, raises serious questions about the rationale behind such cultural diplomacy.

The Egyptian failure to arrange Mubarak's visit for nearly a decade also indicates the current status of Indo-Egyptian relations. This is in contrast to the heydays of friendship between Nehru and President Gamal Abdul Nasser. Both leaders met over a dozen times and Cairo was a constant stopover for many of Nehru's sojourns to Europe.

World has changed a lot and so is the Egyptian attitude. While Mubarak could not be forced to come to India, the latter could learn something out of this bitter experience. If India and its leaders are less important, there is no reason for New Delhi to be generous towards Cairo. Having treated the award named after India's first Prime Minister with such distain and contempt, Egypt now wants a sweetener.

But expecting Mubarak to be the Chief Guest at next year's Republic Day celebrations is nothing short of chutzpah.

Bribes threaten Indo-Israeli military ties

Investigations into corruption and bribes surrounding the Barak missile deal threatens to upset growing Indo-Israeli ties, ISN Security Watch (01/04/08)

Military ties, the most visible manifestation of Indo-Israeli relations, are being undermined from within by corruption and bribery. To ensure the smooth functioning of its growing military exports, leading Israeli companies have greased a few Indian palms – actions that are now threatening to blow up into a major controversy.

In October 2000, under the government of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, India signed a US$250 million Barak missile deal with Israel. Within months, media began revealing large-scale corruption involving senior political figures and arms merchants.

Besides the usual defense agents and greedy politicians, the scandal has also involved members of the naval fraternity. Suresh Nanda - son of the former naval chief who headed the Indian navy during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war - is the prime suspect. He is estimated to have earned about US$100 million in commissions for the Barak deal, while some smaller amounts went to the friends of George Fernandes, India's defense minister at the time the deal was signed. The investigative agencies have also questioned Admiral Sushil Kumar, the then-commander of the Indian Navy.

Furthermore, recommendations against the procurement of Barak by APJ Abdul Kalam, the-then scientific advisor and later on president, worked against the deal, especially when bribes appeared to have tilted the scales.

Defense deals have always been controversial, especially since New Delhi sought to lessen its dependency on Russia. Because its ties with Moscow were tightly controlled and managed, one never heard of money changing hands even when the USSR remained India's most favored arms supplier. Its desire to diversify defense procurements brought in arms merchants who understood and worked within the pulses of the Indian establishment.

In the 1980s, a bribery scandal involving the Swedish Bofors Company adversely affected the electoral prospects of then-prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and cost the Congress party dearly. The long-drawn controversy was largely responsible for the party losing its nation-wide appeal and popularity.

Since then, Indian leaders have been arguing against using middlemen and agents in defense contrast. However, given the complexity of the process, legendary Indian bureaucratic bottlenecks and cut throat completions, conducting major defense deals without agents is nearly impossible.

For its part, the Indian defense establishment is maintaining that the Barak deal was a good acquisition that was badly executed. Similar arguments were put forth by the army at the height of the Bofors scandal: good gun, bad procedure.

Partly with political calculations in mind, upon coming to power in May 2004, the government of Manmohan Singh instituted probes into 48 major defense contracts signed by the previous government. And the Barak deal is not the only one under scrutiny.

According to media reports, Israeli Attorney General Menachem Mazuz is investigating Moshe Keret - the CEO of Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) for 20 year until 2005 for his role in the Phalcon spy plane deal. The judiciary in Israel has issued a gag order against disclosing the identity of another arms dealer involved in the probe.

As per the original deal signed with China, Israel was to supply four spy planes for US$1 billion. When the US scuttled that deal, Israel found a new buyer in India and agreed to sell three planes for US$1.1 billion. According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, though the Indian deal is still in the implementation phase, "the agent has received an advance of millions of dollars with many more millions promised."

The investigative agencies are closing in on the Indian beneficiaries of the Barak deal, but at the same time, the Indian government will not be able to remain silent on the role played by the Israeli companies.

Already the communist parties who are highly critical of India's defense ties with Israel have jumped at the opportunity and have demanded the blacklisting of Israeli companies involved in the scam. Should the Indian government accept their plea, leading firms such as the state-owned Rafael will be affected as it is involved in a number of defense deals with India.

Within a short span of 15 years, Israel has emerged as the second largest arms supplier to India and New Delhi the prime export destination for Israeli arms. In recent months, both countries are moving into joint defense research and other forms of security cooperation. Despite some disquiet in countries such as Iran and Egypt, both are keen to establish a long-term defense partnership.

Seen in this larger context, the Barak scandal is a major setback and will haunt both defense establishments for a long time to come.

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Israel and Hamas

Israel, Hamas need a strategy

New Indian Express, (Chennai), Wednesday 26, 2008

ONGOING violence between Israel and Palestinian militant group Hamas is heading for one interesting pos sibility, namely, both sides burying their hatchet and seeking a temporary truce. While full recognition and formal negotiations are still far off, some form of rational interaction between the warring sides is increasingly become inevitable. It is matter of "when" and not "if."

For both sides, military option has become ineffective and politically problematic. A growing number of countries feel that Israel's response to the barrage of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip has been disproportionate.

Even those who sympathise with Israel and endorse its right to defend its civilian population are extremely concerned over the mounting Palestinian civilian casualties. In the latest round, the Israeli forces killed over 100 Palestinians, a vast majority of whom being non-combatants.

Advanced technology and human intelligence significantly diminish the chances of civilian casualties. But the world is yet to witness a weapon that only targets militants, leaving the unarmed unharmed. As Israel often recognises, even targeted killing would have to be extremely accurate, if civilian deaths were to be avoided.

Moreover, as the world once again learnt, Israel lacks an effective military strategy vis-à-vis the militants. Since the late-1980s, it has been fighting a host of militant groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and factions of mainstream Fatah. More than two decades later, however, Israel is yet to evolve an effective and successful military strategy against non-state actors. In short, Israel's response has not only been disproportionate but also ineffective. If it were to protect its civilian population from rocket attacks, Israel needs a strategy that works.

Even for Hamas the military option has been ineffective and costlier. For months Palestinian militants have been launching Qassam rockets against Sderot in the Negev. In recent weeks, they managed to strike the port city of Ashkelon north of the Gaza Strip. While Israel's human casualties remained small, these rockets have completely disrupted the daily lives of thousands of Israeli civilians, made them vulnerable and exposed the limitations of national defence. Minimal property damage was accompanied by large-scale psychological hardships and fear among Israelis.

By escalating the rocket attacks against Israel, Hamas not only exhibited its capability but also challenged Israeli military might. That it was able to launch Qassams despite massive Israeli responses underscore Hamas' determination, arsenal and organisational effectiveness. The large scale destruction of civilian infrastructure by Israel has not weakened the militants. Put it mildly, Hamas is unable to provide basic necessities to the people of the Gaza Strip but can still deliver Qassam rockets against Israel! This however has not changed the fortunes of the Hamas. International sympathy for the Palestinians is accompanied by widespread disapproval of rocket attacks against Israeli civilians. Even those Arab countries which have little sympathy for Israel are unable to understand let alone endorse the strategy pursued by Hamas-held the Gaza Strip authorities. Not even in private mainstream Arab leaders are prepared to endorse rocket attacks against Israel.

Moreover the military strength has not resulted in any improvement in the political fortunes of Hamas. The political isolation of Hamas-held the Gaza Strip is far from over. Despite the obvious limitations, the international community or those who matter, continue to rely on the Palestinian Authority under the leadership of President Mahmoud Abbas. The widespread Arab sympathy over Israeli reprisals has not transformed into pro-Hamas sympathies. No Arab ruler is prepared to shift his support from Abbas to Hamas.

Thus, Hamas also needs a strategy that would end its isolation and garner political dividends. While Qassam rockets can ensure its military strength, they are not a sign of Hamas' political acceptance.

Thus, their failed military strategy would eventually force Israel and Hamas to re-examine their attitude towards one another. For Israel, Abbas-led Palestinian Authority is preferable because it is moderate, believes in co-existence and also worked with Israel for over a decade.

But on the flip side, it lacks popular support and becoming increasingly marginalised.

On the critical question preventing Qassam rockets, the effectiveness of Abbas is less than zero. Any meaningful Israeli strategy against Qassam therefore would mean Israel seeking some tacit understanding with Hamas, even if this means undermining Abbas and his determination to isolate the Islamic militants. In short, if Israel were to stop Qassam rockets, Abbas is not the address.

Even if this does not mean mutual recognition, sooner or later Israel will have to deal with Hamas politically.

The Islamic militants also have no option but to deal with Israel politically. Ironic as it might sound, the ability of Hamas to end its diplomatic isolation depends upon Israel. In September 1993 the White House rolled out a red carpet welcome to Yasser Arafat because the Palestinian leader was acceptable to Israel. This changed radically when Arafat ceased to be a peace partner. Israel's isolation of the Palestinian leader resulted in the US disengaging from the Palestinian leader. Pro-Arafat Arab countries did nothing to his confinement within his Ramallah compound.

The fate of Hamas will not be different. Its ability to emerge as a player in the Middle East peace process would inevitably require some Israel acquiescence, acceptance and gradual recognition. Without that Hamas will not be able to convert its military attacks against Israel into political dividends. By offering security guarantees to Israel in the form of suspension of Qassam attacks, Hamas could emerge as meaningful political player in the Middle East.

For its part, ensuring civilian security is of paramount importance to Israel rather than ideological rigidity towards dealing with Hamas. If it can rein in and control its rank and file Hamas will find Israel to be its partner. An effective hardliner like Hamas is a rational choice for Israel rather than ineffective moderates like Abbas.

Israel may be less sensitive towards the sufferings of the Palestinians but it is hyper about its own casualties. This will inevitably force Israel to re-examine its policy towards Hamas.

Here the Palestinians are at a great disadvantage. By elevating them as martyrs, Hamas has reduced the Palestinians as a cannon fodder for its suicidal policies. Time has thus come for Hamas to re-examine the efficacy of its military strategy within the context of Palestinian suffering. Palestinians lives should be protected and cherished and not squandered on mindless militant ideology. If it wants the international community to abhor the killing of innocent civilians, the Palestinian leadership, especially the Hamas should start valuing the lives of the Palestinians. The living souls are as valuable as the dead. When they start valuing lives of their own people a bit more seriously, the Israel-Hamas cooperation becomes inevitable.

Gaza crisis

Exodus to catastrophe?

New Indian Express, Chennai, Feb 12, 2008

THE massive humanitarian catastrophe along the Gaza-Egypt border underscores the shortsighted attitude of various Middle Eastern leaders and the apathy of the international community. Literally over half a million Palestinians broke into Egypt, something many had not anticipated. Cornered by prolonged Israeli economic blockade, international isolation and Arab indifference, there were no option before the people of the impoverished the Gaza Strip.

For months the Gaza Strip was like a tightly sealed pressure cooker waiting to explode. The intensification of the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip in mid-January was followed by severe shortage of fuel and food supplies.

Recognising the internal tensions, Hamas literally broke down the fragile barriers with Egypt north of the Rafah crossing and opened the floodgate.

Thousands of Gazans moved into the Sinai Peninsula to buy and stock up basic necessities such as bread.

However, given the magnitude of the human exodus, restoring status quo ante along the Gaza-Egypt border will be easier said than done. With none of the major players having any viable option, "stabilisation" is perhaps the best anyone could hope for, if that is possible.

The crisis once again underscored the limitations of Israel's skewed policy following its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. While pulling out from the Strip enjoyed widespread domestic support, it did not lead to an overall reshaping of Israel's foreign policy priorities. The Gaza pullout should have been followed by a similar withdrawal from large portions of the West Bank. While unilateralism was feasible in the Gaza Strip, any Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian territory in the West Bank would have to be a negotiated arrangement. The tragic stroke suffered by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and inept leadership of Ehud Olmert meant that the Gaza withdrawal became an end in itself. It failed to become a part of a larger Israeli arrangement with the Palestin ian leadership.

Furthermore, as highlighted by the second Lebanon war in the summer of 2006 and the ongoing rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip, Israel has not developed an effective response to militant groups. At one level, Israel cannot afford to expose its citizens to the constant barrage of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip but at the same time, it is unable to go beyond retaliatory strikes that are ineffective.

The electoral victory of Hamas in January 2006 and its taking full control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of last year, meant Israel imposing a virtual embargo upon the nearly million and half Palestinians. When Israel tightened the restrictions, Palestinians broke through the barrier. As some Hamas leaders have warned, next time around Palestinians will flood into Israel, with ominous consequences.

Egypt is equally in a precarious situation. No country could accept such a large-scale uncontrolled movement of foreigners into its territory. What happened in Sinai was a virtual invasion.

Already fighting domestic militants, President Hosni Mubarak does not need another militant-related humanitarian crisis. Having sided with President Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian National Authority over the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, Mubarak has no option but to deal with the Islamic movements to re-establish border control. Even though success cannot be guaranteed, Egypt has very little option other than to re-engage with Hamas.

Progress on border control will heavily depend upon Cairo's ability to offer significant political concessions to Hamas and its preparedness to be a mediator between rival Palestinian factions. Though Mubarak had played such a role in the past, this time around, he would be doing it under duress, necessitated by the Palestinian exodus into Egypt.

At third level, the crisis has undermined the position of Abbas and his extravagant claims of being the sole representative of all Palestinians. Since the Hamas takeover of the Gaza Strip, described by some as coup d'état, Abbas was unable to set foot in the Gaza Strip. Partly aimed at his western audience and supporters, he has scrupulously avoided any negotiations with Hamas.
In recent days Abbas has expressed his willingness to take ‘control' of the Gaza-Egypt border. This is a daydream. This will be possible only if Abbas is able to cooperate with Hamas. Otherwise the recognised Palestinian leadership will be a nonplayer in resolving the Gaza exodus.

Other players are also equally busy.

If the US is in the middle of an intense election campaign, the others have rarely changed anything in the Middle East for the better. As various other regional problems highlighted, the Arab League is reduced to being a talking shop.

Contrary to widespread perception, Hamas also has not come out well. By blowing up the fences, it was able to let go the internal tensions and provided a temporary air to the beleaguered peo ple of the Strip. By forcing Cairo to reengage with it, the group has also obtained some political mileage. The current crisis might also compel President Abbas to reevaluate his refusal to deal with Hamas. These are not insignificant.

But, if one takes a broader look, Hamas has also come out badly from the crisis. Ever since it's electoral victory in January 2006, the organisation has brought more miseries to Palestinians than benefits. While Israeli intransigence and Arab indifferences are crucial, Hamas also cannot escape from its share. Since the Oslo accord of 1993, Hamas has consistently challenged the legitimacy and authority of the Palestinian Authority and its chairman Yasser Arafat. It did all it could to sabotage the peace process.

After the 2006 electoral victory, Hamas sang a different tune: total Palestinian acceptance of its legitimacy, especially on the peace process.

Even the Saudi mediation which resulted in the Mecca accord was insufficient to bridge the internal schisms. Rather than working in tandem with the other groups, especially Fatah, Hamas violently challenged the authority of Abbas and took full control of the Gaza Strip.

Not many would have forgotten masked Hamas militants stamping over the portraits of Arafat when they took over Palestinian offices.

Not only has it refused to negotiate with Israel, Hamas has been continuously launching rockets into Israel, especially at the western Negev town of Sderot. Its refusal to reign in rocket attacks has resulted in Israeli retaliations and economic sanctions, which in turn ended in the Gaza-Egypt crisis. Hamas can divert the attention and blame Israel and others for the problem. But in the long run, it cannot escape the inevitable question: Is Hamas ready to take responsibility and start governing? Without serious soul searching by all major players, the current crisis is a step closer to catastrophe for Palestinian national aspirations.

India and Israeli Satellite

With Israel, is sky the limit?

New Indian Express (Chennai), Tuesday, January 29, 2008

The successful launch of 300 kilogram Israeli satellite on Monday by the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV-C10) from Satish Dawan Space Centre in Sriharikota undoubtedly marks a new stage in the Indo-Israeli relations. Also known as Polaris, TecSar has a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), a radar system which is more advanced than the Ofek generation satellites that Israel currently relies on. This allweather satellite is capable of providing images with a resolution of up to 10 centimetres.

Media reports in Israel were quick to point out that this new spy satellite significantly enhances Israel's intelligence capability and offers a roundthe-clock monitoring of its principal foe in the Middle East, the Islamic Republic of Iran. With its lingering suspicions over Iran's nuclear ambition, the launch could not have come at a better time for Israel.

For the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), Polaris is a vindication of growing international confidence in its ability to successfully place satellites in orbit. Not long ago, it placed an Italian satellite in orbit and the Indian space industry is keen to corner a significant portion of this growing market. With only a handful of countries capable of launching satellites, the market is rather lucrative and aspires to earn about Rs 750 crores before the current financial year ends in March.

The issue however, is not as straightforward as some would like to believe.

Launching of satellite, especially spy satellites, is never a simple commercial transaction, more so, if it involves Israel.

The pre-launch publicity which is normally associated with the ISRO was conspicuous by its absence. As one keen media observer noted, the formal announcement was made not by the space agency but Antrix, the marketing and commercial arm of the ISRO.

The launch was originally slated for late last year but had to be postponed a few times. While space officials attribute this to "technical difficulties" and weather, media reports suggest that the delay was due to intense "political pressures" from the Gulf countries.

No country is however, formally named. Given the tacit political understanding that exists between them and the Jewish State, the Arab countries are unlikely to lose their sleep over an Israeli spy satellite. Indeed some of the smaller countries like Qatar and United Arab Emirates (UAE) have unpublicised low-level Israeli representations on their soil. Hence, it is safe to assume that such pressures, if real, could have come primarily from Iran.

Not known for its restraint, the Israeli media was quick to flag the Iran ian angle. Unnamed Israeli officials were quoted as saying that the Polaris gives "Israel the capability to keep an eye on the Iranian nuclear programme." In the light of the tension and war of words between Israel and Iran, such statements are bound to paint India as an active collaborator in Israel's military strategy vis-à-vis Iran.

Put simply, should Israel resort to a military option against Iran's nuclear installations in future, Polaris would be pivotal. Perhaps it was due to this consideration that the launch was surrounded with secrecy.

Second, though the space agency might present it as a commercial enterprise, India's participation in the Polaris highlight India's growing military-intelligence cooperation with Israel. Spy satellites are often clear political signals. Through the launch India also signals its growing confi dence in forging security partnership with Israel. Since the relations were established in January 1992, military relations primarily benefited India.

Through arms sales and upgrading of aging Soviet weapons, Israel significantly contributed to the Indian military establishment. For its part Israel benefited economically.

The satellite launch marks a new phase and indicates India's willingness to play an active part towards Israeli security calculations. By enabling Israel acquire real-time intelligence over its adversaries India is enhancing Israel's security.

Three, the launch should not be seen in isolation. Last July the Cabinet Committee on Security approved a $2.5 billion project for the development of missiles capable of intercepting aircraft and other aerial targets. To be undertaken jointly by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and Israel Aerospace Industries, this was a marked improvement in India's security ties with Israel.

From the erstwhile the cash-and-carry approach, New Delhi took a quantum leap towards joint defence research.

Four, the launch was also a subtle but firm message of the UPA government to the coalition partners, especially to the Left parties. Since the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada by the Palestinians in September 2000, the Left has been highly critical of the bilateral relations. When the BJP was in power, it even depicted them a part of the anti-Muslim agenda of hindut va. Hence, after Manmohan Singh became Prime Minister in May 2004, the Left parties were demanding "a course correction" and the freezing of all military-security ties with Israel.

Not only did the UPA government not oblige the Left, but it has also taken bilateral relations to a higher level.

Joint missile defence and Polaris launch are a part of its willing to consolidate is military-security ties with Israel, despite the Left. Unlike the NDA, the UPA government is more transparent in disclosing its military transactions with Israel. Furthermore, such actions challenge the argument that the Indo-Israeli relations are a part of the anti-Muslim agenda. When the Cong party which is conscious of its Muslim support base is seeking military cooperation with Israel, the antiMuslim rationale depicted by the Left becomes impossible to sustain.

The launch, however, could generate some criticisms, concerns and negative reactions. Given the Israeli rhetoric, Iran is bound to react strongly. Some in Tehran might even accuse New Delhi of joining hands with the "Little Satan", the ayatollahs favourite expression for the Jewish state. As happened following India's vote in IAEA in September 2005, Iran might link the spy satellite to ongoing price negotiations over energy supplies. Despites its own problems with the ayatollahs, Egypt which is yet to come to terms with the Indo-Israeli normalisation, might join the chorus.

Other countries however, would not be blind towards the larger realities. India's bilateral relations with the Gulf countries are independent of Israel and vice-versa. Put it differently, Israel will not be able to address India's energy security and the Arab world can't address India's military security.

As the ISRO Chief Madhavan Nair aptly described, the Polaris is "a landmark event." But definitely not for the technical finesse of the launch.

India Sril Lanka

Lanka & the Lakshman Rekha

New Indian Express, (Chennai), January 18, 2008, Friday.

SCHEDULING problems. That is how Prime Minister Manmohan Singh opted to resolve the controversy surrounding his anticipated visit to Colombo for the 60th Independence Day celebrations of Sri Lanka on February 4. The disappointment in Colombo was understandable especially when the Indian leader was expected to be the chief guest.

Since becoming President in November 2005, Mahinda Rajapakse has visited India thrice; two state visits in December 2005 and November 2006 and the summit meeting of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in April 2007. Manmohan Singh who was happy to host him, however, had to operate under different sets of constraints.

India is yet to come to terms with its bitter experience vis-a-vis its southern neighbour. If the ill-conceived Indo-Sri Lankan Accord of 1987 and the subsequently deployment of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to fight the Tamil Tigers were not sufficient, the brutal assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by a female suicide bomber in 1991, virtually ended India’s involvement in the Lankan civil war. By encouraging Norwegian mediation, New Delhi has largely washed its hands off the long standing conflict.

As the current head of the SAARC, the Indian leader would be making an official visit to Colombo before handing over the responsibility to the latter. But to participate in such a visible event like the Independence Day celebrations was not something that India could contemplate easily.

Yet, New Delhi cannot ignore the Sri Lankan policy towards the ethnic conflict. Despite the costly war and human losses, Colombo has not formally abandoned the military option. It is hopeful of 'resolving' the problem by eliminating the cadres of Tamil Tigers. Media speculation about the health and welfare of LTTE supremo V Prabhakaran is part of this military option.

New Delhi should also remind Colombo that even if a complete military 'victory' over LTTE, if that is ever possible, will not resolve the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka. Tamil militancy gained prominence because of the systematic marginalisation of the Tamil minorities and not the other way around. One Muttiah Muralitharan or Lakshman Kadirgamar does not make Sri Lanka as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural republic.

Secondly, New Delhi’s avoidance of a mediatory role and its desire for good neighbourliness should not imply that India is turning a blind eye to the destruction of innocent civilians, especially women and children, by the Lankan army. Because such violence evokes strong resentment and public anger within the country, New Delhi will have to abandon its deep slumber over Sri Lanka.

However, if it wants to avoid revisiting the saga of the 1980s, New Delhi has to draw its Lakshman rekha not only vis-a-vis Colombo but also vis-a-vis Chennai.

The events of the 1980s were also a reminder of the tensions within India's foreign policy: conflicting perceptions, one might even say interest, between New Delhi and Chennai visא-a-vis Sri Lanka. The ethno-national links with Sri Lankan Tamils play out strongly in the Tamil Nadu politics. Driven by narrow worldview and electoral calculations, many have turned a blind eye to blatant act of terrorism pursued by the Tamil militants or the widespread presence of child soldiers in their ranks. With the result, not many were abhorred by widespread fratricide and elimination of prominent non-LTTE personalities.

While Rajiv's assassination was a setback, pro-Tiger sentiments are still visible. Thus, even while being Chief Minister M Karunanidhi could openly eulogise a slain LTTE leader, without New Delhi making a murmur. All said and done, technically S P Tamilselvan was a member of a banned 'terrorist organisation' for its suspected involvement in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination. Surviving on the support of the 39 MPs from the state, however, the ruling UPA does not have the stomach to annoy the Dravidian leader. The political compulsions of the state thus, are so strong and paradoxical that pro-LTTE and anti- LTTE forces often co-exist amicably; just as J Jayalalithaa is happy with pro-LTTE Vaiko the Congress survives on the DMK.

It is time, New Delhi draws its Lakshman rekha vis-a-vis the politicians of Tamil Nadu, especially those members of the UPA coalition. As a democratic country India would have to listen, accommodate and reflect concerns and aspirations of all segments of the population. The right of different groups to influence policy is a pre-condition for democracy. A contrary view regarding the rights of different ethnic, religious, linguistic and political groups would mean end of democracy in India.

Such a right is also essential in the foreign policy arena. Strong ethnocultural heritage and linkages have enabled a number of groups to articulate stands vis-a-vis certain aspects of Indian foreign policy.

The Bengali elite for example, wield considerable influence upon India's policy towards Bangladesh. Same is true for Kashmiris vis-a-vis Pakistan. As publicly stated by the Prime Minister in September 2005, India's policy towards Iran has a Shia component.

Similarly, the people of Tamil Nadu who share strong ethno-national and linguistic heritage and affinity with the Tamils of Sri Lanka, has an inherent right and duty to influence India's policy regarding Colombo, especially over the ethnic conflict. A contrary position will be untenable in a democracy. Hence, despite the lame excuse of 'scheduling problem' it is widely recognised that the reluctance of Manmohan Singh to visit the island republic at this juncture is primarily due to pressures and demands from his coalition partners, especially the DMK and its allies.

As a democracy, New Delhi cannot ignore the concerns of various ethnic, national and religious groups while formulating its foreign policy. At the same time, it is essential to recognise that interests and positions of a particular group will not always be in sync with wider national interest.

As with corporate lobbying, ethno- national groups would advocate positions which are not beneficial to the larger society and this is true for Tamil politics.

While Singh's visit would have strengthened the position of President Rajapakse, it would also be interpreted as a sign of Indian endorsement of the military option and the Lankan abrogation of the ceasefire agreement with the LTTE. Hence, not going to Colombo is the best option, despite the stated reasons.

At the same time, Singh will not be able to put off visiting Sri Lanka forever, especially with Colombo hosting the SAARC summit later this year. So, pressures from Chennai will resurface.

Many in the state would see electoral dividends from the stronger Indian stand towards Sri Lanka. The active involvement and eventual intervention in Sri Lanka in the 1980s were the result of New Delhi accepting the demands of the leaders of Tamil Nadu.

Driven by emotions, the political forces in the state pushed for a course that eventually proved disastrous for all. One should at least learn from the past. Put it differently, Chennai can influence but not set New Delhi's agenda regarding Colombo. Even geography says it: Sri Lanka is east of Tamil Nadu but south of New Delhi.

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